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Author: Eric Emch
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Affinity credit cards
Languages : en
Pages : 48
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Book Description
Author: Eric Emch
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Affinity credit cards
Languages : en
Pages : 48
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Book Description
Author: Paul Belleflamme
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1108625622
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 275
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Book Description
Digital platforms controlled by Alibaba, Alphabet, Amazon, Facebook, Netflix, Tencent and Uber have transformed not only the ways we do business, but also the very nature of people's everyday lives. It is of vital importance that we understand the economic principles governing how these platforms operate. This book explains the driving forces behind any platform business with a focus on network effects. The authors use short case studies and real-world applications to explain key concepts such as how platforms manage network effects and which price and non-price strategies they choose. This self-contained text is the first to offer a systematic and formalized account of what platforms are and how they operate, concisely incorporating path-breaking insights in economics over the last twenty years.
Author: Adriaan Ten Kate
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
This is a ready-to-read version of my previous paper 'Deciphering the Two-Sided Market Model of Rochet and Tirole'. It blows away the smokescreen of logical disorder, incoherent language and mathematical sophistication of the original article by rephrasing the model in clear language, spelling out the underlying assumptions explicitly and analyzing their implications. It turns out that the model captures a reality much narrower than pretended by the authors and that the findings are surprisingly unsurprising. They are supposed to be typical for two-sided markets, but the outcomes are not really different from what is found for complementary products in ordinary markets. Moreover, the key insights, claimed to be derived from those findings, are unrelated to them. Although the story told around the model is quite interesting by itself, there is hardly any value added in the modeling exercise.
Author: Martin Grossmann
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 23
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Book Description
In this article, we analyze the dynamic competition between two platform firms (A&B) in two-sided markets with network externalities. In Period 1, platform A or B wins the contest in a first stage and can serve the two-sided market monopolistically in a second stage. In Period 2, the two platforms carry over previous investments to a subsequent contest in a first stage, and the winner (A or B) serves the market monopolistically in a second stage. We show that a head start of one platform does not guarantee future success. The combination of cost advantages and network externalities affects the platforms' success. Moreover, a market dominance of a platform does not necessarily result in higher profits.
Author: Michael A. Cusumano
Publisher: HarperCollins
ISBN: 0062896334
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 320
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Book Description
A trio of experts on high-tech business strategy and innovation reveal the principles that have made platform businesses the most valuable firms in the world and the first trillion-dollar companies. Managers and entrepreneurs in the digital era must learn to live in two worlds—the conventional economy and the platform economy. Platforms that operate for business purposes usually exist at the level of an industry or ecosystem, bringing together individuals and organizations so they can innovate and interact in ways not otherwise possible. Platforms create economic value far beyond what we see in conventional companies. The Business of Platforms is an invaluable, in-depth look at platform strategy and digital innovation. Cusumano, Gawer, and Yoffie address how a small number of companies have come to exert extraordinary influence over every dimension of our personal, professional, and political lives. They explain how these new entities differ from the powerful corporations of the past. They also question whether there are limits to the market dominance and expansion of these digital juggernauts. Finally, they discuss the role governments should play in rethinking data privacy laws, antitrust, and other regulations that could reign in abuses from these powerful businesses. Their goal is to help managers and entrepreneurs build platform businesses that can stand the test of time and win their share of battles with both digital and conventional competitors. As experts who have studied and worked with these firms for some thirty years, this book is the most authoritative and timely investigation yet of the powerful economic and technological forces that make platform businesses, from Amazon and Apple to Microsoft, Facebook, and Google—all dominant players in shaping the global economy, the future of work, and the political world we now face.
Author: Jay Hyun
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
In light of recent trends in social networking services that encourage users of platforms to “share,” “recommend,” and “do activities” with others, this work analyzes platform competition in two-sided markets that exhibit direct (or within-) network effect in addition to conventional cross-network effect. Introduction of direct network effect to one group (buyer-side) in a two-sided market generates two counter-acting effects: demand-augmenting effect and demand-sensitizing effect. The former allows platforms to raise buyer-side price, thereby increasing the sum of prices charged to buyers and sellers, whereas the latter causes platforms to lower them. I show that demand-augmenting effect dominates demand-sensitizing effect under the monopoly platform, whereas introducing competition between platforms under sufficient direct network effect relatively strengthens the demand- sensitizing effect, which lowers the price charged to buyers.
Author: Richard Schmalensee
Publisher: North Holland
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 1002
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Book Description
Determinants of firm and market organization; Analysis of market behavior; Empirical methods and results; International issues and comparision; government intervention in the Marketplace.
Author: William J. Baumol
Publisher: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt P
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 578
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Book Description
Author: Jens-Uwe Franck
Publisher: Centre on Regulation in Europe asbl (CERRE)
ISBN:
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 96
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Book Description
With the rise of digital platforms and the natural tendency of markets involving platforms to become concentrated, competition authorities and courts are more frequently in a position to investigate and decide merger and abuse cases that involve platforms. This report provides guidance on how to define markets and on how to assess market power when dealing with two-sided platforms. DEFINITION Competition authorities and courts are well advised to uniformly use a multi-markets approach when defining markets in the context of two-sided platforms. The multi-markets approach is the more flexible instrument compared to the competing single-market approach that defines a single market for both sides of a platform, as the former naturally accounts for different substitution possibilities by the user groups on the two sides of the platform. While one might think of conditions under which a single-market approach could be feasible, the necessary conditions are so severe that it would only be applicable under rare circumstances. To fully appreciate business activities in platform markets from a competition law point of view, and to do justice to competition law’s purpose, which is to protect consumer welfare, the legal concept of a “market” should not be interpreted as requiring a price to be paid by one party to the other. It is not sufficient to consider the activities on the “unpaid side” of the platform only indirectly by way of including them in the competition law analysis of the “paid side” of the platform. Such an approach would exclude certain activities and ensuing positive or negative effects on consumer welfare altogether from the radar of competition law. Instead, competition practice should recognize straightforwardly that there can be “markets” for products offered free of charge, i.e. without monetary consideration by those who receive the product. ASSESSMENT The application of competition law often requires an assessment of market power. Using market shares as indicators of market power, in addition to all the difficulties in standard markets, raises further issues for two-sided platforms. When calculating revenue shares, the only reasonable option is to use the sum of revenues on all sides of the platform. Then, such shares should not be interpreted as market shares as they are aggregated over two interdependent markets. Large revenue shares appear to be a meaningful indicator of market power if all undertakings under consideration serve the same sides. However, they are often not meaningful if undertakings active in the relevant markets follow different business models. Given potentially strong cross-group external effects, market shares are less apt in the context of two-sided platforms to indicate market power (or the lack of it). Barriers to entry are at the core of persistent market power and, thus, the entrenchment of incumbent platforms. They deserve careful examination by competition authorities. Barriers to entry may arise due to users’ coordination failure in the presence of network effect. On two-sided platforms, users on both sides of the market have to coordinate their expectations. Barriers to entry are more likely to be present if an industry does not attract new users and if it does not undergo major technological change. Switching costs and network effects may go hand in hand: consumer switching costs sometimes depend on the number of platform users and, in this case, barriers to entry from consumer switching costs increase with platform size. Since market power is related to barriers to entry, the absence of entry attempts may be seen as an indication of market power. However, entry threats may arise from firms offering quite different services, as long as they provide a new home for users’ attention and needs.
Author: Jean-Charles Rochet
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Markets
Languages : en
Pages : 47
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Book Description
