Personalized Pricing when Consumers Can Purchase Multiple Items

Personalized Pricing when Consumers Can Purchase Multiple Items PDF Author: Qiuyu Lu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
We discuss the effect of personalized pricing on profits and welfare in a Hotelling model in which consumers can simultaneously purchase from both firms. As the additional gain from the second purchase increases, personalized pricing is more likely to harm (resp., benefit) consumers (resp., firms). If the additional gain is interme- diate, personalized pricing improves consumer welfare and firms' profits, contrasting with the standard result: personalized pricing benefits consumers but harms firms. When firms can choose one of the pricing policies: uniform or personalized, both choose uniform (resp., personalized) pricing under some parameters (resp., in any case); multiple equilibria can co-exist.

Personalized Pricing when Consumers Can Purchase Multiple Items

Personalized Pricing when Consumers Can Purchase Multiple Items PDF Author: Qiuyu Lu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
We discuss the effect of personalized pricing on profits and welfare in a Hotelling model in which consumers can simultaneously purchase from both firms. As the additional gain from the second purchase increases, personalized pricing is more likely to harm (resp., benefit) consumers (resp., firms). If the additional gain is interme- diate, personalized pricing improves consumer welfare and firms' profits, contrasting with the standard result: personalized pricing benefits consumers but harms firms. When firms can choose one of the pricing policies: uniform or personalized, both choose uniform (resp., personalized) pricing under some parameters (resp., in any case); multiple equilibria can co-exist.

Personalized Pricing and Consumer Welfare

Personalized Pricing and Consumer Welfare PDF Author: Jean-Pierre Dubé
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
We study the welfare implications of personalized pricing, an extreme form of third-degree price discrimination implemented with machine learning for a large, digital firm. Using data from a unique randomized controlled pricing field experiment we train a demand model and conduct inference about the effects of personalized pricing on firm and consumer surplus. In a second experiment, we validate our predictions in the field. The initial experiment reveals unexercised market power that allows the firm to raise its price optimally, generating a 55% increase in profits. Personalized pricing improves the firm's expected posterior profits by an additional 19%, relative to the optimized uniform price, and by 86%, relative to the firm's unoptimized status quo price. Turning to welfare effects on the demand side, total consumer surplus declines 23% under personalized pricing relative to uniform pricing, and 47% relative to the firm's unoptimized status quo price. However, over 60% of consumers benefit from lower prices under personalization and total welfare can increase under standard inequity-averse welfare functions. Simulations with our demand estimates reveal a non-monotonic relationship between the granularity of the segmentation data and the total consumer surplus under personalization. These findings indicate a need for caution in the current public policy debate regarding data privacy and personalized pricing insofar as some data restrictions may not per se improve consumer welfare.

Personalized Pricing with Imperfect Customer Recognition

Personalized Pricing with Imperfect Customer Recognition PDF Author: Stefano Colombo
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
We consider a duopoly model where firms can identify only a share of consumers, which is positively correlated with the consumer' preferences. Firms charge personalized prices to the consumers they can recognize and a uniform price to the rest of consumers. The firms' available information is given by the combination of two factors: the intensive margin, which determines the share of consumers the firms can recognize in each single location, and the extensive margin, which determines how many locations the firms can identify. Different market configurations emerge according to the size of these margins. We characterize the values of the intensive and extensive margins that maximize firms' profits, and we show that profits are non-monotonic. We also show that the composition, in addition to the size, of the available information - i.e., the mix of these margins - affects firms' profits significantly. Implications for regulatory policies concerning the protection of consumers' information are finally discussed.

Personalized Pricing and Quality Customization

Personalized Pricing and Quality Customization PDF Author: Anindya Ghose
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 50

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Book Description
We embed the principal-agent model in a model of spatial differentiation with correlated consumer preferences to investigate the competitive implications of personalized pricing and quality allocation (PPQ), whereby duopoly firms charge different prices and offer different qualities to different consumers, based on their willingness-to-pay. Our model sheds light on the equilibrium product-line pricing and quality schedules offered by firms, given that none, one, or both firms implement PPQ. The adoption of PPQ has three effects in our model: it enables firms to extract higher rents from loyal customers, intensifies price competition for non-loyal customers, and eliminates cannibalization from customer self-selection. Contrary to prior literature on one-to-one marketing and price discrimination, we show that even symmetric firms can avoid the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma problem when they engage in personalized pricing and quality customization. When both firms have PPQ, consumer surplus is non-monotonic in valuations such that some low valuation consumers get higher surplus than high valuation consumers. The adoption of PPQ can reduce information asymmetry, and therefore sellers offer higher quality products after the adoption of PPQ. Overall, we find that while the simultaneous adoption of PPQ generally improves total social welfare and firm profits, it decreases total consumer surplus.

Behavior-based Personalized Pricing when Firms Can Share Customer Information

Behavior-based Personalized Pricing when Firms Can Share Customer Information PDF Author: Chongwoo Choe
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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Book Description
We study a model of behavior-based price discrimination where firms can agree to share customer information that can be used for personalized pricing. We show that firms are better off sharing customer information as it softens up-front competition when they gather information, consumers are worse off as a result, but total surplus can increase thanks to the improved quality of matching between firms and consumers.

Dynamic Personalized Pricing with Active Consumers

Dynamic Personalized Pricing with Active Consumers PDF Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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Book Description


Behavioral Consequences of Dynamic Pricing

Behavioral Consequences of Dynamic Pricing PDF Author: David Prakash
Publisher: BoD – Books on Demand
ISBN: 3754359932
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 156

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Book Description
Digital technologies are driving the application of dynamic pricing. Today, this pricing strategy is used not only for perishable products such as flights or hotel rooms, but for almost any product or service category. With dynamic pricing, retailers frequently adjust their prices over time to respond to factors such as demand, their supply and that of competitors, or the time of sale. Additionally, dynamic pricing allows retailers to take advantage of a large share of consumers' willingness to pay while avoiding losses from unsold products. Ultimately, this can lead to an increase in revenue and profit. However, the application of dynamic pricing comes with great challenges. In addition to the technological implementation, companies have to take into account that dynamic pricing can cause complex and unintended behavioral consequences on the consumer side. The key objective of this dissertation is to provide a deeper understanding of the impact of dynamic pricing on consumer behavior. To this end, this dissertation presents insights from four perspectives. First, how reference prices as a critical component in purchase decisions are operationalized. Second, how customers search for products priced dynamically, differentiated by business and private customers, as well as by different devices used for the search. Third, whether and how dynamic pricing influences the impact of internal reference prices on purchase decisions. Finally, this dissertation demonstrates that consumers perceive price changes as personalized in different purchase contexts, leading to reduced perceptions of fairness and undesirable behavioral consequences.

Competitive Personalized Pricing

Competitive Personalized Pricing PDF Author: Zhijun Chen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 51

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Book Description
We study a duopoly model where each firm chooses personalized prices for its targeted consumers, who can be active or passive in identity management. Active consumers can bypass price discrimination and have access to the price offered to non-targeted consumers, which passive consumers cannot. When all consumers are passive, personalized pricing leads to intense competition and total industry profit lower than that under the Hoteling equilibrium. But market is always fully covered. Active consumers raise the firm's cost of serving non-targeted consumers, which softens competition. When firms have sufficiently large and non-overlapping target segments, active consumers enable firms to extract full surplus from their targeted consumers through perfect price discrimination. With active consumers, firms also choose not to serve the entire market when the commonly non-targeted market segment is small. Thus active identity management can lead to lower consumer surplus and lower social welfare. We also discuss the regulatory implications for the use of consumer information by firms as well as the implications for management.

Consumer Viewpoint on Personalized Pricing

Consumer Viewpoint on Personalized Pricing PDF Author: Sr Sarmento
Publisher: Publishers
ISBN: 9781805285656
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
"Consumer Viewpoint on Personalized Pricing" is a thought-provoking book authored by Sr Sarmento. The book explores the complex issue of personalized pricing, where companies tailor prices based on consumer data such as their browsing history, demographics, and purchase behavior. The book provides a comprehensive analysis of this controversial practice, its implications on consumer behavior, and the ethical considerations surrounding it. The book starts by defining personalized pricing and discussing its evolution from traditional pricing methods. It then delves into the various forms of personalized pricing, such as dynamic pricing, surge pricing, and discriminatory pricing. The author discusses the pros and cons of each type and how they affect consumers' purchasing decisions. The book then addresses the ethical concerns surrounding personalized pricing. The author argues that companies must ensure that personalized pricing is fair and transparent, and consumers should have the right to access their data and control how it's used. The book also explores the potential for personalized pricing to exacerbate existing social inequalities, such as discriminating against low-income consumers or marginalized groups. Throughout the book, the author presents various real-life examples of personalized pricing and how consumers have responded to them. The author also discusses how technology has made personalized pricing more prevalent and sophisticated, raising questions about privacy and data protection. In conclusion, "Consumer Viewpoint on Personalized Pricing" is a must-read book for anyone interested in the intersection of business, technology, and ethics. The author's writing is engaging and accessible, making it suitable for both academics and the general public. The book provides a balanced view of personalized pricing, acknowledging its potential benefits while also highlighting the need for transparency and fairness. Overall, it's an insightful and thought-provoking read that will leave readers questioning the impact of personalized pricing on our society.

Personalized Pricing and Distribution Strategies

Personalized Pricing and Distribution Strategies PDF Author: Bruno Jullien
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 64

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Book Description
The availability of consumer data is inducing a growing number of firms to adopt more personalized pricing policies. This affects both the performance of, and the competition between alternative distribution channels, which in turn has implications for firms' distribution strategies. We develop a formal model to examine a brand manufacturer's choice between mono distribution (selling only through its own direct channel) or dual distribution (selling through an independent retailer as well). We consider different demand patterns, covering both horizontal and vertical differentiation and different pricing regimes, with the manufacturer and retailer each charging personalized prices or a uniform price. We show that dual distribution is optimal for a large number of cases. In particular, this is always the case when the channels are horizontally differentiated, regardless of the pricing regime; moreover, if both firms charge personalized prices, a well-designed wholesale tariff allows them to extract the entire consumer surplus. These insights obtained here for the case of intra-brand competition between vertically related firms are thus in stark contrast to those obtained for inter-brand competition, where personalized pricing dissipates industry profit. With vertical differentiation, dual distribution remains optimal if the manufacturer charges a uniform price. By contrast, under personalized pricing mono distribution can be optimal when the retailer does not expand demand sufficiently. Interestingly, the industry profit may be largest in a hybrid pricing regime, in which the manufacturer forgoes the use of personalized pricing and only the retailer charges personalized prices.