Optimal Unemployment Insurance

Optimal Unemployment Insurance PDF Author: Andreas Pollak
Publisher: Mohr Siebeck
ISBN: 9783161493041
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 204

Get Book Here

Book Description
Designing a good unemployment insurance scheme is a delicate matter. In a system with no or little insurance, households may be subject to a high income risk, whereas excessively generous unemployment insurance systems are known to lead to high unemployment rates and are costly both from a fiscal perspective and for society as a whole. Andreas Pollak investigates what an optimal unemployment insurance system would look like, i.e. a system that constitutes the best possible compromise between income security and incentives to work. Using theoretical economic models and complex numerical simulations, he studies the effects of benefit levels and payment durations on unemployment and welfare. As the models allow for considerable heterogeneity of households, including a history-dependent labor productivity, it is possible to analyze how certain policies affect individuals in a specific age, wealth or skill group. The most important aspect of an unemployment insurance system turns out to be the benefits paid to the long-term unemployed. If this parameter is chosen too high, a large number of households may get caught in a long spell of unemployment with little chance of finding work again. Based on the predictions in these models, the so-called "Hartz IV" labor market reform recently adopted in Germany should have highly favorable effects on the unemployment rates and welfare in the long run.

Optimal Unemployment Insurance

Optimal Unemployment Insurance PDF Author: Andreas Pollak
Publisher: Mohr Siebeck
ISBN: 9783161493041
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 204

Get Book Here

Book Description
Designing a good unemployment insurance scheme is a delicate matter. In a system with no or little insurance, households may be subject to a high income risk, whereas excessively generous unemployment insurance systems are known to lead to high unemployment rates and are costly both from a fiscal perspective and for society as a whole. Andreas Pollak investigates what an optimal unemployment insurance system would look like, i.e. a system that constitutes the best possible compromise between income security and incentives to work. Using theoretical economic models and complex numerical simulations, he studies the effects of benefit levels and payment durations on unemployment and welfare. As the models allow for considerable heterogeneity of households, including a history-dependent labor productivity, it is possible to analyze how certain policies affect individuals in a specific age, wealth or skill group. The most important aspect of an unemployment insurance system turns out to be the benefits paid to the long-term unemployed. If this parameter is chosen too high, a large number of households may get caught in a long spell of unemployment with little chance of finding work again. Based on the predictions in these models, the so-called "Hartz IV" labor market reform recently adopted in Germany should have highly favorable effects on the unemployment rates and welfare in the long run.

Optimal Unemployment Insurance Requirements

Optimal Unemployment Insurance Requirements PDF Author: Gustavo de Souza
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

Get Book Here

Book Description


Optimal Unemployment Insurance

Optimal Unemployment Insurance PDF Author: Carl Davidson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Unemployment insurance
Languages : en
Pages : 64

Get Book Here

Book Description


Optimal Unemployment Insurance in a Matching Equilibrium

Optimal Unemployment Insurance in a Matching Equilibrium PDF Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

Get Book Here

Book Description


Modelling Unemployment Insurance

Modelling Unemployment Insurance PDF Author: Paola Potestio
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 3030913198
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 182

Get Book Here

Book Description
This book examines unemployment insurance policy through a survey, taking stock of the theoretical work in the field of labor economics. It closely follows and assesses developments in the modelling of optimal unemployment insurance (UI) policies, beginning with the initial analytical findings produced in the second half of the 1970s. A main part of the survey is devoted to the two basic strands of analysis about, respectively, the optimal level of UI benefits and the optimal time profile of UI policy. The book has two different objectives. The first is to provide an essential summary of the individual models, with the intention of underscoring how a number of specific messages for the policy-maker can be derived from analytical constructions. It further emphasizes and comments on what the models deliver to UI policy-makers. The second objective is to stress the importance and extension of open questions in the field of the theoretical approach to the unemployment insurance issue. The survey discusses the multiplicity of heterogeneities of the labor world in particular as relevant for UI issues on the one side, and on the other hand, the independence of the two basic choices of UI policy, its meaning and its limits, and the possible forms of complementarity between these choices. The book is a must-read for researchers, students, and policy-makers interested in a better understanding of the field of labor economics in general, as well as unemployment insurance policies in particular.

Optimal Unemployment Insurance when Income Effects are Large

Optimal Unemployment Insurance when Income Effects are Large PDF Author: Raj Chetty
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Unemployed
Languages : en
Pages : 56

Get Book Here

Book Description
Studies of the consumption-smoothing benefits of unemployment insurance (UI) have found that the optimal benefit level is very small, perhaps even 0, for conventional levels of risk aversion. In this paper, I derive a formula for the optimal benefit rate in terms of income and price elasticities of unemployment durations, directly inferring risk aversion for the unemployed from their behavioral responses to UI benefits. The optimal rate of social insurance is shown to depend positively on the size of the income elasticity and negatively on the size of the substitution elasticity. I estimate these elasticities using semi-parametric hazard models and variation in UI laws across states and over time. The estimates indicate that income effects account for 70% of the effect of UI on unemployment durations, and yield an optimal replacement rate around 50% of pre-unemployment wages. These results challenge the prevailing view that social safety nets provide minimal welfare gains at a large efficiency cost.

Income Contingent Loans

Income Contingent Loans PDF Author: Timothy Higgins
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 1137413204
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 312

Get Book Here

Book Description
This study explores the prospect of the application of the basic principles of ICL into many other potential areas of social and economic policy. Using case studies it evaluates previously implemented ICL schemes where interest rate subsidies are usually the norm, and questions the merits of this approach.

The Armchair Economist

The Armchair Economist PDF Author: Steven E. Landsburg
Publisher: Simon and Schuster
ISBN: 1471112233
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 364

Get Book Here

Book Description
Air bags cause accidents, because well-protected drivers take more risks. This well-documented truth comes as a surprise to most people, but not to economists, who have learned to take seriously the proposition that people respond to incentives. In The Armchair Economist, Steven E. Landsburg shows how the laws of economics reveal themselves in everyday experience and illuminate the entire range of human behavior. Why does popcorn cost so much at the cinema? The 'obvious' answer is that the owner has a monopoly, but if that were the whole story, there would also be a monopoly price to use the toilet. When a sudden frost destroys much of the Florida orange crop and prices skyrocket, journalists point to the 'obvious' exercise of monopoly power. Economists see just the opposite: If growers had monopoly power, they'd have raised prices before the frost. Why don't concert promoters raise ticket prices even when they are sure they will sell out months in advance? Why are some goods sold at auction and others at pre-announced prices? Why do boxes at the football sell out before the standard seats do? Why are bank buildings fancier than supermarkets? Why do corporations confer huge pensions on failed executives? Why don't firms require workers to buy their jobs? Landsburg explains why the obvious answers are wrong, reveals better answers, and illuminates the fundamental laws of human behavior along the way. This is a book of surprises: a guided tour of the familiar, filtered through a decidedly unfamiliar lens. This is economics for the sheer intellectual joy of it.

Unemployment Insurance Reform

Unemployment Insurance Reform PDF Author: David E. Balducchi
Publisher: W.E. Upjohn Institute
ISBN: 0880996528
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 247

Get Book Here

Book Description
The Unemployment Insurance (UI) system is a lasting piece of the Social Security Act which was enacted in 1935. But like most things that are over 80 years old, it occasionally needs maintenance to keep it operating smoothly while keeping up with the changing demands placed upon it. However, the UI system has been ignored by policymakers for decades and, say the authors, it is broken, out of date, and badly in need of repair. Stephen A. Wandner pulls together a group of UI researchers, each with decades of experience, who describe the weaknesses in the current system and propose policy reforms that they say would modernize the system and prepare us for the next recession.

Optimal Unemployment Insurance for Older Workers

Optimal Unemployment Insurance for Older Workers PDF Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

Get Book Here

Book Description