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Languages : en
Pages : 127
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Book Description
Project CHECO was established in 1962 to document and analyze air operations in Southeast Asia. Over the years the meaning of the acronym changed several times to reflect the escalation of operations: Current Historical Evaluation of Counterinsurgency Operations, Contemporary Historical Evaluation of Combat Operations and Contemporary Historical Examination of Current Operations. Project CHECO and other U. S. Air Force Historical study programs provided the Air Force with timely and lasting corporate insights into operational, conceptual and doctrinal lessons from the war in SEA.
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 127
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Book Description
Project CHECO was established in 1962 to document and analyze air operations in Southeast Asia. Over the years the meaning of the acronym changed several times to reflect the escalation of operations: Current Historical Evaluation of Counterinsurgency Operations, Contemporary Historical Evaluation of Combat Operations and Contemporary Historical Examination of Current Operations. Project CHECO and other U. S. Air Force Historical study programs provided the Air Force with timely and lasting corporate insights into operational, conceptual and doctrinal lessons from the war in SEA.
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Languages : en
Pages : 127
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This CHECO study deals extensively with military efforts made in the latter part of 1966 to pacify northern Binh Dinh Province, one of the most populated and heavily-contested areas of the country. The struggle for Binh Dinh Province began seriously in December 1964, when the Viet Cong made battalion-sized attacks for the first time. They moved into the An Lao Valley, captured two Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) fortified positions, and remained despite extensive air attacks and counter-operations. This enemy initiative, an escalation in fact, which was later revealed as part of a plan to cut South Vietnam in half along Highway 19, played a major part in the United States' decision to raise its level of participation in the year. Some two and a half years later, the struggle. for control of this area is continuing with definite signs of progress as indicated in this report. Nevertheless, the fact that this important area, where the U.S. has launched a major military effort, still is not secure, underscores the painstaking military approach required in the unique fighting of Vietnam. airpower is an essential element of this approach and was used extensively, but, it, too, cannot be expected to produce sudden, dramatic, finite results any more than the search-and-clear ground operations they support. This hard reality, the recognition of a long and difficult military task against a resilient and determined enemy, must be kept in mind in reading this study. This study has greater detail than previous battle studies to provide a more complete environmental background in which the air role can be placed in perspective. This same treatment will be given in later studies to extended operations in other geographic areas.
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Languages : en
Pages : 40
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The scenario of Operation HICKORY called for a multipronged assault into the DMZ, with forces of the 3rd Marine Division and Vietnamese Army (ARVN) units striking north into the heart of the lowland area, and a Marine landing force sweeping in from the eastern coast. Air support for the Marine units, including the landing force (SLF Alpha), was to be provided by the Marine tactical air arm, while close support for ARVN forces was to be provided by the 7AF TACS. On the day prior to the operation, the TACS was to provide USAF aircraft for preparatory strikes immediately north of the DMZ, with the Marines conducting air strikes inside the zone. The TACS was to provide continuous suppression strikes north of the attacking forces throughout the course of the operation. Obviously, in a multi-force operation of this nature, joint planning and close coordination were key tactical prerequisities. In the early phases of Operation HICKORY, however, several situations arose which indicated an inadequacy in-joint planning. Breakdowns in the system of-coordination on air requirements, on at least two occasions, jeopardized friendly forces. Had airpower been applied under a system of centralized control, it is likely these breakdowns could have-been avoided.
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 61
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Book Description
Project CHECO was established in 1962 to document and analyze air operations in Southeast Asia. Over the years the meaning of the acronym changed several times to reflect the escalation of operations: Current Historical Evaluation of Counterinsurgency Operations, Contemporary Historical Evaluation of Combat Operations and Contemporary Historical Examination of Current Operations. Project CHECO and other U. S. Air Force Historical study programs provided the Air Force with timely and lasting corporate insights into operational, conceptual and doctrinal lessons from the war in SEA.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 30
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Book Description
Project CHECO was established in 1962 to document and analyze air operations in Southeast Asia. Over the years the meaning of the acronym changed several times to reflect the escalation of operations: Current Historical Evaluation of Counterinsurgency Operations, Contemporary Historical Evaluation of Combat Operations and Contemporary Historical Examination of Current Operations. Project CHECO and other U. S. Air Force Historical study programs provided the Air Force with timely and lasting corporate insights into operational, conceptual and doctrinal lessons from the war in SEA.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 72
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Book Description
Project CHECO was established in 1962 to document and analyze air operations in Southeast Asia. Over the years the meaning of the acronym changed several times to reflect the escalation of operations: Current Historical Evaluation of Counterinsurgency Operations, Contemporary Historical Evaluation of Combat Operations and Contemporary Historical Examination of Current Operations. Project CHECO and other U.S. Air Force Historical study programs provided the Air Force with timely and lasting corporate insights into operational, conceptual and doctrinal lessons from the war in SEA.
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 45
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Attempts to create helicopter landing zones through the use of tactical strikes were made as early as October 1966 in the eastern II Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) under Operation Irving, only to meet with a conspicuous lack of success. The general opinion of the FACs and air liaison officers (ALOs) after the over-all operation was that the use of a tactical air effort to con- struct LZs for the Army was '1quite a waste of tactical airpower." Even after sufficient strikes had been put in to clear the area, the resulting craters usually made the landing zone unsuitable for helicopter operations. This report follows the evolution of a different concept: that of dropping a "big" bomb from a transport type aircraft to create "instant" helicopter landing zones in Southeast Asia (SEA)--from inception, through development and testing, to eventual adoption as a standard, highly successful operational tactic which would stand as an exemplar of interservice cooperation.
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Languages : en
Pages : 78
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In late 1961, when the United States accelerated aid to South Vietnam and Thailand, communications and control facilities were primitive and limited. A rudimentary Air Traffic Control System existed, using high frequency (HF) radio for communications and low frequency beacons for navigational aids. This was sufficient to handle the commercial traffic and existing military traffic. Increased U.S. air involvement, made necessary by the rapidly growing Communist guerrilla activities in South Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand soon created a need for a comprehensive air request net and Tactical Air Control system (TACS) to control efficiently this increase in military traffic. On 1 October 1961, the 5th Communications and Control Group and the 1st Mobile Communications Squadron were reorganized. The two 5th Communications and Control Squadrons were deactivated and their personnel and equipment became absorbed in the 1st Mobile Communications Squadron, which was then redesignated the 1st Mobile Communications Group under the Air Force Communications Service. The 605th Tactical Control Squadron was deactivated, and the 5th Communications and Control Group became the 5th Tactical Control Group under the Thirteenth Air Force at Clark Air Base, Philippines. The USAF initially inserted TDY units into South Vietnam and Thailand in November 1961, with elements of the 5th and 507th (Shaw AFB, South Carolina) Tactical Control Groups and the 1st Mobile Communications Group (MCG), which had already acquired the sobriquet of "1st Mob." These mobile units consisted basically of navigational aids (navaids) and single channel high frequency radio systems to link the widely spread activities. As the tempo of operations increased and the extent of USAF participation grew to match the increase insurgency activity, these communications systems proved barely adequate for several reasons. The nucleus for a TACS in Southeast Asia had, however, been formed.
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 110
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This report traces the 1968 Communist Tet Offensive in Vietnam. Significant events which had an impact on airpower, and the application and responsiveness of air, are examined during this period of extremely heightened military activity. Air response ranged across the entire spectrum of air capability, from tactical airstrikes to the ground defense of air installations. Close support of ground troops in cities, air base defense, VNAF performance, emergency airlift, and civic responsiveness are all examined in this report.
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 68
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In the parlance of artillerymen, a "Short Round" is a shell that falls short of the enemy and inflicts casualties on friendly troops. The expression is so starkly descriptive and brief that it has come to be used as a convenient label for most incidents wherein friendly ordnance causes friendly casualties. This report is concerned with air-delivered Short Rounds--specifically, those involving the fixed-wing aircraft under operational control of the Seventh Air Force Tactical Air Control Center (TACC). This third CHECO report On "Short Rounds" covers occurrences from June 1968 through May 1969. It emphasizes rates and trends, interesting corollaries, lessons learned, and recent attempts to eliminate Short Rounds. This study also examines several Short Round incidents to illustrate some of the problems encountered by ground commanders, forward air controllers (FACs), and strike aircraft commanders in their joint efforts to conduct close air support. Ground and air commanders at all levels are deeply concerned about the tragic results of Short Round incidents, and Strenuous efforts have been made to reduce the probability of such occurrences. To have achieved absolute immunity from Short Rounds, the ground forces would have had to sacrifice the benefits of air support whenever they were closely engaged with the enemy. These were hard choices to make, but nearly all of the situations dictated accepting the risk of Short Rounds to diminish the certain lethality of hostile fire.
