Operational Encirclement: Quick Decisive Victory Or A Bridge Too Far? PDF Download
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Author: Major Robert G. Fix
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1786253186
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 58
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Book Description
History is replete with examples of lost opportunities to decisively defeat an enemy’s army on the field of battle. All too often, tactical success has not been followed by actions to ensure operational success. This failure may be attributable to a misunderstanding of the dynamics of operational encirclement. Two case studies highlight these dynamics. The Battles of the Falaise Gap in 1944 and the Ruhr Pocket in 1945 both illustrate the difficulties operational commanders face in conducting this type of operation. In the first case, Allied commanders failed to anticipate the opportunities presented by poor operational planning and tactical execution by their German adversaries and missed an opportunity for a quick and decisive victory. In the second, Allied commanders succeeded in learning from their previous mistakes at Falaise to achieve decisive operational results during the encirclement of the Ruhr. This monograph examines the dynamics of operational encirclement and determines what critical factors impact success or failure in achieving decisive results. It concludes that the three most critical factors which directly impact the success or failure of an operational encirclement include: the development of a flexible campaign plan, the establishment of an efficient and effective command and control infrastructure, and an ability to properly read the events on the battlefield. Based on these factors several planning considerations are identified as useful in the planning and execution of operational encirclements.
Author: Major Robert G. Fix
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1786253186
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 58
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Book Description
History is replete with examples of lost opportunities to decisively defeat an enemy’s army on the field of battle. All too often, tactical success has not been followed by actions to ensure operational success. This failure may be attributable to a misunderstanding of the dynamics of operational encirclement. Two case studies highlight these dynamics. The Battles of the Falaise Gap in 1944 and the Ruhr Pocket in 1945 both illustrate the difficulties operational commanders face in conducting this type of operation. In the first case, Allied commanders failed to anticipate the opportunities presented by poor operational planning and tactical execution by their German adversaries and missed an opportunity for a quick and decisive victory. In the second, Allied commanders succeeded in learning from their previous mistakes at Falaise to achieve decisive operational results during the encirclement of the Ruhr. This monograph examines the dynamics of operational encirclement and determines what critical factors impact success or failure in achieving decisive results. It concludes that the three most critical factors which directly impact the success or failure of an operational encirclement include: the development of a flexible campaign plan, the establishment of an efficient and effective command and control infrastructure, and an ability to properly read the events on the battlefield. Based on these factors several planning considerations are identified as useful in the planning and execution of operational encirclements.
Author: Major Scott Thomas
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 178625395X
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 88
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Book Description
This study is a historical analysis of how encirclement operations have been and still are important offensive operations. These operations need to be given priority in planning and execution by the United States Military. Encirclement operations have proven to be decisive military operations throughout history; regardless of the composition and disposition of the enemy encircled. The U.S. military has maintained the decisive edge on the battlefield for over sixty years. Even with the benefits of technology, air supremacy, firepower, mobility, and maneuver, the U.S. military has not yet been completely successful in planning and executing encirclement operations. Today the U.S. military is arguably the best equipped and trained force in history. Even with this professional force, it is questionable whether the U.S. military could successfully execute an encirclement operation. Therefore this monograph provides a historical examination as to why the U.S. military has been unable to reap the benefits of the offensive maneuver of encirclement. To accomplish this examination, this monograph conducts an analysis of four historical case studies: The Argentan-Falaise Pocket, the Battle of Ia Drang, Doctrinal Revolution from 1986-2001, and Operation Anaconda. The analysis identifies the U.S. military has placed an over reliance on firepower to replace the maneuver of ground combat units. Secondly, this monograph also argues the U.S. military has placed too much emphasis on technology. This belief in technology has reduced the number of ground combat units employed in offensive operations. Additionally, U.S. military doctrine historically has not provided the foundation necessary to support and encourage the planning and execution of encirclement operations. These deficiencies together have prevented the U.S. military from capitalizing on the decisive nature resulting from the speed and shock of correctly executed encirclement operations.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 58
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Book Description
This study is a historical analysis of how encirclement operations have been and still are important offensive operations. These operations need to be given priority in planning and execution by the United States Military. Encirclement operations have proven to be decisive military operations throughout history; regardless of the composition and disposition of the enemy encircled. The U.S. military has maintained the decisive edge on the battlefield for over sixty years. Even with the benefits of technology, air supremacy, firepower, mobility, and maneuver, the U.S. military has not yet been completely successful in planning and executing encirclement operations. Today the U.S. military is arguably the best equipped and trained force in history. Even with this professional force, it is questionable whether the U.S. military could successfully execute an encirclement operation. Therefore this monograph provides a historical examination as to why the U.S. military has been unable to reap the benefits of the offensive maneuver of encirclement. This paper concludes the Army must acknowledge and amend its doctrine to reflect the encirclement operation as a stand-alone form of offensive maneuver. Furthermore, encirclement operations are not just a result of a pursuit or exploitation operation. Encirclement operations can and should be planned as an independent operation. Prioritizing these operations by making them an independent mission will ensure U.S. forces have the resources and combat power needed to ensure success on the battlefield.
Author: Robert G. Fix
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Envelopment (Military science)
Languages : en
Pages : 53
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Book Description
History is replete with examples of lost opportunities to decisively defeat an enemy's army on the field of battle. All too often, tactical success has not been followed by actions to ensure operational success. This failure may be attributable to a misunderstanding of the dynamics of operational encirclement. Two case studies highlight these dynamics. The Battles of the Falaise Gap in 1944 and the Ruhr Pocket in 1945 both illustrate the difficulties operational commanders face in conducting this type of operation. In the first case, Allied commanders failed to anticipate the opportunities presented by poor operational planning and tactical execution by their German adversaries and missed an opportunity for a quick and decisive victory. In the second, Allied commanders succeeded in learning from their previous mistakes at Falaise to achieve decisive operational results during the encirclement of the Ruhr.
Author: Robert G. Fix
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Envelopment (Military science)
Languages : en
Pages : 53
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Book Description
Author: Daniel J. Peters
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Envelopment (Military science)
Languages : en
Pages : 28
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Book Description
Author: David M. Glantz
Publisher: University Press of Kansas
ISBN: 0700625267
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 952
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Book Description
With the defeat and destruction of German Sixth Army at Stalingrad all but certain at the end of 1942, the war on the Eastern Front took a definitive turn as the Germans struggled to erect a new defensive front to halt the Soviet juggernaut driving west. Operation Don’s Main Attack is the first detailed study of the dramatic clash of armies that followed, unfolding inexorably over the course of two months across an expanse of more than 1,600 kilometers. Using recently released Russian archival material never before available to researchers, David M. Glantz provides a close-up account, from both sides, of the planning and conduct of Operation Don—the Soviet offensive by the Red Army's Southern front that aimed to capture Rostov in January–February 1943. His book includes a full array of plans, candid daily reports, situation maps, and strength and casualty reports prepared for the forces that participated in the offensive at every level. Drawing on an unprecedented and comprehensive range of documents, the book delves into many hitherto forbidden topics, such as unit strengths and losses and the foibles and attitudes of command cadre. Glantz’s work also presents rare insights into the military strategy, combat tactics, and operational art of such figures as Generals Eremenko and Malinovsky and Field Marshal Erich von Manstein. A uniquely informed study of a critical but virtually forgotten Soviet military operation, Operation Don’s Main Attack offers a fresh perspective on the nature of the twentieth century’s most terrible of wars.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Defensive (Military science).
Languages : en
Pages : 84
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Book Description
"The Soviet-German war was marked by numerous encirclements, first of Soviet units and, as the war continued, of German units as large as entire armies, such as the 6th Army at Stalingrad. Fighting encircled became a frequent occurrence for German commanders, and their experiences at Klin, Cherkassy, and Kamenets-Podolskiy are related here as well as an analysis of the critical role of air support when fighting encircled."--CMH website.
Author: Robert J. Curran
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Envelopment (Military science)
Languages : en
Pages : 45
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Book Description
This study analyzes how encirclement operations are important to current U.S. Army doctrine as professed in FM 100-5-- Operations. The basic tenets of AirLland Battle, how doctrine is a guide for commonality within the armed services, and World War II and NATOEX operations are examined to discover their applicability for inclusion in current doctrine. Study conclusions include: coalition warfare, unless greatly rehearsed, is a detriment to the successful conduct of an encirclement operation; lack of unity of command over the operation, unless created from the onset of the operation, respective commanders' concern with their areas of operations and not the big picture; planning considerations must include size and composition of attacking force, use of artillery, reserves, and combat service support at a minimum; and educational preparation of the commanders and staffs on the procedures for conducting an encirclement is needed to insure a cogent plan and operation. While the conceptual framework furnished in FM 100-5 and other Army manuals does not contain the appropriate amount of guidance for conducting an encirclement operation, Soviet doctrine contains information that could prove beneficial to US Army doctrine writers.
Author: Rick Gutwald
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Envelopment (Military science)
Languages : en
Pages : 48
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Book Description
Military theorists expect successful encirclement operations to produce high payoffs in war. Unfortunately, say these theorists, encirclements also incur great risks. Soviet encirclement operations at Korsun and Minsk in 1944 validate the promise of increased benefits, but demonstrate that the risks can be overcome by employing sound battlefield techniques and superior numbers. A comparison of the two World War II operations against contemporary warfare conditions identifies surprise, air superiority and nuclear weapons as major factors contributing to the success or failure of encirclements. This paper concludes that encirclements remain applicable today, but they are not a remedy for all situations. Additionally, campaign planners should know the pros and cons of encirclement employment and should consider incorporating it in their plans when possible.
