Operational Decisions, Capital Structure, and Managerial Compensation PDF Download
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Author: Xiaodong Xu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 28
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Book Description
While firm growth critically depends on financing ability and access to external capital, the operations management literature seldom considers the effects of financial constraints on the firms' operational decisions. Another critical assumption in traditional operations models is that corporate managers always act in the firm owners' best interests. Managers are, however, agents of the owners of the company, whose interests are often not aligned with those of equity-holders or debt-holders; hence, managers may make major decisions that are suboptimal from the firm owners' point of view. This paper builds on a news vendor model to make optimal production decisions in the presence of financial constraints and managerial incentives. We explore the relationship between operating conditions and financial leverage and observe that financial leverage can increase as margins reach either low or high extremes. We also provide some empirical support for this observation. We further extend our model to consider the effects of agency costs on the firm's production decision and debt choice by including performance-based bonuses in the manager's compensation. Our analyses show how managerial incentives may drive a manager to deviate from firm-optimal decisions and that low-margin producers face significant risk from this agency cost while high-margin producers face relatively low risk in using such compensation.
Author: Xiaodong Xu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 28
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Book Description
While firm growth critically depends on financing ability and access to external capital, the operations management literature seldom considers the effects of financial constraints on the firms' operational decisions. Another critical assumption in traditional operations models is that corporate managers always act in the firm owners' best interests. Managers are, however, agents of the owners of the company, whose interests are often not aligned with those of equity-holders or debt-holders; hence, managers may make major decisions that are suboptimal from the firm owners' point of view. This paper builds on a news vendor model to make optimal production decisions in the presence of financial constraints and managerial incentives. We explore the relationship between operating conditions and financial leverage and observe that financial leverage can increase as margins reach either low or high extremes. We also provide some empirical support for this observation. We further extend our model to consider the effects of agency costs on the firm's production decision and debt choice by including performance-based bonuses in the manager's compensation. Our analyses show how managerial incentives may drive a manager to deviate from firm-optimal decisions and that low-margin producers face significant risk from this agency cost while high-margin producers face relatively low risk in using such compensation.
Author: H. Kent Baker
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
ISBN: 1118022947
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 504
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Book Description
A comprehensive guide to making better capital structure and corporate financing decisions in today's dynamic business environment Given the dramatic changes that have recently occurred in the economy, the topic of capital structure and corporate financing decisions is critically important. The fact is that firms need to constantly revisit their portfolio of debt, equity, and hybrid securities to finance assets, operations, and future growth. Capital Structure and Corporate Financing Decisions provides an in-depth examination of critical capital structure topics, including discussions of basic capital structure components, key theories and practices, and practical application in an increasingly complex corporate world. Throughout, the book emphasizes how a sound capital structure simultaneously minimizes the firm's cost of capital and maximizes the value to shareholders. Offers a strategic focus that allows you to understand how financing decisions relates to a firm's overall corporate policy Consists of contributed chapters from both academics and experienced professionals, offering a variety of perspectives and a rich interplay of ideas Contains information from survey research describing actual financial practices of firms This valuable resource takes a practical approach to capital structure by discussing why various theories make sense and how firms use them to solve problems and create wealth. In the wake of the recent financial crisis, the insights found here are essential to excelling in today's volatile business environment.
Author: Arvin Ghosh
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1351530178
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 140
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Book Description
Capital structure theory is one of the most dynamic areas of finance and forms the basis for modern thinking on the capital structure of firms. Much controversy has resulted from comparisons of the theory of capital structure originally developed by Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller to real-world situations. Two competing theories have emerged over the years, the optimal capital structure theory and the pecking order theory.Arvin Ghosh begins with an overview of the controversies regarding capital structure theories, and then statistically tests both the optimal capital structure and pecking order theories. Using the binomial approach he analyzes the determinants of capital structure while discussing the role of market power in determining capital structure decisions. Ghosh probes the questions of new stock offerings and stockholders' returns, and analyzes capital structure and executive compensation. He then looks into debt financing ownership structure, and the controversal relationship between capital structure and firm profitability. Finally, he discusses the latest developments in the field of capital structure.A concise overview of a major issue in business economics and finance, this volume provides a fuller understanding of capital structure influence on the financial performance of firms, and will certainly stimulate further debate. While hundreds of scholarly articles have been written on the subject this is the first book to test competing theories against measurements of firms' performance and their underlying capital structure.
Author: Angel N. Salinas González
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 434
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Book Description
Author: Riccardo Calcagno
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Author: Yamini Agarwal
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
ISBN: 111820316X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 208
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Book Description
Inside the risk management and corporate governance issues behind capital structure decisions Practical ways of determining capital structures have always been mysterious and riddled with risks and uncertainties. Dynamic paradigm shifts and the multi-dimensional operations of firms further complicate the situation. Financial leaders are under constant pressure to outdo their competitors, but how to do so is not always clear. Capital Structure Decisions offers an introduction to corporate finance, and provides valuable insights into the decision-making processes that face the CEOs and CFOs of organizations in dynamic multi-objective environments. Exploring the various models and techniques used to understand the capital structure of an organization, as well as the products and means available for financing these structures, the book covers how to develop a goal programming model to enable organization leaders to make better capital structure decisions. Incorporating international case studies to explain various financial models and to illustrate ways that capital structure choices determine their success, Capital Structure Decisions looks at existing models and the development of a new goal-programming model for capital structures that is capable of handling multiple objectives, with an emphasis throughout on mitigating risk. Helps financial leaders understand corporate finance and the decision-making processes involved in understanding and developing capital structure Includes case studies from around the world that explain key financial models Emphasizes ways to minimize risk when it comes to working with capital structures There are a number of criteria that financial leaders need to consider before making any major capital investment decision. Capital Structure Decisions analyzes the various risk management and corporate governance issues to be considered by any diligent CEO/CFO before approving a project.
Author: Yossi Spiegel
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 50
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Book Description
We investigate the interaction between financial structure and managerial compensation in the context of a managerial entrenchment model in the spirit of Shleifer and Vishny (1989). We show that risky debt affects both the probability of managerial replacement and the manager's wage if he is retained by the firm. Our model yields a rich set of predictions including the following:The market values of equity and debt decrease if the manager is replaced. Moreover, the expected cash flow of firms that retain their managers exceeds that of firms that replace their managers.Firms that publicly announce the adoption of a new managerial compensation plan should experience positive price reactions in the capital market as well as strong positive performance following the adoption.Managers of firms with risky debt outstanding are promised lower severance payments (golden parachute) than managers of firms that do not have risky debt.Controlling for firm's size, leverage, managerial compensation, and the cash flow of firms that retain their managers are positively correlated.Controlling for firm's size, the probability of managerial turnover and firm value are negatively correlated.
Author: Harold Bierman Jr.
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 1461510376
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 230
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Book Description
In 1958 an academic paper on corporate finance written by two professors (Merton Miller and Frances Modigliani, who were later awarded the Nobel prize for their research efforts) was published in The American Economic Review. One prime conclusion of their paper was that the exact form of a firm's capital structure did not affect the firm's value. Later papers by the same two authors and by many others modified the assumptions and changed this conclusion. We now think that capital structure decisions do affect a firm's value and corporate managers should understand better the financing alternatives that are available. One of the most important financial decisions is the decision to buy or lease assets. The leasing industry is large and getting larger. Unfortunately, it is very easy for a firm to evaluate incorrectly lease alternatives (see Chapter 12). The capital structure decision is one of the three most important financial decisions that management make (the distribution of earnings and the capital budgeting decisions are the other two contenders). Managers should increase their understanding of capital structure alternatives and remember that choosing the best capital structure is an art and not an exact simple calculation. But applying the art can be improved with understanding.
Author: Dilip B. Madan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
This paper provides an optimal design of managerial compensation in the presence of an exogenous capital structure with its associated debt agency costs. The model entails the analysis of a three-party conflict between debtholders, equity holders, and management. Equityholders, as principals owning a production technology, design a compensation contract for managers. Management is engaged solely in the choice of project risk with risky return outcomes along a production frontier. It is shown that, in the absence of debt, risk averse managers would tend to risk-shift downwards, realizing suboptimal firm value. In the presence of a senior debt claim equity holders find it advantageous to choose higher risk projects and it is possible that for sufficiently high debt levels, the agency costs of debt and managerial risk aversion counterbalance each other, with the final outcome coinciding with first best risk choices. The empirical relationship between capital structure and compensation is also studied, as are the implications of debt and risk aversion for the pay- performance relations.
Author: Riccardo Calcagno
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 34
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Book Description
We show that the relative seniority of debt and managerial compensation has important implications on the design of remuneration contracts. Whereas the traditional literature assumes that debt is senior to remuneration, we show that this is frequently not the case according to bankruptcy regulation and as observed in practice. We theoretically show that including risky debt changes the incentive to provide the manager with stronger performance-related incentives (quot;contract substitutionquot; effect). If managerial compensation has priority over the debt claims, higher leverage produces lower power-incentive schemes (lower bonuses) and a higher base salary. With junior compensation, we expect more emphasis on pay-for-performance incentives. The empirical findings are in line with the regime of remuneration seniority as the base salary is significantly higher and the performance bonus is lower in financially distressed firms.
