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Author: John M. Griffith
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 22
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Book Description
This study focuses on REIT CEO compensation. We utilize five different definitions for CEO compensation: salary, bonus, cash compensation, total compensation, and option awards. To capture the determinants of CEO compensation, we use the following performance measures: three-year stock returns, MVA (market value added), and Tobin's q. We also examine the impact of managerial power on compensation. We utilize a panel data set to capture both the time-series and cross-sectional effects. Our panel data set captures both the time-series and cross-sectional effects. Previous work on REIT executive compensation has chiefly looked at compensation data on cross-sectional basis. We find performance and size do not influence the CEO's salary while, risk, term, title, ownership, and age have significant impacts. Contrary to previous findings and our expectations, bonuses are not influenced by risk, CEO power, or size.
Author: John M. Griffith
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 22
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Book Description
This study focuses on REIT CEO compensation. We utilize five different definitions for CEO compensation: salary, bonus, cash compensation, total compensation, and option awards. To capture the determinants of CEO compensation, we use the following performance measures: three-year stock returns, MVA (market value added), and Tobin's q. We also examine the impact of managerial power on compensation. We utilize a panel data set to capture both the time-series and cross-sectional effects. Our panel data set captures both the time-series and cross-sectional effects. Previous work on REIT executive compensation has chiefly looked at compensation data on cross-sectional basis. We find performance and size do not influence the CEO's salary while, risk, term, title, ownership, and age have significant impacts. Contrary to previous findings and our expectations, bonuses are not influenced by risk, CEO power, or size.
Author: Chinmoy Ghosh
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
In a perfect world where the board of directors is independent of CEO influence, CEO pay-for-performance compensation contracts should be a function of performance only. If the CEO can influence board structure through his ownership of company stock or chairmanship of the board, however, performance contracts are sub-optimal and agency problems arise, which allow the CEO to extract rent and demand compensation in excess of the equilibrium level. As such, models of compensation contracts must include board and ownership structure variables, in addition to the traditional economic determinants. Our analyses with REITs corroborate this notion. Our data demonstrate that the structure of REIT boards are not independent of CEO influence, and significant agency problems exist allowing the CEO to design boards that reward him at the cost of shareholder wealth. CEO compensation in REITs depends significantly on the usual economic measures of performance including firm size and return on assets; more importantly, CEO compensation is higher in REITs where the board is weak in monitoring because of large size, and older directors; the effect of a blockholder is adverse, however. This study provides additional evidence to the growing literature that observed board structures are ineffective in monitoring and governance.
Author: Anita K. Pennathur
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Executive compensation has garnered much attention in the last decade from both academicians and practitioners. We examine the relationship between increase in CEO compensation, industry specific performance measures, and stock return for the years 1993-1999 in the Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) industry. We find evidence that compensation evaluation is related to stock returns, and to changes in Real Estate Investment and Funds from Operation for the years 1997, 1998, and 1999. Furthermore, we document a negative relation between CEO raise and age. We find no link between compensation and Earnings per Share, whether the REIT is self-managed, or type of property in which the REIT specializes.
Author: Zhilan Feng
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Our objective in this paper is to investigate the relationship between institutional ownership and CEO compensation structure of REITs. Based on detailed analyses of data on institutional ownership, performance, CEO and board characteristics over the 10 year period 1998-2007, we find significant evidence that large institutions influence governance through CEO compensation -- greater institutional ownership is associated with greater emphasis on incentive-based compensation (higher pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation), and higher cash and total compensation for CEOs. Further, we find that institutions are less active when managers are performing in a superior fashion. Two important conclusions emerge from the analysis. First, similar to unregulated firms, institutional owners do act as monitors in REITs. Broadly, this result suggests that governance is necessary for REITs. Second, institutional investors set a high pay-performance sensitivity for CEOs, but are willing to pay higher cash compensation to induce managers to take risk.
Author: Jennifer Carpenter
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 1475751923
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 159
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Book Description
Executive compensation has gained widespread public attention in recent years, with the pay of top U.S. executives reaching unprecedented levels compared either with past levels, with the remuneration of top executives in other countries, or with the wages and salaries of typical employees. The extraordinary levels of executive compensation have been achieved at a time when U.S. public companies have realized substantial gains in stock market value. Many have cited this as evidence that U.S. executive compensation works well, rewarding managers who make difficult decisions that lead to higher shareholder values, while others have argued that the overly generous salaries and benefits bear little relation to company performance. Recent conceptual and empirical research permits for the first time a truly rigorous debate on these and related issues, which is the subject of this volume.
Author: Magdy Carolina Noguera
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 88
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Book Description
JEL classification. G30; G32; G34.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
This research examines the relation between incentive-based compensation and subsequent Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) performance as well as the determinants of incentive-based compensation for REITs. I propose that REITs either rely on incentive-based compensation to substitute for poor corporate governance practices or may not need to rely excessively on incentive-based compensation to align managers and shareholder interests, given their heavily regulated nature and their corporate governance practices. Using a sample of publicly traded equity, hybrid, and operating REITs for the 1999-2003 period, I find a negative relation between incentive based compensation awards and subsequent stock returns for REITs. Interestingly, this relation is not found when return on assets (ROA) is the measure of performance. These results imply that excessive incentive-based compensation negatively impact future REIT performance from a market perspective, but not an accounting perspective. With regard to the determinants of incentive based compensation, I find that CEO ownership, board of director characteristics, and institutional ownership are consistent determinants of the level of incentive based compensation awarded to REIT CEOs. Overall, the results imply that REIT corporate governance practices substitute for incentive-based compensation, but still, the level of incentive-based compensation paid to REIT CEOs is excessive up to the point that it negatively affects subsequent REIT performance.
Author: Frederick D. Lipman
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
ISBN: 9780470283035
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 336
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Book Description
Executive Compensation Best Practices demystifies the topic of executive compensation, with a hands-on guide providing comprehensive compensation guidance for all members of the board. Essential reading for board members, CEOs, and senior human resources leaders from companies of every size, this book is the most authoritative reference on executive compensation.
Author: Edge
Publisher: Windsor Professional Information
ISBN: 9781893190252
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 564
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Book Description
Drawing from nine of the leading compensation advisory firms in the country, Executive Compensation: The Professional's Guide to Current Issues and Practices is the first publication to bring together a number of the top practitioners and experts in the field to provide the information and insights needed to navigate within the new era of accountability and performance standards.
Author: Ira T. Kay
Publisher: CRC Press
ISBN: 9781574442038
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 164
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Book Description
U.S. executive pay, particularly that of CEOs, has been under serious attack for nearly a decade. Despite the fact that tying executive performance and pay to stock price has appeared to have substantially benefited the U.S. economy, this criticism has not subsided. CEO Pay and Shareholder Value challenges some assumptions behind this criticism by addressing these pertinent questions and more:
