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Author: Amy F. Woolf
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1437922317
Category : Technology & Engineering
Languages : en
Pages : 31
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Book Description
Contents: (1) Intro.; (2) Distinction Between Strategic and Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons (NNW); (3) U.S. and Soviet NNW: (a) U.S. NNW During the Cold War; (b) Soviet NNW During the Cold War; (c) 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives; (d) U.S. NNW after the Cold War; (e) Russian NNW after the Cold War; (f) Changing the Focus of the Debate; (4) Issues for Congress: (a) Issues: Safety and Security of Russian NNW; The Role of NNW in Russia¿s National Security Policy; The Role of NNW in U.S. National Security Policy; The Role of NNW in NATO Policy and Alliance Strategy; The Relationship Between NNW and U.S. Nonproliferation Policy; (b) Policy Options: Status Quo; Reduce Reliance on Nuclear Weapons; Cooperative Responses.
Author: Amy F. Woolf
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1437922317
Category : Technology & Engineering
Languages : en
Pages : 31
Get Book Here
Book Description
Contents: (1) Intro.; (2) Distinction Between Strategic and Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons (NNW); (3) U.S. and Soviet NNW: (a) U.S. NNW During the Cold War; (b) Soviet NNW During the Cold War; (c) 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives; (d) U.S. NNW after the Cold War; (e) Russian NNW after the Cold War; (f) Changing the Focus of the Debate; (4) Issues for Congress: (a) Issues: Safety and Security of Russian NNW; The Role of NNW in Russia¿s National Security Policy; The Role of NNW in U.S. National Security Policy; The Role of NNW in NATO Policy and Alliance Strategy; The Relationship Between NNW and U.S. Nonproliferation Policy; (b) Policy Options: Status Quo; Reduce Reliance on Nuclear Weapons; Cooperative Responses.
Author: Amy F. Woolf
Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
ISBN: 9781544151878
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Recent debates about U.S. nuclear weapons have questioned what role weapons with shorter ranges and lower yields can play in addressing emerging threats in Europe and Asia. These weapons, often referred to as nonstrategic nuclear weapons, have not been limited by past U.S.- Russian arms control agreements, although some analysts argue such limits would be of value, particularly in addressing Russia's greater numbers of these types of weapons. Others have argued that the United States should expand its deployments of these weapons, in both Europe and Asia, to address new risks of war conducted under a nuclear shadow. Both the Trump Administration and Congress may address these questions during a new review of the U.S. nuclear posture. During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union both deployed nonstrategic nuclear weapons for use in the field during a conflict. While there are several ways to distinguish between strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons, most analysts consider nonstrategic weapons to be shorter-range delivery systems with lower yield warheads that might be used to attack troops or facilities on the battlefield. They have included nuclear mines; artillery; short-, medium-, and long-range ballistic missiles; cruise missiles; and gravity bombs. In contrast with the longer-range 'strategic' nuclear weapons, these weapons had a lower profile in policy debates and arms control negotiations, possibly because they did not pose a direct threat to the continental United States. At the end of the 1980s, each nation still had thousands of these weapons deployed with their troops in the field, aboard naval vessels, and on aircraft. In 1991, the United States and Soviet Union both withdrew from deployment most and eliminated from their arsenals many of their nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The United States now has approximately 760 nonstrategic nuclear weapons, with around 200 deployed with aircraft in Europe and the remaining stored in the United States. Estimates vary, but experts believe Russia still has between 1,000 and 6,000 warheads for nonstrategic nuclear weapons in its arsenal. The Bush Administration quietly redeployed and removed some of the nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. Russia, however seems to have increased its reliance on nuclear weapons in its national security concept. Some analysts argue that Russia has backed away from its commitments from 1991 and may develop and deploy new types of nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Analysts have identified a number of issues with the continued deployment of U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons. These include questions about the safety and security of Russia's weapons and the possibility that some might be lost, stolen, or sold to another nation or group; questions about the role of these weapons in U.S. and Russian security policy; questions about the role that these weapons play in NATO policy and whether there is a continuing need for the United States to deploy them at bases overseas; questions about the implications of the disparity in numbers between U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons; and questions about the relationship between nonstrategic nuclear weapons and U.S. nonproliferation policy. Some argue that these weapons do not create any problems and the United States should not alter its policy. Others argue that NATO should consider expanding its deployments in response to Russia's aggression in Ukraine. Some believe the United States should reduce its reliance on these weapons and encourage Russia to do the same. Many have suggested that the United States and Russia expand efforts to cooperate on ensuring the safe and secure storage and elimination of these weapons; others have suggested that they negotiate an arms control treaty that would limit these weapons and allow for increased transparency in monitoring their deployment and elimination.
Author: Amy F. Woolf
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781693260711
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 50
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Book Description
Recent debates about U.S. nuclear weapons have questioned what role weapons with shorter ranges and lower yields can play in addressing emerging threats in Europe and Asia. These weapons, often referred to as nonstrategic nuclear weapons, have not been limited by past U.S.Russian arms control agreements, although some analysts argue such limits would be of value, particularly in addressing Russia's greater numbers of these types of weapons. Others have argued that the United States should expand its deployments of these weapons, in both Europe and Asia, to address new risks of war conducted under a nuclear shadow. The Trump Administration addressed these questions in the Nuclear Posture Review released in February 2018, and determined that the United States should acquire two new types of nonstrategic nuclear weapons: a new low-yield warhead for submarine-launched ballistic missiles and a new sealaunched cruise missile. During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union both deployed nonstrategic nuclear weapons for use in the field during a conflict. While there are several ways to distinguish between strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons, most analysts consider nonstrategic weapons to be shorter-range delivery systems with lower-yield warheads that might be used to attack troops or facilities on the battlefield. They have included nuclear mines; artillery; short-, medium-, and long-range ballistic missiles; cruise missiles; and gravity bombs. In contrast with the longer-range "strategic" nuclear weapons, these weapons had a lower profile in policy debates and arms control negotiations, possibly because they did not pose a direct threat to the continental United States. At the end of the 1980s, each nation still had thousands of these weapons deployed with their troops in the field, aboard naval vessels, and on aircraft. In 1991, the United States and Soviet Union both withdrew from deployment most and eliminated from their arsenals many of their nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The United States now has approximately 500 nonstrategic nuclear weapons, with around 200 deployed with aircraft in Europe and the remaining stored in the United States. Estimates vary, but experts believe Russia still has between 1,000 and 6,000 warheads for nonstrategic nuclear weapons in its arsenal. The Bush Administration quietly redeployed some U.S. weapons deployed in Europe, while the Obama Administration retired older sea-launched cruise missiles. Russia, however seems to have increased its reliance on nuclear weapons in its national security concept. Analysts have identified a number of issues with the continued deployment of U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons. These include questions about the safety and security of Russia's weapons and the possibility that some might be lost, stolen, or sold to another nation or group; questions about the role of these weapons in U.S. and Russian security policy; questions about the role that these weapons play in NATO policy and whether there is a continuing need for the United States to deploy them at bases overseas; questions about the implications of the disparity in numbers between U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons; and questions about the relationship between nonstrategic nuclear weapons and U.S. nonproliferation policy. Some argue that these weapons do not create any problems and the United States should not alter its policy. Others argue that the United States should expand its deployments of these weapons in response to challenges from Russia, China, and North Korea. Some believe the United States should reduce its reliance on these weapons and encourage Russia to do the same. Many have suggested that the United States and Russia expand efforts to cooperate on ensuring the safe and secure storage and elimination of these weapons; others have suggested that they negotiate an arms control treaty that would limit these weapons and allow for increased transparency.
Author: Congressional Research Service
Publisher: Independently Published
ISBN: 9781794504837
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 50
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Book Description
Recent debates about U.S. nuclear weapons have questioned what role weapons with shorter ranges and lower yields can play in addressing emerging threats in Europe and Asia. These weapons, often referred to as nonstrategic nuclear weapons, have not been limited by past U.S.-Russian arms control agreements, although some analysts argue such limits would be of value, particularly in addressing Russia's greater numbers of these types of weapons. Others have argued that the United States should expand its deployments of these weapons, in both Europe and Asia, to address new risks of war conducted under a nuclear shadow. The Trump Administration addressed these questions in the Nuclear Posture Review released in February 2018, and determined that the United States should acquire two new types of nonstrategic nuclear weapons: a new low-yield warhead for submarine-launched ballistic missiles and a new sea-launched cruise missile. During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union both deployed nonstrategic nuclear weapons for use in the field during a conflict. While there are several ways to distinguish between strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons, most analysts consider nonstrategic weapons to be shorter-range delivery systems with lower yield warheads that might be used to attack troops or facilities on the battlefield. They have included nuclear mines; artillery; short-, medium-, and long-range ballistic missiles; cruise missiles; and gravity bombs. In contrast with the longer-range "strategic" nuclear weapons, these weapons had a lower profile in policy debates and arms control negotiations, possibly because they did not pose a direct threat to the continental United States. At the end of the 1980s, each nation still had thousands of these weapons in the field, aboard naval vessels, and on aircraft. In 1991, the United States and Soviet Union both withdrew from deployment most and eliminated from their arsenals many of their nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The United States now has approximately 500 nonstrategic nuclear weapons, with around 200 deployed with aircraft in Europe and the remaining stored in the United States. Estimates vary, but experts believe Russia still has between 1,000 and 6,000 warheads for nonstrategic nuclear weapons in its arsenal. The Bush Administration quietly redeployed some U.S. weapons deployed in Europe, while the Obama Administration retired older sea-launched cruise missiles. Russia, however seems to have increased its reliance on nuclear weapons in its national security concept. Analysts have identified a number of issues with the continued deployment of U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons. These include questions about the safety and security of Russia's weapons and the possibility that some might be lost, stolen, or sold to another nation or group; questions about the role of these weapons in U.S. and Russian security policy; questions about the role that these weapons play in NATO policy and whether there is a continuing need for the United States to deploy them at bases overseas; questions about the implications of the disparity in numbers between U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons; and questions about the relationship between nonstrategic nuclear weapons and U.S. nonproliferation policy. Some argue that these weapons do not create any problems and the United States should not alter its policy. Others argue that the United States should expand its deployments of these weapons in response to challenges from Russia, China, and North Korea. Some believe the United States should reduce its reliance on these weapons and encourage Russia to do the same. Many have suggested that the United States and Russia expand efforts to cooperate on ensuring the safe and secure storage and elimination of these weapons; others have suggested that they negotiate an arms control treaty that would limit these weapons and allow for increased transparency.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
The Congressional Commission, which issued its report in April 2009, briefly addressed the role of nonstrategic nuclear weapons Congressional Research Service 3 Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons in U. S. national security strategy and noted concerns about the imbalance in the numbers of U. S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons.5 The NPR is due to be completed in early 2010, and is also likely to [...] It then provides some historical background, describing the numbers and types of nonstrategic nuclear weapons deployed by both nations during the Cold War and in the past decade; the policies that guided the deployment and prospective use of these weapons; and the measures that the two sides have taken to reduce, eliminate, and, more recently, augment their forces. [...] The Distinction Between Strategic and Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons The distinction between strategic and nonstrategic (also known as tactical) nuclear weapons reflects the military definitions of, on the one hand, a strategic mission and, on the other hand, the tactical use of nuclear weapons. [...] On the other hand, the "strategic" weapons identified by these capabilities-ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers-are the only systems covered by the limits in strategic offensive arms control agreements-the SALT agreements signed in the 1970s, the START agreements signed in the 1990s, and the Moscow Treaty signed in 2002. [...] Not only did the presence of these weapons (and the presence of U. S. forces, in general) increase the likelihood that the United States would come to the defense of its allies if they were attacked, the weapons also could have been used on the battlefield to slow or Congressional Research Service 6 Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons stop the advance of the adversaries' conventional forces.
Author: Amy F Woolf
Publisher: BiblioGov
ISBN: 9781295273829
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 42
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Book Description
The FY2013 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4310, Section 1037) indicates that it is the sense of Congress that "the United States should pursue negotiations with the Russian Federation aimed at the reduction of Russian deployed and nondeployed nonstrategic nuclear forces." The United States and Russia have not included limits on these weapons in past arms control agreements. Nevertheless, some analysts and Members of Congress have argued that disparities in the numbers of nonstrategic nuclear weapons may become more important as the United States and Russia reduce their numbers of deployed long-range, strategic nuclear weapons. During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union both deployed nonstrategic nuclear weapons for use in the field during a conflict. While there are several ways to distinguish between strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons, most analysts consider nonstrategic weapons to be shorter-range delivery systems with lower yield warheads that might be used to attack troops or facilities on the battlefield. They have included nuclear mines; artillery; short-, medium-, and long-range ballistic missiles; cruise missiles; and gravity bombs. In contrast with the longer-range "strategic" nuclear weapons, these weapons had a lower profile in policy debates and arms control negotiations, possibly because they did not pose a direct threat to the continental United States. At the end of the 1980s, each nation still had thousands of these weapons deployed with their troops in the field, aboard naval vessels, and on aircraft.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Electronic books
Languages : en
Pages : 544
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Book Description
"NATO has been a "nuclear" alliance since its inception. Nuclear weapons have served the dual purpose of being part of NATO military planning as well as being central to the Alliance's deterrence strategy. For over 4 decades, NATO allies sought to find conventional and nuclear forces, doctrines, and agreed strategies that linked the defense of Europe to that of the United States. Still, in light of the evolving security situation, the Alliance must now consider the role and future of tactical or non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs). Two clear conclusions emerge from this analysis. First, in the more than 2 decades since the end of the Cold War, the problem itself -- that is, the question of what to do with weapons designed in a previous century for the possibility of a World War III against a military alliance that no longer exists -- is understudied, both inside and outside of government. Tactical weapons, although less awesome than their strategic siblings, carry significant security and political risks, and they have not received the attention that is commensurate to their importance. Second, it is clear that whatever the future of these arms, the status quo is unacceptable. It is past the time for NATO to make more resolute decisions, find a coherent strategy, and formulate more definite plans about its nuclear status. Consequently, decisions about the role of nuclear weapons within the Alliance and the associated supporting analysis are fundamental to the future identity of NATO. At the Lisbon Summit in Portugal in November 2010, the Alliance agreed to conduct the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR). This effort is designed to answer these difficult questions prior to the upcoming NATO Summit in May 2012. The United States and its closest allies must define future threats and, in doing so, clarify NATO's identity, purpose, and corresponding force requirements. So far, NATO remains a "nuclear alliance," but it is increasingly hard to define what that means."--Publisher's website.
Author: Douglas T. Stuart
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 552
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Book Description
is understudied, both inside and outside of government. Tactical weapons, although less awesome than their strategic siblings, carry significant security and political risks, and they have not received the attention that is commensurate to their importance. Second, it is clear that whatever the future of these arms, the status quo is unacceptable. It is past the time for NATO to make more resolute decisions, find a coherent strategy, and formulate more definite plans about its nuclear status. Consequently, decisions about the role of nuclear weapons within the Alliance and the associated supporting analysis are fundamental to the future identity of NATO. At the Lisbon Summit in Portugal in November 2010, the Alliance agreed to conduct the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR). This effort is designed to answer these difficult questions prior to the upcoming NATO Summit in May 2012.
Author: U. S. Army
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781549749940
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 186
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Book Description
This important report from the U.S. Army's Strategic Studies Institute provides the complete history of tactical nuclear weapons starting with the early days of the Cold War, along with unique up-to-date insights into the future of tactical nukes in Europe and Asia. The role and future of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe are subjects that sometimes surprise even experts in international security, primarily because it is so often disconcerting to remember that these weapons still exist. Many years ago, an American journalist wryly noted that the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was "a subject that drives the dagger of boredom deep, deep into the heart" - a dismissive quip which would have remained true right up until the moment World War III broke out. The same goes for tactical nuclear weapons: compared to the momentous issues that the East and West have tackled since the end of the Cold War, the scattering of hundreds (or in the Russian case, thousands) of battlefield weapons throughout Europe seems to be almost an afterthought, a detail left behind that should be easy to tidy up. Such complacency is unwise. Tactical nuclear weapons (or NSNWs, "non-strategic nuclear weapons") still exist because NATO and Russia have not fully resolved their fears about how a nuclear war might arise, or how it might be fought. They represent, as Russian analyst Nikolai Sokov once wrote, "the longest deadlock" in the history of arms control. Washington and Moscow, despite the challenges to the "reset" of their relations, point to reductions in strategic arms as a great achievement, but strategic agreements also reveal the deep ambiguity toward nuclear weapons as felt by the former superpower rivals. The numbers in the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) are lower than at any point in history, but they are based on leaving each side a reliable ability to destroy up to 300 urban targets each. Inflicting this incredible amount of destruction is, on its face, a step no sane national leader would take. Preface * Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO: An Introductory Reminiscence * PART I. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS * 1. The Historical Context * 2. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in NATO and Beyond: A Historical and Thematic Examination * 3. U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy and Policymaking: The Asian Experience * PART II. RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVES ON TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS * 4. Russian Perspectives on Tactical Nuclear Weapons * 5. Russian Doctrine on Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Contexts, Prisms, and Connections * 6. Aspects of the Current Russian Perspective on Tactical Nuclear Weapons * 7. Influences on Russian Policy and Possibilities for Reduction in Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons * 8. Russian Perspectives on Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons * PART III. EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES * 9. Introduction of European Policies and Opinions Relating to Tactical Nuclear Weapons * 10. The Role and Place of Tactical Nuclear Weapons - A NATO Perspective * 11. European and German Perspectives * 12. European Perspectives * 13. Europe, NATO's Tactical Nuclear Conundrum, and Public Debate: Be Careful What You Wish For * PART IV. AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES * 14. American Perspectives on Tactical Nuclear Weapons * 15. The Role of Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: An American Perspective * 16. NATO's Nuclear Debate: The Broader Strategic Context * 17. Role of Nuclear Weapons in NATO's Deterrence and Defense Posture Review: Prospects for Change * PART V. ARMS CONTROL AS AN OPTION * 18. Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO: Arms Control as an Option * 19. Arms Control Options for Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons * 20. Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO: A Conventional Arms Control Perspective * 21. Arms Control after START * 22. The Conventional and Nuclear Nexus in Europe * PART VI. CONCLUSION * 23. Summing Up and Issues for the Future
Author: Stephen P. Lambert
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Nuclear arms control
Languages : en
Pages : 64
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Book Description
As politicians and policy makers trumpet the successes of strategic reductions and the achievements of the START agreements, Russia has increasingly focused on a rhetorical and doctrinal campaign to enhance the credibility of nuclear war fighting threats by legitimizing theater or tactical nuclear systems. The Russian Federation is convinced that its security rests upon these weapons, and it has therefore attempted to shield both the personnel and the hardware from the effects of the military rollback. The notion that the two largest possessors of nuclear weapons could speedily draw down their arsenals to under 2000 warheads, as a START 3 regime suggests, is misguided. This ignores the thousands of so called tactical nuclear weapons possessed by both states. The very real threats associated with Russia's tactical nuclear arsenal should impel those with genuine concerns to redirect their efforts toward the lower end of nuclear weapons spectrum. The arms control proposal presented in this paper incorporates a regime calling for the elimination of air delivered tactical nuclear weapons that may prove to be a useful model for reinvigorating the stalled process of nuclear arms reductions.
