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Author: Arun Sundararajan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 34
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Book Description
A number of technology products display positive network effects, and are used invariable quantities by heterogeneous customers. Examples include operating systems, infrastructureand back-end software, web services and networking equipment. This paper studies optimalnonlinear pricing for such products, under incomplete information, and with the threat of competitiveentry. Both homogeneous and heterogeneous network effects are modeled. Conditions underwhich a fulfilled-expectations contract exists and is unique are established. While network effectsgenerally raise price, it is shown that accompanying changes in consumption depend on the natureof the network effects - in some cases, it is optimal for the monopolist to induce no changes in usageacross customers, while in others cases, network effects raise the usage of all market participants.Optimal pricing is shown to include quantity discounts that increase with usage, and may also involvea nonlinear two-part tariff. These results highlight the impact of network effects on trade-offsbetween price discrimination and value creation, and have important managerial implications forpricing policy in technology markets.The need to deter competitive entry generally lowers profits for the monopolist, and increasescustomer surplus. When network effects are homogeneous across customers, the resulting entry-deterringmonopoly contract is a fixed fee and results in the socially optimal outcome. However,when the magnitude of heterogeneous network effects is relatively high, there are no changes intotal surplus induced by the entry threat, and the price changes merely cause a transfer of valuefrom the seller to its customers. The presence of network effects, and of a credible entry threat, arealso shown to increase distributional efficiency by reducing the disparity in relative value capturedby different customer types. Regulatory and policy implications of these results are discussed.
Author: Arun Sundararajan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 34
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Book Description
A number of technology products display positive network effects, and are used invariable quantities by heterogeneous customers. Examples include operating systems, infrastructureand back-end software, web services and networking equipment. This paper studies optimalnonlinear pricing for such products, under incomplete information, and with the threat of competitiveentry. Both homogeneous and heterogeneous network effects are modeled. Conditions underwhich a fulfilled-expectations contract exists and is unique are established. While network effectsgenerally raise price, it is shown that accompanying changes in consumption depend on the natureof the network effects - in some cases, it is optimal for the monopolist to induce no changes in usageacross customers, while in others cases, network effects raise the usage of all market participants.Optimal pricing is shown to include quantity discounts that increase with usage, and may also involvea nonlinear two-part tariff. These results highlight the impact of network effects on trade-offsbetween price discrimination and value creation, and have important managerial implications forpricing policy in technology markets.The need to deter competitive entry generally lowers profits for the monopolist, and increasescustomer surplus. When network effects are homogeneous across customers, the resulting entry-deterringmonopoly contract is a fixed fee and results in the socially optimal outcome. However,when the magnitude of heterogeneous network effects is relatively high, there are no changes intotal surplus induced by the entry threat, and the price changes merely cause a transfer of valuefrom the seller to its customers. The presence of network effects, and of a credible entry threat, arealso shown to increase distributional efficiency by reducing the disparity in relative value capturedby different customer types. Regulatory and policy implications of these results are discussed.
Author: Arun Sundararajan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
A number of technology products display positive network effects, and are used in variable quantities by heterogeneous customers. Examples include operating systems, infrastructure and back-end software, web services and networking equipment. This paper studies optimal nonlinear pricing for such products, under incomplete information, and with the threat of competitive entry. Both homogeneous and heterogeneous network effects are modeled. Conditions under which a fulfilled-expectations contract exists and is unique are established. While network effects generally raise prices, it is shown that accompanying changes in consumption depend on the nature of the network effects - in some cases, it is optimal for the monopolist to induce no changes in usage across customers, while in others cases, network effects raise the usage of all market participants. Optimal pricing is shown to include quantity discounts that increase with usage, and may also involve a nonlinear two-part tariff. These results highlight the impact of network effects on trade-offs between price discrimination and value creation, and have important managerial implications for pricing policy in technology markets. The need to deter competitive entry generally lowers profits for the monopolist, and increases customer surplus. When network effects are homogeneous across customers, the resulting entry-deterring monopoly contract is a fixed fee and results in the socially optimal outcome. However, when the magnitude of heterogeneous network effects is relatively high, there are no changes in total surplus induced by the entry threat, and the price changes merely cause a transfer of value from the seller to its customers. The presence of network effects, and of a credible entry threat, are also shown to increase distributional efficiency by reducing the disparity in relative value captured by different customer types. Regulatory and policy implications of these results are discussed.
Author: Liang Chen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Author: Mark Armstrong
Publisher: Elsevier
ISBN: 008055184X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 943
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Book Description
This is Volume 3 of the Handbook of Industrial Organization series (HIO). Volumes 1 & 2 published simultaneously in 1989 and many of the chapters were widely cited and appeared on graduate reading lists. Since the first volumes published, the field of industrial organization has continued to evolve and this volume fills the gaps. While the first two volumes of HIO contain much more discussion of the theoretical literature than of the empirical literature, it was representative of the field at that time. Since then, the empirical literature has flourished, while the theoretical literature has continued to grow, and this new volume reflects that change of emphasis. Thie volume is an excellent reference and teaching supplement for industrial organization or industrial economics, the microeconomics field that focuses on business behavior and its implications for both market structures and processes, and for related public policies. *Part of the renowned Handbooks in Economics series *Chapters are contributed by some of the leading experts in their fields *A source, reference and teaching supplement for industrial organizations or industrial economists
Author: Vithala R. Rao
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 1848447442
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 617
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Book Description
Pricing is an essential aspect of the marketing mix for brands and products. Further, pricing research in marketing is interdisciplinary, utilizing economic and psychological concepts with special emphasis on measurement and estimation. This unique Handbook provides current knowledge of pricing in a single, authoritative volume and brings together new cutting-edge research by established marketing scholars on a range of topics in the area. The environment in which pricing decisions and transactions are implemented has changed dramatically, mainly due to the advent of the Internet and the practices of advance selling and yield management. Over the years, marketing scholars have incorporated developments in game theory and microeconomics, behavioral decision theory, psychological and social dimensions and newer market mechanisms of auctions in their contributions to pricing research. These chapters, specifically written for this Handbook, cover these various developments and concepts as applied to tackling pricing problems. Academics and doctoral students in marketing and applied economics, as well as pricing-focused business practitioners and consultants, will appreciate the state-of-the-art research herein.
Author: Alex Lundberg
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 5
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Book Description
The simple circular model of horizontal product differentiation, where firms compete in price, implies an excessive entry of firms in equilibrium. When non-monotonic network effects are present, this result no longer holds. If consumers differ in their optimal number of other consumers choosing the same good, entry in equilibrium can be insufficient.
Author: Arne Gramstad
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 33
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Book Description
This paper presents a model of second-degree price discrimination by a monopolistic seller who offers a menu of price-quantity pair contracts to consumers located in a social network. Network effects are local as consumers' private valuations are increasing in their friends' adoption decisions. When designing the optimal set of contracts, the seller takes into account how these local network effects are generated over the social network. Increased participation generates externalities through a ''market size effect'' (higher participation due to higher valuations) and a ''distribution effect'' (consumers upgrade to a higher quantity contract). Local network effects can induce the seller to offer contracts to some consumer segments at a loss (e.g., by offering a free-of-charge plan). Due to the combination of network effects and asymmetric information a complete market failure can occur, i.e., no output is produced despite some production is socially desirable.
Author: Frank Linde
Publisher: Walter de Gruyter
ISBN: 3110236095
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 641
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Book Description
Information Markets is a compendium of the i-commerce, the commerce with digital information, content as well as software. Information Markets is a comprehensive overview of the state of the art of economic and information science endeavors on the markets of digital information. It provides a strategic guideline for information providers how to analyse their market environment and how to develop possible strategic actions. It is a book for information professionals, both for students of LIS (Library and Information Science), CIS (Computer and Information Science) or Information Management curricula and for practitioners as well as managers in these fields.
Author: Kurt Geihs
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642574769
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 205
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Book Description
New information and communication technologies unquestionably brought about enormous changes that resulted in an ever-increasing networked society. Indeed, there is no area in the social and economic world which is unaffected by the recent advances. In response to these changes scientists from numerous disciplines teamed up in 1997 to lay a foundation for a common theory of networks. The objective was to gain a deeper understanding of the mechanisms behind social, economic, technical and other kinds of networks in order to develop a unified theory of networks. Such a theory would then guide public and private decisions concerning the planning, operations and controlling of all kinds of networks. The contributions in this book represent the first steps toward this ambitious goal.
Author: Wouter Dessein
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Previous research, assuming linear pricing, has argued that telecommunications networks may use a high access charge as an instrument of collusion. I show that this conclusion is difficult to maintain when operators compete in nonlinear pricing: (i) As long as subscription demand is inelastic, profits can remain independent of the access charge, even when customers are heterogeneous and networks engage in second-degree price discrimination. (ii) When demand for subscriptions is elastic, networks may increase profits by agreeing on an access charge below marginal cost (relative to cost-based access pricing). Welfare is typically increased by setting the access charge above marginal cost.
