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Author: Adriaan van den Assem
Publisher:
ISBN: 9789076301280
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 202
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Book Description
Author: Adriaan van den Assem
Publisher:
ISBN: 9789076301280
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 202
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 28
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Book Description
For the heads of state and government representing the 16 member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Rome Summit of 7-8 November 1991 presented the Euro-Atlantic Alliance a chance to respond to the key question: Has NATO lost its raison d'etre? Crafting a response was no small undertaking in light of the collapse of the Soviet threat and the accompanying political changes sweeping Europe, which have significantly altered the security environment there. Nevertheless, the NATO leaders sought to provide a positive answer. They had promised at an earlier summit, held in London in 1990, to develop a new strategy to adapt NATO to the new Europe for presentation in Rome. Not surprisingly, the Alliance leadership unveiled a plan in Rome that outlined a rationale for a continued role for NATO. The plan, called "New Strategic Concept" (NSC), dictated that "Prudence requires us to maintain an overall strategic balance and to remain ready to meet any potential risks to our security which may arise from instability or tensions." Acknowledging that the threat of a full-scale attack on NATO's European fronts had disappeared, the NSC contended nevertheless that an environment of uncertainty and unpredictability existed. This meant that the Alliance " ... retained its enduring value." According to the document, the allies would respond to the new, more favorable security circumstances in Europe. The Alliance promised to reduce its military forces and to restructure them along smaller, more flexible, mobile lines. They would be more multinational in nature as well. Further, NATO reaffirmed its commitment to be less reliant on nuclear weapons. The author contends that, at a time of continued strain and adjustment, NATO can provide a stabilizing influence at least over the short-term. He proposes that the Alliance be granted a lease on life out to the year 2000, using the New Strategic Concept as its mandate.
Author: Heidi Hardt
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 019067220X
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 297
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Book Description
In crisis management operations, strategic errors can cost lives. Some international organizations (IOs) learn from these failures whereas others tend to repeat them. Given that they have high rates of turnover, how is it possible that any IO retains knowledge about the past? This book introduces an argument for how and why IOs develop institutional memory from their efforts to manage crises. Findings indicate that the design of an IO's learning infrastructure (e.g. lessons learned offices and databases) can inadvertently disincentivize IO elites from using it to share knowledge about strategic errors. Elites - high-level officials in IOs - perceive reporting to be a risky endeavour. In response, they develop institutional memory by creating and using informal processes, including transnational interpersonal networks, private documentation and conversations during crisis management exercises. The result is an institutional memory that is highly dependent on only a handful of individuals. The book draws on the author's interviews and a survey experiment with 120 NATO elites across four countries. Cases of NATO crisis management in Afghanistan, Libya and Ukraine further illustrate the development of institutional memory. Findings challenge existing research on organizational learning by suggesting that formal learning processes alone are insufficient for ensuring that learning happens. The book also offers recommendations to policymakers for strengthening the learning capacity of IOs.
Author: Wesley B. Truitt
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing USA
ISBN: 1440871396
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 230
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Book Description
Is NATO still in the best interest of the United States? This provocative work argues that the focus on NATO distracts the U.S. from the vital foreign policy challenges of the 21st century, most notably China's rise in power. Since its beginning in 1949, NATO—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—has been at the center of U.S. foreign policy. The alliance was crucial during the decades of the Cold War, and the United States collaborated closely with NATO during crises in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya. But does the NATO alliance still serve the best interests of the U.S.? The NATO of today—one that has expanded to 30 member countries—risks involving the U.S. in unwanted military activities of the future, actions that were not intended in the original Atlantic alliance. In addition, the real challenges for foreign policy of 21st century are not in Europe, but in the expanding economic powerhouses in Asia, especially China. NATO Reconsidered argues that the changes in world politics in recent decades requires that the more than 70-year-old alliance should no longer be the principal focus of U.S. foreign policy.
Author: Michael E. O'Hanlon
Publisher: Brookings Institution Press
ISBN: 0815732589
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 171
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Book Description
In this new Brookings Marshall Paper, Michael O'Hanlon argues that now is the time for Western nations to negotiate a new security architecture for neutral countries in eastern Europe to stabilize the region and reduce the risks of war with Russia. He believes NATO expansion has gone far enough. The core concept of this new security architecture would be one of permanent neutrality. The countries in question collectively make a broken-up arc, from Europe's far north to its south: Finland and Sweden; Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus; Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan; and finally Cyprus plus Serbia, as well as possibly several other Balkan states. Discussion on the new framework should begin within NATO, followed by deliberation with the neutral countries themselves, and then formal negotiations with Russia. The new security architecture would require that Russia, like NATO, commit to help uphold the security of Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and other states in the region. Russia would have to withdraw its troops from those countries in a verifiable manner; after that, corresponding sanctions on Russia would be lifted. The neutral countries would retain their rights to participate in multilateral security operations on a scale comparable to what has been the case in the past, including even those operations that might be led by NATO. They could think of and describe themselves as Western states (or anything else, for that matter). If the European Union and they so wished in the future, they could join the EU. They would have complete sovereignty and self-determination in every sense of the word. But NATO would decide not to invite them into the alliance as members. Ideally, these nations would endorse and promote this concept themselves as a more practical way to ensure their security than the current situation or any other plausible alternative.
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 998
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Book Description
Author: James M. Goldgeier
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield
ISBN: 0815791054
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 234
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Book Description
How did Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic become the newest members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization? Based on interviews conducted with more than 75 individuals—from Cabinet officials to desk officers—James M. Goldgeier tells the inside story of this controversial Clinton administration initiative. Analyzing the earliest internal deliberations, as well as administration discussions with allies, the Russians, and the United States Senate, Goldgeier demonstrates how a handful of committed policymakers outmaneuvered overwhelming bureaucratic opposition. He shows the role of domestic politics in shaping the evolution of this policy and dissects the national campaign waged by the administration's specially created NATO enlargement ratification office and its outside supporters. Weaving together insights about bureaucratic politics, policy entrepreneurship, and domestic politics, this book provides fresh insights into the American foreign policymaking process.
Author: Benjamin S. Lambeth
Publisher: Rand Corporation
ISBN: 0833032372
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 323
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Book Description
This book offers a thorough appraisal of Operation Allied Force, NATO's 78-day air war to compel the president of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, to end his campaign of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. The author sheds light both on the operation's strengths and on its most salient weaknesses. He outlines the key highlights of the air war and examines the various factors that interacted to induce Milosevic to capitulate when he did. He then explores air power's most critical accomplishments in Operation Allied Force as well as the problems that hindered the operation both in its planning and in its execution. Finally, he assesses Operation Allied Force from a political and strategic perspective, calling attention to those issues that are likely to have the greatest bearing on future military policymaking. The book concludes that the air war, although by no means the only factor responsible for the allies' victory, certainly set the stage for Milosevic's surrender by making it clear that he had little to gain by holding out. It concludes that in the end, Operation Allied Force's most noteworthy distinction may lie in the fact that the allies prevailed despite the myriad impediments they faced.
Author: Ivo H. Daalder
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield
ISBN: 9780815798422
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 370
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Book Description
After eleven weeks of bombing in the spring of 1999, the United States and NATO ultimately won the war in Kosovo. Serbian troops were forced to withdraw, enabling an international military and political presence to take charge in the region. But was this war inevitable or was it the product of failed western diplomacy prior to the conflict? And once it became necessary to use force, did NATO adopt a sound strategy to achieve its aims of stabilizing Kosovo? In this first in-depth study of the Kosovo crisis, Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon answer these and other questions about the causes, conduct, and consequences of the war. Based on interviews with many of the key participants, they conclude that notwithstanding important diplomatic mistakes before the conflict, it would have been difficult to avoid the Kosovo war. That being the case, U.S. and NATO conduct of the war left much to be desired. For more than four weeks, the Serbs succeeded where NATO failed, forcefully changing Kosovo's ethnic balance by forcing 1.5 million Albanians from their home and more than 800,000 from the country. Had they chosen to massacre more of their victims, NATO would have been powerless to stop them. In the end, NATO won the war by increasing the scope and intensity of bombing, making serious plans for a ground invasion, and moving diplomacy into full gear in order to convince Belgrade that this was a war Serbia would never win. The Kosovo crisis is a cautionary tale for those who believe force can be used easily and in limited increments to stop genocide, mass killing, and the forceful expulsion of entire populations. Daalder and O'Hanlon conclude that the crisis holds important diplomatic and military lessons that must be learned so that others in the future might avoid the mistakes that were made in this case.
Author: Ronald D. Asmus
Publisher: Columbia University Press
ISBN: 0231502397
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 425
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Book Description
How and why did NATO, a Cold War military alliance created in 1949 to counter Stalin's USSR, become the cornerstone of new security order for post-Cold War Europe? Why, instead of retreating from Europe after communism's collapse, did the U.S. launch the greatest expansion of the American commitment to the old continent in decades? Written by a high-level insider, Opening NATO's Door provides a definitive account of the ideas, politics, and diplomacy that went into the historic decision to expand NATO to Central and Eastern Europe. Drawing on the still-classified archives of the U.S. Department of State, Ronald D. Asmus recounts how and why American policy makers, against formidable odds at home and abroad, expanded NATO as part of a broader strategy to overcome Europe's Cold War divide and to modernize the Alliance for a new era. Asmus was one of the earliest advocates and intellectual architects of NATO enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of communism in the early 1990s and subsequently served as a top aide to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott, responsible for European security issues. He was involved in the key negotiations that led to NATO's decision to extend invitations to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, and finally, the U.S. Senate's ratification of enlargement. Asmus documents how the Clinton Administration sought to develop a rationale for a new NATO that would bind the U.S. and Europe together as closely in the post-Cold War era as they had been during the fight against communism. For the Clinton Administration, NATO enlargement became the centerpiece of a broader agenda to modernize the U.S.-European strategic partnership for the future. That strategy reflected an American commitment to the spread of democracy and Western values, the importance attached to modernizing Washington's key alliances for an increasingly globalized world, and the fact that the Clinton Administration looked to Europe as America's natural partner in addressing the challenges of the twenty-first century. As the Alliance weighs its the future following the September 11 terrorist attacks on the U.S. and prepares for a second round of enlargement, this book is required reading about the first post-Cold War effort to modernize NATO for a new era.
