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Author: Qi Luo
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 17
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Book Description
Incentive contracts with multiple agents is a classical decentralized decision-making problem with asymmetric information. Contract design aims to incentivize noncooperative agents to act in the principal's interest over a planning horizon. We extend the single-agent incentive contract to a multiagent setting with history-dependent terminal conditions. Our contributions include: (a) Finding sufficient conditions for the existence of optimal multiagent incentive contracts and conditions under which they form a unique Nash Equilibrium; (b) Showing that the optimal multiagent incentive contracts can be solved by a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation with equilibrium constraints; (c) Proposing a backward iterative algorithm to solve the problem.
Author: Qi Luo
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 17
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Book Description
Incentive contracts with multiple agents is a classical decentralized decision-making problem with asymmetric information. Contract design aims to incentivize noncooperative agents to act in the principal's interest over a planning horizon. We extend the single-agent incentive contract to a multiagent setting with history-dependent terminal conditions. Our contributions include: (a) Finding sufficient conditions for the existence of optimal multiagent incentive contracts and conditions under which they form a unique Nash Equilibrium; (b) Showing that the optimal multiagent incentive contracts can be solved by a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation with equilibrium constraints; (c) Proposing a backward iterative algorithm to solve the problem.
Author: Bengt Holmstrom
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 60
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Author: Jonathan C. Glover
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 73
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Book Description
This monograph presents existing and new research on three approaches to multiagent incentives: simpler mechanisms, robust mechanisms, and implicit contracts. The goal of all three approaches is to find theories that better explain observed institutions than the standard approach has.
Author: Yaping Shan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Merit pay
Languages : en
Pages : 80
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Book Description
In this multiagent problem, each agents payment depends not only on his own performance, but is affected by the other agents performance as well. Similar to the single-agent case, an agent is rewarded when he succeeds, and his payment decreases over time when both agents fail. Regarding how an agents payment relates to his coworkers performance, I find that the optimal incentive regime is a function of the way in which agents efforts interact with one another: relative-performance evaluation is used when their efforts are substitutes whereas joint-performance evaluation is used when their efforts are complements. This result sheds new light on the notion of optimal incentive regimes, an issue that has been widely discussed in multi-agent incentive problems.
Author: Yehui Zhang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
The increasing demand for aviation complex products makes complex product manufacturers pay more attention to delivery efficiency, and the efficiency and effect of delivery problems are the key factors that restrict the delivery efficiency. This study aims to design a long-term effective incentive contract, which stimulates the subjective initiative of each technical business department to deal with delivery problems so as to improve delivery efficiency. We consider the behavioral characteristics of each technical business department (fairness preference, interrelationship diversity, technical capability, etc.) to expand the benchmark incentive model. The multi-stage incentive mechanism which combines the explicit incentives and implicit incentives are developed to explore the optimal delivery strategies based on a benchmark model. The results show that the incentive contracts can improve delivery efficiency and benefit delivery centers and technical business departments. The delivery decisions of the department are influenced by the closeness of department relationships and the fairness of assignment, and the departments tend to pay more effort in tasks with high relative importance and low effort cost. When the relative importance of tasks is equal to the ratio of marginal cost, a weak incentive zone in the delivery incentive contract is existed. The incentive effect of reputation effect is obvious except for the last stage. Base on the designed incentive contracts, the subjective initiative of the participants can be effectively stimulated to empower complex product delivery.
Author: Priyodorshi Banerjee
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 35
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Book Description
We study contracting in a principal multi-agent moral hazard problem where agents receive private information on the realisation of a common productivity shock after contracts are signed, but before actions are taken. Joint performance evaluation schemes can be optimal when private information is of sufficiently high quality, while relative performance evaluation schemes are optimal with poor quality private signals. Interdependent incentive schemes create an endogenous externality between agents, the nature of which depends on the structure of the evaluation scheme. Joint performance evaluation schemes generate endogenous complementarities in the presence of correlated private information, and so may be optimal.
Author: Joel S. Demski
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 58
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Author: Nick Bassiliades
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 3030664120
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 612
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Book Description
This book constitutes the revised post-conference proceedings of the 17th European Conference on Multi-Agent Systems, EUMAS 2020, and the 7th International Conference on Agreement Technologies, AT 2020, which were originally planned to be held as a joint event in Thessaloniki, Greece, in April 2020. Due to COVID-19 pandemic the conference was postponed to September 2020 and finally became a fully virtual conference. The 38 full papers presented in this volume were carefully reviewed and selected from a total of 53 submissions. The papers report on both early and mature research and cover a wide range of topics in the field of autonomous agents and multi-agent systems.
Author: United States. General Accounting Office
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 24
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Author: Jacques Paul Lawarrée
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 418
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