Moral Hazard, Limited Liability and the Corporation Tax PDF Download
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Author: Anindya Banerjee
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 36
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Author: Anindya Banerjee
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 36
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Author: Marie-Laure Djelic
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 40
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Book Description
The principle of limited liability is one of the defining characteristics of modern corporate capitalism. It is also, we argue in this paper, a powerful structural source of moral hazard. Engaging in a double conceptual genealogy, we investigate how the concepts of moral hazard and limited liability were created and diffused over time. We highlight two very similar but parallel paths of emergence, moral contestation and eventual institutionalization, and outline how the two notions have become connected through time, showing clear elective affinities between both concepts and their respective evolution. Going one step further, we suggest that both concepts have come to be connected through time. In the context of contemporary capitalism, limited liability has to be understood, we argue, as a powerful structural source of moral hazard. In conclusion, we propose that this structural link between limited liability and moral hazard is an important explanatory factor of the recent financial crisis and a seemingly intractable characteristic of modern corporate capitalism.
Author: Fabian Meißner
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 35
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In this paper we investigate the incentive effects of corporate taxes in an agency setting with a principal facing an investment opportunity including an abandonment option. We are particularly interested in the interplay of taxation and the real option on the principal's incentives to motivate the agent to work hard. First, we extend the well-known studies on tax effects on decision making under uncertainty to moral hazard settings. In a benchmark case we find that, as confirmed in current literature, the corporate income tax has no incentive effect. If the principal accounts for the real option we show that paradoxical tax effects may occur. Also, with respect to the effect of the real option on the incentive problem we show that the option makes it less attractive for the principal to induce the agent to exert a high effort.
Author: Jasper Kjar-Cruttenden
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Bankruptcy
Languages : en
Pages : 124
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Author: Rohan Pitchford
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 18
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Author: Carter G. Bishop
Publisher: Warren Gorham & Lamont
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 2036
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Author: Tony Orhnial
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
ISBN: 9780709905158
Category : Corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 223
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Author: Amy Finkelstein
Publisher: Columbia University Press
ISBN: 0231538685
Category : Medical
Languages : en
Pages : 161
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Book Description
Addressing the challenge of covering heath care expenses—while minimizing economic risks. Moral hazard—the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others—is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow’s seminal 1963 paper on this topic (included in this volume) was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for health care, and Amy Finkelstein—recognized as one of the world’s foremost experts on the topic—here examines this issue in the context of contemporary American health care policy. Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and her own research, including a 2008 Health Insurance Experiment in Oregon, Finkelstein presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this. The volume also features commentaries and insights from other renowned economists, including an introduction by Joseph P. Newhouse that provides context for the discussion, a commentary from Jonathan Gruber that considers provider-side moral hazard, and reflections from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow. “Reads like a fireside chat among a group of distinguished, articulate health economists.” —Choice
Author: Steven M. Matthews
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 21
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Author: Steven A. Matthews
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 40
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