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Author: Babu Nahata
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
This pedagogical note explains how the same basic principle can be applied to explain the profit-maximizing behavior of a monopolist under both linear and nonlinear pricing by introducing an average price function. It is shown that optimal conditions under nonlinear pricing are similar to that of linear pricing. These conditions can be explained through a simple graphical exposition. The optimal conditions under monopolistic linear and nonlinear price discriminations are also similar.
Author: Babu Nahata
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
This pedagogical note explains how the same basic principle can be applied to explain the profit-maximizing behavior of a monopolist under both linear and nonlinear pricing by introducing an average price function. It is shown that optimal conditions under nonlinear pricing are similar to that of linear pricing. These conditions can be explained through a simple graphical exposition. The optimal conditions under monopolistic linear and nonlinear price discriminations are also similar.
Author: Dezsö Szalay
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 21
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Book Description
Author: Kaushik Basu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Monopolies
Languages : en
Pages : 14
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Book Description
Author: Robert B. Wilson
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 9780195115826
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 446
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Book Description
What do phone rates, frequent flyer programs, and railroad tariffs all have in common? They are all examples of nonlinear pricing. Pricing is nonlinear when it is not strictly proportional to the quantity purchased. The Electric Power Research Institute has commissioned Robert Wilson to review the various facets of nonlinear pricing. The work starts with a general non-mathematical discussion, followed by a more technical presentation intended for readers with a fairly advanced background. Thorough and detailed, this study has ample examples of case studies from a variety of industries.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 142
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Book Description
Author: Hongxia Shen
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780549096375
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 104
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Book Description
This dissertation addresses optimal linear and nonlinear pricing policy design for a monopolistic network service provider with various types of public and private information on user types. In the communication network pricing literature, it is the linear pricing schemes that have been largely adopted, and here we investigate both linear and nonlinear pricing within the framework of a hierarchical Stackelberg (leader-follower) game, where the service provider sets prices for the resources (bandwidth) he offers as the leader, and the users respond by their choices of the amount of bandwidth (flow) they are willing to pay for. At the lower level, the presence of congestion cost (negative network effect) in the net utility functions of users leads to a noncooperative game among themselves, with Nash or Bayesian equilibrium being natural candidates for a solution. In the nonlinear pricing case, the approach is to view the problem as a reverse Stackelberg game, which is also an incentive-design problem. We also consider, for both linear and nonlinear pricing, three different scenarios based on the information sharing structure for all parties on the users' true types, namely complete information, partially incomplete information, and totally incomplete information. For each case, we obtain the optimal, or near-optimal, pricing policy that maximizes the service provider's profit given the noncooperative price-taking behavior of the users, generally for the asymptotic case regarding the number of users, since our focus is on communication networks with a large user population. Comparative studies between linear and nonlinear pricing, as well as between the three classes of informational scenarios, are carried out to evaluate profit improvement by adoption of nonlinear pricing and the service provider's game preferences.
Author: Patrick M. Emerson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Author: Sanford V. Berg
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521338936
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 580
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Book Description
Considered the cutting edge of microeconomic theory in the 1970s, natural monopoly research remains an active and fertile field. Policy makers and regulators have begun to implement entry and pricing policies that are based on theoretical and empirical analyses. This book develops a comprehensive framework for analyzing natural monopoly. The authors first present a historical overview of regulatory economics, followed by analyses of optimal pricing and investment for single- and multiproduct natural monopolies. Topics covered include cost and demand structures, efficiency impacts of linear and multipart pricing, peak-load pricing, capacity determination, and the sustainability of natural monopolies. After a survey and analysis of natural monopoly regulation in practice, the links between technological change and regulation are identified. The book concludes with a discussion of the alternatives to traditional regulation, including public ownership, franchise schemes, quality regulation, and new incentive systems. Throughout the book, issues from the telecommunications and energy industries are used to illustrate key points. Its integrated framework will make it useful to academic economists, regulatory analysts, business researchers, and advanced students of public utility economics.
Author: Lynne Pepall
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
ISBN: 1118250303
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 741
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Book Description
Pepall's Industrial Organization: Contemporary Theory and Empirical Applications, 5th Edition offers an accessible text in which topics are organized in a manner that motivates and facilitates progression from one chapter to the next. It serves as a complete, but concise, introduction to modern industrial economics. The text uniquely uses the tools of game theory, information economics, contracting issues, and practical examples to examine multiple facets of industrial organization. The fifth edition is more broadly accessible, balancing the tension between making modern industrial analysis accessible while also presenting the formal abstract modeling that gives the analysis its power. The more overtly mathematical content is presented in the Contemporary Industrial Organization text (aimed at the top tier universities) while this Fifth Edition will less mathematical (aimed at a wider range of four-year colleges and state universities.
Author: David M. Kreps
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691202753
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 870
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Book Description
David M. Kreps has developed a text in microeconomics that is both challenging and "user-friendly." The work is designed for the first-year graduate microeconomic theory course and is accessible to advanced undergraduates as well. Placing unusual emphasis on modern noncooperative game theory, it provides the student and instructor with a unified treatment of modern microeconomic theory--one that stresses the behavior of the individual actor (consumer or firm) in various institutional settings. The author has taken special pains to explore the fundamental assumptions of the theories and techniques studied, pointing out both strengths and weaknesses. The book begins with an exposition of the standard models of choice and the market, with extra attention paid to choice under uncertainty and dynamic choice. General and partial equilibrium approaches are blended, so that the student sees these approaches as points along a continuum. The work then turns to more modern developments. Readers are introduced to noncooperative game theory and shown how to model games and determine solution concepts. Models with incomplete information, the folk theorem and reputation, and bilateral bargaining are covered in depth. Information economics is explored next. A closing discussion concerns firms as organizations and gives readers a taste of transaction-cost economics.
