Author: Graf Von Helmuth Moltke
Publisher: Hardpress Publishing
ISBN: 9781290960793
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 202
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Book Description
Unlike some other reproductions of classic texts (1) We have not used OCR(Optical Character Recognition), as this leads to bad quality books with introduced typos. (2) In books where there are images such as portraits, maps, sketches etc We have endeavoured to keep the quality of these images, so they represent accurately the original artefact. Although occasionally there may be certain imperfections with these old texts, we feel they deserve to be made available for future generations to enjoy.
Author: Helmuth Graf von Moltke
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Tactics
Languages : en
Pages : 196
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Book Description
Author: Helmuth Graf von Moltke
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Tactics
Languages : en
Pages : 175
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Book Description
Author: Karl von Donat
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Tactics
Languages : en
Pages : 175
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Book Description
Author: Helmuth Graf von Moltke
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Tactics
Languages : en
Pages : 202
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Book Description
Author: Helmuth Moltke
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781375664998
Category : Fiction
Languages : en
Pages : 194
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Book Description
Author: United States. Adjutant-General's Office. Military Information Division
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Military art and science
Languages : en
Pages : 588
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Book Description
Author: United States. Military Information Division. War Department
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 606
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Book Description
Author: United States. Adjutant-General's Office. Military Information Division
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 978
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Book Description
Author: Jack Snyder
Publisher: Cornell University Press
ISBN: 0801468620
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 270
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Book Description
Jack Snyder's analysis of the attitudes of military planners in the years prior to the Great War offers new insight into the tragic miscalculations of that era and into their possible parallels in present-day war planning. By 1914, the European military powers had adopted offensive military strategies even though there was considerable evidence to support the notion that much greater advantage lay with defensive strategies. The author argues that organizational biases inherent in military strategists' attitudes make war more likely by encouraging offensive postures even when the motive is self-defense. Drawing on new historical evidence of the specific circumstances surrounding French, German, and Russian strategic policy, Snyder demonstrates that it is not only rational analysis that determines strategic doctrine, but also the attitudes of military planners. Snyder argues that the use of rational calculation often falls victim to the pursuit of organizational interests such as autonomy, prestige, growth, and wealth. Furthermore, efforts to justify the preferred policy bring biases into strategists' decisions—biases reflecting the influences of parochial interests and preconceptions, and those resulting from attempts to simplify unduly their analytical tasks. The frightening lesson here is that doctrines can be destabilizing even when weapons are not, because doctrine may be more responsive to the organizational needs of the military than to the implications of the prevailing weapons technology. By examining the historical failure of offensive doctrine, Jack Snyder makes a valuable contribution to the literature on the causes of war.
