Author: Peter Roman
Publisher: Cornell University Press
ISBN: 150174478X
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 281
Book Description
Uncertainty about Soviet intentions and capabilities after the launch of Sputnik required changes in U.S. strategic nuclear policy; Peter J. Roman draws from recently declassified archives to examine of one of the most unstable periods in the Cold War. Roman argues that presidential leadership from 1957 to 1960 was crucial to national security. Dwight D. Eisenhower was, he argues, actively involved in all nuclear policy making. His responses to the extreme uncertainty of the late 1950s shaped American nuclear policy for decades, and in its internal deliberations his administration anticipated much of the subsequent public debate. Eisenhower and the Missile Gap investigates a variety of issues, actors, and institutions to explain how a government deals with high levels of technological uncertainty. Several significant themes emerge: the evolution of American perceptions of vulnerability; problems in intelligence collection and analysis; the integration of new weapons systems into strategy; the influence of the armed forces; the impact of organizational interests on policy and force decisions; Eisenhower's internal and external leadership style; and presidential management of defense and foreign policy.
Eisenhower and the Missile Gap
Author: Peter Roman
Publisher: Cornell University Press
ISBN: 150174478X
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 281
Book Description
Uncertainty about Soviet intentions and capabilities after the launch of Sputnik required changes in U.S. strategic nuclear policy; Peter J. Roman draws from recently declassified archives to examine of one of the most unstable periods in the Cold War. Roman argues that presidential leadership from 1957 to 1960 was crucial to national security. Dwight D. Eisenhower was, he argues, actively involved in all nuclear policy making. His responses to the extreme uncertainty of the late 1950s shaped American nuclear policy for decades, and in its internal deliberations his administration anticipated much of the subsequent public debate. Eisenhower and the Missile Gap investigates a variety of issues, actors, and institutions to explain how a government deals with high levels of technological uncertainty. Several significant themes emerge: the evolution of American perceptions of vulnerability; problems in intelligence collection and analysis; the integration of new weapons systems into strategy; the influence of the armed forces; the impact of organizational interests on policy and force decisions; Eisenhower's internal and external leadership style; and presidential management of defense and foreign policy.
Publisher: Cornell University Press
ISBN: 150174478X
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 281
Book Description
Uncertainty about Soviet intentions and capabilities after the launch of Sputnik required changes in U.S. strategic nuclear policy; Peter J. Roman draws from recently declassified archives to examine of one of the most unstable periods in the Cold War. Roman argues that presidential leadership from 1957 to 1960 was crucial to national security. Dwight D. Eisenhower was, he argues, actively involved in all nuclear policy making. His responses to the extreme uncertainty of the late 1950s shaped American nuclear policy for decades, and in its internal deliberations his administration anticipated much of the subsequent public debate. Eisenhower and the Missile Gap investigates a variety of issues, actors, and institutions to explain how a government deals with high levels of technological uncertainty. Several significant themes emerge: the evolution of American perceptions of vulnerability; problems in intelligence collection and analysis; the integration of new weapons systems into strategy; the influence of the armed forces; the impact of organizational interests on policy and force decisions; Eisenhower's internal and external leadership style; and presidential management of defense and foreign policy.
Missile Gap
Author: Charles Stross
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781596060586
Category : Alternative histories (Fiction)
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Alternative history novella. "It's 1976 again ... the Cold War is in full swing -- and the earth is flat. It has been flat ever since the eve of the Cuban war of 1962."
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781596060586
Category : Alternative histories (Fiction)
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Alternative history novella. "It's 1976 again ... the Cold War is in full swing -- and the earth is flat. It has been flat ever since the eve of the Cuban war of 1962."
John F. Kennedy and the Missile Gap
Author: Christopher A. Preble
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Cold War
Languages : en
Pages : 264
Book Description
Capitalizing on fear of nuclear war, months after Kennedy's inauguration he won Congressional authorization for two supplemental appropriations that increased the defense budget by more than 15 percent. This study of the political uses of an alleged threat to national security, argues that the missile gap was a myth.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Cold War
Languages : en
Pages : 264
Book Description
Capitalizing on fear of nuclear war, months after Kennedy's inauguration he won Congressional authorization for two supplemental appropriations that increased the defense budget by more than 15 percent. This study of the political uses of an alleged threat to national security, argues that the missile gap was a myth.
Blind over Cuba
Author: David M. Barrett
Publisher: Texas A&M University Press
ISBN: 1603447687
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 226
Book Description
In the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, questions persisted about how the potential cataclysm had been allowed to develop. A subsequent congressional investigation focused on what came to be known as the “photo gap”: five weeks during which intelligence-gathering flights over Cuba had been attenuated. In Blind over Cuba, David M. Barrett and Max Holland challenge the popular perception of the Kennedy administration’s handling of the Soviet Union’s surreptitious deployment of missiles in the Western Hemisphere. Rather than epitomizing it as a masterpiece of crisis management by policy makers and the administration, Barrett and Holland make the case that the affair was, in fact, a close call stemming directly from decisions made in a climate of deep distrust between key administration officials and the intelligence community. Because of White House and State Department fears of “another U-2 incident” (the infamous 1960 Soviet downing of an American U-2 spy plane), the CIA was not permitted to send surveillance aircraft on prolonged flights over Cuban airspace for many weeks, from late August through early October. Events proved that this was precisely the time when the Soviets were secretly deploying missiles in Cuba. When Director of Central Intelligence John McCone forcefully pointed out that this decision had led to a dangerous void in intelligence collection, the president authorized one U-2 flight directly over western Cuba—thereby averting disaster, as the surveillance detected the Soviet missiles shortly before they became operational. The Kennedy administration recognized that their failure to gather intelligence was politically explosive, and their subsequent efforts to influence the perception of events form the focus for this study. Using recently declassified documents, secondary materials, and interviews with several key participants, Barrett and Holland weave a story of intra-agency conflict, suspicion, and discord that undermined intelligence-gathering, adversely affected internal postmortems conducted after the crisis peaked, and resulted in keeping Congress and the public in the dark about what really happened. Fifty years after the crisis that brought the superpowers to the brink, Blind over Cuba: The Photo Gap and the Missile Crisis offers a new chapter in our understanding of that pivotal event, the tensions inside the US government during the cold war, and the obstacles Congress faces when conducting an investigation of the executive branch.
Publisher: Texas A&M University Press
ISBN: 1603447687
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 226
Book Description
In the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, questions persisted about how the potential cataclysm had been allowed to develop. A subsequent congressional investigation focused on what came to be known as the “photo gap”: five weeks during which intelligence-gathering flights over Cuba had been attenuated. In Blind over Cuba, David M. Barrett and Max Holland challenge the popular perception of the Kennedy administration’s handling of the Soviet Union’s surreptitious deployment of missiles in the Western Hemisphere. Rather than epitomizing it as a masterpiece of crisis management by policy makers and the administration, Barrett and Holland make the case that the affair was, in fact, a close call stemming directly from decisions made in a climate of deep distrust between key administration officials and the intelligence community. Because of White House and State Department fears of “another U-2 incident” (the infamous 1960 Soviet downing of an American U-2 spy plane), the CIA was not permitted to send surveillance aircraft on prolonged flights over Cuban airspace for many weeks, from late August through early October. Events proved that this was precisely the time when the Soviets were secretly deploying missiles in Cuba. When Director of Central Intelligence John McCone forcefully pointed out that this decision had led to a dangerous void in intelligence collection, the president authorized one U-2 flight directly over western Cuba—thereby averting disaster, as the surveillance detected the Soviet missiles shortly before they became operational. The Kennedy administration recognized that their failure to gather intelligence was politically explosive, and their subsequent efforts to influence the perception of events form the focus for this study. Using recently declassified documents, secondary materials, and interviews with several key participants, Barrett and Holland weave a story of intra-agency conflict, suspicion, and discord that undermined intelligence-gathering, adversely affected internal postmortems conducted after the crisis peaked, and resulted in keeping Congress and the public in the dark about what really happened. Fifty years after the crisis that brought the superpowers to the brink, Blind over Cuba: The Photo Gap and the Missile Crisis offers a new chapter in our understanding of that pivotal event, the tensions inside the US government during the cold war, and the obstacles Congress faces when conducting an investigation of the executive branch.
Eyes in the Sky
Author: Theresa B Tabak
Publisher: Naval Institute Press
ISBN: 1612510140
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 517
Book Description
Dino A. Brugioni, author of the best-selling account of the Cuban Missile crisis, Eyeball to Eyeball, draws on his long CIA career as one of the world's premier experts on aerial reconnaissance to provide the inside story of President Dwight D. Eisenhower's efforts to use spy planes and satellites to gather intelligence. He reveals Eisenhower to be a hands-on president who, contrary to popular belief, took an active role in assuring that the latest technology was used to gather aerial intelligence. This previously untold story of the secret Cold War program makes full use of the author's firsthand knowledge of the program and of information he gained from interviews with important participants. As a founder and senior officer of the CIA's National Photographic Interpretation Center, Brugioni was a key player in keeping Eisenhower informed of developments, and he sheds new light on the president's contributions toward building an effective and technologically advanced intelligence organization. The book provides details of the president's backing of the U-2's development and its use to dispel the bomber gap and to provide data on Soviet missile and nuclear efforts and to deal with crises in the Suez, Lebanon, Chinese Off Shore Islands, Tibet, Indonesia, East Germany, and elsewhere. Brugioni offers new information about Eisenhower's order of U-2 flights over Malta, Cyprus, Toulon, and Israel and subsequent warnings to the British, French, and Israelis that the U.S. would not support an invasion of Egypt. He notes that the president also backed the development of the CORONA photographic satellite, which eventually proved the missile gap with the Soviet Union didn't exist, and a variety of other satellite systems that detected and monitored problems around the world. The unsung reconnaissance roles played by Jimmy Doolittle and Edwin Land are also highlighted in this revealing study of Cold War espionage.
Publisher: Naval Institute Press
ISBN: 1612510140
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 517
Book Description
Dino A. Brugioni, author of the best-selling account of the Cuban Missile crisis, Eyeball to Eyeball, draws on his long CIA career as one of the world's premier experts on aerial reconnaissance to provide the inside story of President Dwight D. Eisenhower's efforts to use spy planes and satellites to gather intelligence. He reveals Eisenhower to be a hands-on president who, contrary to popular belief, took an active role in assuring that the latest technology was used to gather aerial intelligence. This previously untold story of the secret Cold War program makes full use of the author's firsthand knowledge of the program and of information he gained from interviews with important participants. As a founder and senior officer of the CIA's National Photographic Interpretation Center, Brugioni was a key player in keeping Eisenhower informed of developments, and he sheds new light on the president's contributions toward building an effective and technologically advanced intelligence organization. The book provides details of the president's backing of the U-2's development and its use to dispel the bomber gap and to provide data on Soviet missile and nuclear efforts and to deal with crises in the Suez, Lebanon, Chinese Off Shore Islands, Tibet, Indonesia, East Germany, and elsewhere. Brugioni offers new information about Eisenhower's order of U-2 flights over Malta, Cyprus, Toulon, and Israel and subsequent warnings to the British, French, and Israelis that the U.S. would not support an invasion of Egypt. He notes that the president also backed the development of the CORONA photographic satellite, which eventually proved the missile gap with the Soviet Union didn't exist, and a variety of other satellite systems that detected and monitored problems around the world. The unsung reconnaissance roles played by Jimmy Doolittle and Edwin Land are also highlighted in this revealing study of Cold War espionage.
The Missile Next Door
Author: Gretchen Heefner
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 0674067460
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 321
Book Description
In the 1960s the Air Force buried 1,000 ICBMs in pastures across the Great Plains to keep U.S. nuclear strategy out of view. As rural civilians of all political stripes found themselves living in the Soviet crosshairs, a proud Plains individualism gave way to an economic dependence on the military-industrial complex that still persists today.
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 0674067460
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 321
Book Description
In the 1960s the Air Force buried 1,000 ICBMs in pastures across the Great Plains to keep U.S. nuclear strategy out of view. As rural civilians of all political stripes found themselves living in the Soviet crosshairs, a proud Plains individualism gave way to an economic dependence on the military-industrial complex that still persists today.
Strategy in the Missile Age
Author: Bernard Brodie
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 1400875102
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 440
Book Description
Strategy in the Missile Age first reviews the development of modern military strategy to World War II, giving the reader a reference point for the radical rethinking that follows, as Dr. Brodie considers the problems of the Strategic Air Command, of civil defense, of limited war, of counterforce or pre-emptive strategies, of city-busting, of missile bases in Europe, and so on. The book, unlike so many on modern military affairs, does not present a program or defend a policy, nor is it a brief for any one of the armed services. It is a balanced analysis of the requirements of strength for the 1960's, including especially the military posture necessary to prevent war. A unique feature is the discussion of the problem of the cost of preparedness in relation to the requirements of the national economy, so often neglected by other military thinkers. Originally published in 1959. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 1400875102
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 440
Book Description
Strategy in the Missile Age first reviews the development of modern military strategy to World War II, giving the reader a reference point for the radical rethinking that follows, as Dr. Brodie considers the problems of the Strategic Air Command, of civil defense, of limited war, of counterforce or pre-emptive strategies, of city-busting, of missile bases in Europe, and so on. The book, unlike so many on modern military affairs, does not present a program or defend a policy, nor is it a brief for any one of the armed services. It is a balanced analysis of the requirements of strength for the 1960's, including especially the military posture necessary to prevent war. A unique feature is the discussion of the problem of the cost of preparedness in relation to the requirements of the national economy, so often neglected by other military thinkers. Originally published in 1959. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
How Ike Led
Author: Susan Eisenhower
Publisher: Macmillan + ORM
ISBN: 1250238781
Category : Biography & Autobiography
Languages : en
Pages : 309
Book Description
“Lays bare the essence of [President Eisenhower’s] leadership in war and peace—his singular devotion to the unity and security of the American people.” —The Wall Street Journal Few leaders have made decisions as momentous—and varied—as Dwight D. Eisenhower. From D-Day to Little Rock, from the Korean War to Cold War crises, from the Red Scare to the Missile Gap controversies, Ike was able to give our country eight years of peace and prosperity by relying on a core set of principles. These were informed by his heritage and upbringing, as well as his strong character and personal discipline—but he also avoided making himself the center of things. He was a man of judgment, and a steadying force. He sought national unity by pursuing a course he called the “Middle Way” that tried to make winners on both sides of any issue. Ike was a strategic, not an operational leader, who relied on a rigorous pursuit of the facts for decision-making. His talent for envisioning a whole, especially in the context of the long game, and his ability to see causes and various consequences, explains his success as Allied Commander and as President. After making a decision, he made himself accountable for it, recognizing that personal responsibility is the bedrock of sound principles. Written by his granddaughter, a policy analyst and national security expert, How Ike Led reveals the personality, beliefs, and habits that allowed Eisenhower to lead America through a transformational time. “As good a picture of Ike as we have ever had.” —David Nichols, author of Eisenhower 1956 “Highly personal anecdotes supplement [the author’s] research. Armchair historians will treasure this book.” —Booklist Includes photographs
Publisher: Macmillan + ORM
ISBN: 1250238781
Category : Biography & Autobiography
Languages : en
Pages : 309
Book Description
“Lays bare the essence of [President Eisenhower’s] leadership in war and peace—his singular devotion to the unity and security of the American people.” —The Wall Street Journal Few leaders have made decisions as momentous—and varied—as Dwight D. Eisenhower. From D-Day to Little Rock, from the Korean War to Cold War crises, from the Red Scare to the Missile Gap controversies, Ike was able to give our country eight years of peace and prosperity by relying on a core set of principles. These were informed by his heritage and upbringing, as well as his strong character and personal discipline—but he also avoided making himself the center of things. He was a man of judgment, and a steadying force. He sought national unity by pursuing a course he called the “Middle Way” that tried to make winners on both sides of any issue. Ike was a strategic, not an operational leader, who relied on a rigorous pursuit of the facts for decision-making. His talent for envisioning a whole, especially in the context of the long game, and his ability to see causes and various consequences, explains his success as Allied Commander and as President. After making a decision, he made himself accountable for it, recognizing that personal responsibility is the bedrock of sound principles. Written by his granddaughter, a policy analyst and national security expert, How Ike Led reveals the personality, beliefs, and habits that allowed Eisenhower to lead America through a transformational time. “As good a picture of Ike as we have ever had.” —David Nichols, author of Eisenhower 1956 “Highly personal anecdotes supplement [the author’s] research. Armchair historians will treasure this book.” —Booklist Includes photographs
Missile Guidance and Control Systems
Author: George M. Siouris
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 0387218165
Category : Technology & Engineering
Languages : en
Pages : 670
Book Description
Airborne Vehicle Guidance and Control Systems is a broad and wide- angled engineering and technological area for research, and continues to be important not only in military defense systems but also in industrial process control and in commercial transportation networks such as various Global Positioning Systems (GPS). The book fills a long-standing gap in the literature. The author is retired from the Air Force Institute and received the Air Force's Outstanding Civilian Career Service Award.
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 0387218165
Category : Technology & Engineering
Languages : en
Pages : 670
Book Description
Airborne Vehicle Guidance and Control Systems is a broad and wide- angled engineering and technological area for research, and continues to be important not only in military defense systems but also in industrial process control and in commercial transportation networks such as various Global Positioning Systems (GPS). The book fills a long-standing gap in the literature. The author is retired from the Air Force Institute and received the Air Force's Outstanding Civilian Career Service Award.
Awaiting Armageddon
Author: Alice L. George
Publisher: UNC Press Books
ISBN: 0807861618
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 265
Book Description
For thirteen days in October 1962, America stood at the brink of nuclear war. Nikita Khrushchev's decision to place nuclear missiles in Cuba and John F. Kennedy's defiant response introduced the possibility of unprecedented cataclysm. The immediate threat of destruction entered America's classrooms and its living rooms. Awaiting Armageddon provides the first in-depth look at this crisis as it roiled outside of government offices, where ordinary Americans realized their government was unprepared to protect either itself or its citizens from the dangers of nuclear war. During the seven days between Kennedy's announcement of a naval blockade and Khrushchev's decision to withdraw Soviet nuclear missiles from Cuba, U.S. citizens absorbed the nightmare scenario unfolding on their television sets. An estimated ten million Americans fled their homes; millions more prepared shelters at home, clearing the shelves of supermarkets and gun stores. Alice George captures the irrationality of the moment as Americans coped with dread and resignation, humor and pathos, terror and ignorance. In her examination of the public response to the missile crisis, the author reveals cracks in the veneer of American confidence in the early years of the space age and demonstrates how the fears generated by Cold War culture blinded many Americans to the dangers of nuclear war until it was almost too late.
Publisher: UNC Press Books
ISBN: 0807861618
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 265
Book Description
For thirteen days in October 1962, America stood at the brink of nuclear war. Nikita Khrushchev's decision to place nuclear missiles in Cuba and John F. Kennedy's defiant response introduced the possibility of unprecedented cataclysm. The immediate threat of destruction entered America's classrooms and its living rooms. Awaiting Armageddon provides the first in-depth look at this crisis as it roiled outside of government offices, where ordinary Americans realized their government was unprepared to protect either itself or its citizens from the dangers of nuclear war. During the seven days between Kennedy's announcement of a naval blockade and Khrushchev's decision to withdraw Soviet nuclear missiles from Cuba, U.S. citizens absorbed the nightmare scenario unfolding on their television sets. An estimated ten million Americans fled their homes; millions more prepared shelters at home, clearing the shelves of supermarkets and gun stores. Alice George captures the irrationality of the moment as Americans coped with dread and resignation, humor and pathos, terror and ignorance. In her examination of the public response to the missile crisis, the author reveals cracks in the veneer of American confidence in the early years of the space age and demonstrates how the fears generated by Cold War culture blinded many Americans to the dangers of nuclear war until it was almost too late.