Author: Bruno Mölder
Publisher: John Benjamins Publishing
ISBN: 9027252165
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 309
Book Description
This book provides a thoroughly worked out and systematic presentation of an interpretivist position in the philosophy of mind, of the view that having mental properties is a matter of interpretation. Bruno Molder elaborates and defends a particular version of interpretivism, the ascription theory, which explicates the possession of mental states with contents in terms of their canonical ascribability, and shows how it can withstand various philosophical challenges. Apart from a defence of the ascription theory from the objections commonly directed against interpretivism, the book provides a critical analysis of major alternative accounts of mental state possession as well as the interpretivist ideas originating from Donald Davidson and Daniel Dennett. The viability of the approach is demonstrated by showing how one can treat mental causation as well as the faculties closely connected with consciousness perception and the awareness of one s own mental states in the interpretivist framework. (Series A)"
Mind Ascribed
Author: Bruno Mölder
Publisher: John Benjamins Publishing
ISBN: 9027252165
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 309
Book Description
This book provides a thoroughly worked out and systematic presentation of an interpretivist position in the philosophy of mind, of the view that having mental properties is a matter of interpretation. Bruno Molder elaborates and defends a particular version of interpretivism, the ascription theory, which explicates the possession of mental states with contents in terms of their canonical ascribability, and shows how it can withstand various philosophical challenges. Apart from a defence of the ascription theory from the objections commonly directed against interpretivism, the book provides a critical analysis of major alternative accounts of mental state possession as well as the interpretivist ideas originating from Donald Davidson and Daniel Dennett. The viability of the approach is demonstrated by showing how one can treat mental causation as well as the faculties closely connected with consciousness perception and the awareness of one s own mental states in the interpretivist framework. (Series A)"
Publisher: John Benjamins Publishing
ISBN: 9027252165
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 309
Book Description
This book provides a thoroughly worked out and systematic presentation of an interpretivist position in the philosophy of mind, of the view that having mental properties is a matter of interpretation. Bruno Molder elaborates and defends a particular version of interpretivism, the ascription theory, which explicates the possession of mental states with contents in terms of their canonical ascribability, and shows how it can withstand various philosophical challenges. Apart from a defence of the ascription theory from the objections commonly directed against interpretivism, the book provides a critical analysis of major alternative accounts of mental state possession as well as the interpretivist ideas originating from Donald Davidson and Daniel Dennett. The viability of the approach is demonstrated by showing how one can treat mental causation as well as the faculties closely connected with consciousness perception and the awareness of one s own mental states in the interpretivist framework. (Series A)"
The Mind Club
Author: Daniel M. Wegner
Publisher: Penguin
ISBN: 0143110020
Category : Psychology
Languages : en
Pages : 402
Book Description
“Compelling, and so beautifully written…’The Mind Club’ deftly brings the most up-to-date research about other minds to readers of all backgrounds. It may cause you to think differently about crime and punishment, about business transactions and health care, and even about the upcoming elections. Things might just start looking up.”–The Wall Street Journal From dogs to gods, the science of understanding mysterious minds—including your own. Nothing seems more real than the minds of other people. When you consider what your boss is thinking or whether your spouse is happy, you are admitting them into the "mind club." It’s easy to assume other humans can think and feel, but what about a cow, a computer, a corporation? What kinds of mind do they have? Daniel M. Wegner and Kurt Gray are award-winning psychologists who have discovered that minds—while incredibly important—are a matter of perception. Their research opens a trove of new findings, with insights into human behavior that are fascinating, frightening and funny. The Mind Club explains why we love some animals and eat others, why people debate the existence of God so intensely, how good people can be so cruel, and why robots make such poor lovers. By investigating the mind perception of extraordinary targets—animals, machines, comatose people, god—Wegner and Gray explain what it means to have a mind, and why it matters so much. Fusing cutting-edge research and personal anecdotes, The Mind Club explores the moral dimensions of mind perception with wit and compassion, revealing the surprisingly simple basis for what compels us to love and hate, to harm and to protect.
Publisher: Penguin
ISBN: 0143110020
Category : Psychology
Languages : en
Pages : 402
Book Description
“Compelling, and so beautifully written…’The Mind Club’ deftly brings the most up-to-date research about other minds to readers of all backgrounds. It may cause you to think differently about crime and punishment, about business transactions and health care, and even about the upcoming elections. Things might just start looking up.”–The Wall Street Journal From dogs to gods, the science of understanding mysterious minds—including your own. Nothing seems more real than the minds of other people. When you consider what your boss is thinking or whether your spouse is happy, you are admitting them into the "mind club." It’s easy to assume other humans can think and feel, but what about a cow, a computer, a corporation? What kinds of mind do they have? Daniel M. Wegner and Kurt Gray are award-winning psychologists who have discovered that minds—while incredibly important—are a matter of perception. Their research opens a trove of new findings, with insights into human behavior that are fascinating, frightening and funny. The Mind Club explains why we love some animals and eat others, why people debate the existence of God so intensely, how good people can be so cruel, and why robots make such poor lovers. By investigating the mind perception of extraordinary targets—animals, machines, comatose people, god—Wegner and Gray explain what it means to have a mind, and why it matters so much. Fusing cutting-edge research and personal anecdotes, The Mind Club explores the moral dimensions of mind perception with wit and compassion, revealing the surprisingly simple basis for what compels us to love and hate, to harm and to protect.
Mind, Self and Interiority
Author: Thomas Duddy
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
ISBN: 1351917420
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 203
Book Description
Contemporary philosophers of mind often raise serious questions around the concepts of self, subjectivity, and ’the inner life’ on the grounds that such concepts have their origin in a discredited Cartesian metaphysics. The contention of this book is that the rejection of ’interiority’ and related concepts has been based on a time-honoured misreading of Descartes. In the course of exposing the misconceived anti-Cartesianism of a wide range of thinkers from Wittgenstein and Ryle to Dennett and Foucault, an attempt is made to clear a space for a new post-Cartesian conception of subjectivity - a conception of subjectivity which is consistent with at least some versions of materialism. The aim of this book is not to defend Cartesian dualism but to reclaim important concepts that have been anathematized by having been mistakenly associated with it.
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
ISBN: 1351917420
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 203
Book Description
Contemporary philosophers of mind often raise serious questions around the concepts of self, subjectivity, and ’the inner life’ on the grounds that such concepts have their origin in a discredited Cartesian metaphysics. The contention of this book is that the rejection of ’interiority’ and related concepts has been based on a time-honoured misreading of Descartes. In the course of exposing the misconceived anti-Cartesianism of a wide range of thinkers from Wittgenstein and Ryle to Dennett and Foucault, an attempt is made to clear a space for a new post-Cartesian conception of subjectivity - a conception of subjectivity which is consistent with at least some versions of materialism. The aim of this book is not to defend Cartesian dualism but to reclaim important concepts that have been anathematized by having been mistakenly associated with it.
The Unity of the Mind
Author: D H M Brooks
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 1349231789
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 185
Book Description
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 1349231789
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 185
Book Description
Intentionality Deconstructed
Author: Amir Horowitz
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198896433
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 214
Book Description
Intentionality Deconstructed argues for the view that no concrete entity - mental, linguistic, or any other - can possess intentional content. Nothing can be about anything. The concept of intentionality is flawed, and so content ascriptions cannot be "absolutely" true or false - they lack truth conditions. Nonetheless, content ascriptions have truth conditions and can be true (or possess a related epistemic merit) relative to practices of content ascription, so that different practices may imply different (not real but practice-dependent) intentional objects for the same token mental state. The suggested view does not deny the existence of those mental states standardly considered intentional, notably the so-called propositional attitudes; it affirms it. That is, support is provided for the existence of those states with the properties usually attributed to them, but absent intentional properties. Specifically, it is argued that the so-called propositional attitudes possess logico-syntactic properties, whose postulation plays an important role in addressing the challenge of reconciling intentional anti-realism with beliefs being true or having alternative epistemic merits, the argument from the predictive and explanatory success of content ascription for intentional realism, and the cognitive suicide objection to views that deny intentionality. As part of the rejection of this final objection, intentional anti-realism is presented as a radical view, which claims "Nothing can possess intentional content" but not that nothing can possess intentional content, and it is argued that this is a legitimate characteristic of radical philosophy. In spite of rejecting the "claim that" talk, intentional anti-realism gives clear sense to its dispute with its rivals as well as to its own superiority. Various arguments for intentional anti-realism are presented. One argument rejects all possible accounts of intentionality, namely primitivism, intrinsic reductionism - the prominent example of which is the phenomenal intentionality thesis - and extrinsic reductionism (that is, reductive naturalistic accounts). According to another argument, since intentional properties are shown to be dispensable for all possibly relevant purposes, and no sound arguments support the claim that they ever are instantiated, the application of Ockham's razor shows that no such properties ever are instantiated, and another step shows that neither can they be.
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198896433
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 214
Book Description
Intentionality Deconstructed argues for the view that no concrete entity - mental, linguistic, or any other - can possess intentional content. Nothing can be about anything. The concept of intentionality is flawed, and so content ascriptions cannot be "absolutely" true or false - they lack truth conditions. Nonetheless, content ascriptions have truth conditions and can be true (or possess a related epistemic merit) relative to practices of content ascription, so that different practices may imply different (not real but practice-dependent) intentional objects for the same token mental state. The suggested view does not deny the existence of those mental states standardly considered intentional, notably the so-called propositional attitudes; it affirms it. That is, support is provided for the existence of those states with the properties usually attributed to them, but absent intentional properties. Specifically, it is argued that the so-called propositional attitudes possess logico-syntactic properties, whose postulation plays an important role in addressing the challenge of reconciling intentional anti-realism with beliefs being true or having alternative epistemic merits, the argument from the predictive and explanatory success of content ascription for intentional realism, and the cognitive suicide objection to views that deny intentionality. As part of the rejection of this final objection, intentional anti-realism is presented as a radical view, which claims "Nothing can possess intentional content" but not that nothing can possess intentional content, and it is argued that this is a legitimate characteristic of radical philosophy. In spite of rejecting the "claim that" talk, intentional anti-realism gives clear sense to its dispute with its rivals as well as to its own superiority. Various arguments for intentional anti-realism are presented. One argument rejects all possible accounts of intentionality, namely primitivism, intrinsic reductionism - the prominent example of which is the phenomenal intentionality thesis - and extrinsic reductionism (that is, reductive naturalistic accounts). According to another argument, since intentional properties are shown to be dispensable for all possibly relevant purposes, and no sound arguments support the claim that they ever are instantiated, the application of Ockham's razor shows that no such properties ever are instantiated, and another step shows that neither can they be.
A System Of Mechanical Philosophy
Author: John Robison
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 848
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 848
Book Description
Social Psychology
Author: Arie W. Kruglanski
Publisher: Psychology Press
ISBN: 9780863776946
Category : Psychology
Languages : en
Pages : 676
Book Description
First Published in 2003. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
Publisher: Psychology Press
ISBN: 9780863776946
Category : Psychology
Languages : en
Pages : 676
Book Description
First Published in 2003. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
Groups as Agents
Author: Deborah Perron Tollefsen
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
ISBN: 0745684874
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 114
Book Description
In the social sciences and in everyday speech we often talk about groups as if they behaved in the same way as individuals, thinking and acting as a singular being. We say for example that "Google intends to develop an automated car", "the U.S. Government believes that Syria has used chemical weapons on its people", or that "the NRA wants to protect the rights of gun owners". We also often ascribe legal and moral responsibility to groups. But could groups literally intend things? Is there such a thing as a collective mind? If so, should groups be held morally responsible? Such questions are of vital importance to our understanding of the social world. In this lively, engaging introduction Deborah Tollefsen offers a careful survey of contemporary philosophers? answers to these questions, and argues for the unorthodox view that certain groups should, indeed, be treated as agents and deserve to be held morally accountable. Tollefsen explores the nature of belief, action and intention, and shows the reader how a belief in group agency can be reconciled with our understanding of individual agency and accountability. Groups as Agents will be a vital resource for scholars as well as for students of philosophy and the social sciences encountering the topic for the first time.
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
ISBN: 0745684874
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 114
Book Description
In the social sciences and in everyday speech we often talk about groups as if they behaved in the same way as individuals, thinking and acting as a singular being. We say for example that "Google intends to develop an automated car", "the U.S. Government believes that Syria has used chemical weapons on its people", or that "the NRA wants to protect the rights of gun owners". We also often ascribe legal and moral responsibility to groups. But could groups literally intend things? Is there such a thing as a collective mind? If so, should groups be held morally responsible? Such questions are of vital importance to our understanding of the social world. In this lively, engaging introduction Deborah Tollefsen offers a careful survey of contemporary philosophers? answers to these questions, and argues for the unorthodox view that certain groups should, indeed, be treated as agents and deserve to be held morally accountable. Tollefsen explores the nature of belief, action and intention, and shows the reader how a belief in group agency can be reconciled with our understanding of individual agency and accountability. Groups as Agents will be a vital resource for scholars as well as for students of philosophy and the social sciences encountering the topic for the first time.
Author: Rev Iheanyi Hycenth Iruoma
Publisher: AuthorHouse
ISBN: 1452048541
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 122
Book Description
He that kills a lion shall eat the honey from the carcass. No honey without a lion. He that kills a lion shall eat with kings in their palace. The honey of every man is in his hands which only will come when he kills a lion. Honey without a lion (labor) has no testimony. Honey gotten from killing a lion satisfies, gladdens, attracts God's blessings and fattens human's souls.
Publisher: AuthorHouse
ISBN: 1452048541
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 122
Book Description
He that kills a lion shall eat the honey from the carcass. No honey without a lion. He that kills a lion shall eat with kings in their palace. The honey of every man is in his hands which only will come when he kills a lion. Honey without a lion (labor) has no testimony. Honey gotten from killing a lion satisfies, gladdens, attracts God's blessings and fattens human's souls.
Motivational Science
Author: Edward Tory Higgins
Publisher: Psychology Press
ISBN: 9780863776960
Category : Psychology
Languages : en
Pages : 478
Book Description
A current collection of articles that define the field of motivational science.
Publisher: Psychology Press
ISBN: 9780863776960
Category : Psychology
Languages : en
Pages : 478
Book Description
A current collection of articles that define the field of motivational science.