Market Information and Bidder Heterogeneity in Secondary Market Online B2B Auctions

Market Information and Bidder Heterogeneity in Secondary Market Online B2B Auctions PDF Author: Ali Pilehvar
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
Online auction environments provide several sources of information that can be used by bidders to form their bids. The impact of this information on bidding is likely to be higher when ambiguously specifi ed products are auctioned. The secondary market represents one such environment, where used and returned items from big-box retailers are auctioned off to other business buyers. Using a proprietary dataset of secondary market auctions hosted on an online B2B platform, we study how market pricing information from other auctions for comparable products a ffects the bidding behavior of the first bidder. First bidders are shown to be influenced by two sets of pricing information: prices from their own historical bidding behavior and concurrent prices, formed from other open and just-finished auctions relative to the focal auction. We also study how the impact of these market pricing information are moderated by bidder heterogeneity, captured by bidder experience and cross bidding activity on the platform across comparable concurrent auctions. Finally, we show the fi rst bid is signi cantly associated with the auction's nal price, contingent on the type of first bidder. Auctions are increasingly being used for the sale of ill-defi ned and idiosyncratic products; our work thus provides managerial implications for how auctioneers may design and manage the flow of relevant information to di erent classes of bidders on their sites in order to enhance their yields.

Market Information and Bidder Heterogeneity in Secondary Market Online B2B Auctions

Market Information and Bidder Heterogeneity in Secondary Market Online B2B Auctions PDF Author: Ali Pilehvar
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
Online auction environments provide several sources of information that can be used by bidders to form their bids. The impact of this information on bidding is likely to be higher when ambiguously specifi ed products are auctioned. The secondary market represents one such environment, where used and returned items from big-box retailers are auctioned off to other business buyers. Using a proprietary dataset of secondary market auctions hosted on an online B2B platform, we study how market pricing information from other auctions for comparable products a ffects the bidding behavior of the first bidder. First bidders are shown to be influenced by two sets of pricing information: prices from their own historical bidding behavior and concurrent prices, formed from other open and just-finished auctions relative to the focal auction. We also study how the impact of these market pricing information are moderated by bidder heterogeneity, captured by bidder experience and cross bidding activity on the platform across comparable concurrent auctions. Finally, we show the fi rst bid is signi cantly associated with the auction's nal price, contingent on the type of first bidder. Auctions are increasingly being used for the sale of ill-defi ned and idiosyncratic products; our work thus provides managerial implications for how auctioneers may design and manage the flow of relevant information to di erent classes of bidders on their sites in order to enhance their yields.

Handbook of Business-to-Business Marketing

Handbook of Business-to-Business Marketing PDF Author: Lilien, Gary L.
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 1800376871
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 713

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Book Description
This path-breaking Handbook is targeted primarily at marketing academics and graduate students who want a comprehensive overview of the academic state of the business-to-business marketing domain. It will also prove an invaluable resource for forward-thinking business-to-business practitioners who want to be aware of the current state of knowledge in their domains.

The Handbook of Behavioral Operations

The Handbook of Behavioral Operations PDF Author: Karen Donohue
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
ISBN: 1119138310
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 631

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Book Description
A comprehensive review of behavioral operations management that puts the focus on new and trending research in the field The Handbook of Behavioral Operations offers a comprehensive resource that fills the gap in the behavioral operations management literature. This vital text highlights best practices in behavioral operations research and identifies the most current research directions and their applications. A volume in the Wiley Series in Operations Research and Management Science, this book contains contributions from an international panel of scholars from a wide variety of backgrounds who are conducting behavioral research. The handbook provides succinct tutorials on common methods used to conduct behavioral research, serves as a resource for current topics in behavioral operations research, and as a guide to the use of new research methods. The authors review the fundamental theories and offer frameworks from a psychological, systems dynamics, and behavioral economic standpoint. They provide a crucial grounding for behavioral operations as well as an entry point for new areas of behavioral research. The handbook also presents a variety of behavioral operations applications that focus on specific areas of study and includes a survey of current and future research needs. This important resource: Contains a summary of the methodological foundations and in-depth treatment of research best practices in behavioral research. Provides a comprehensive review of the research conducted over the past two decades in behavioral operations, including such classic topics as inventory management, supply chain contracting, forecasting, and competitive sourcing. Covers a wide-range of current topics and applications including supply chain risk, responsible and sustainable supply chain, health care operations, culture and trust. Connects existing bodies of behavioral operations literature with related fields, including psychology and economics. Provides a vision for future behavioral research in operations. Written for academicians within the operations management community as well as for behavioral researchers, The Handbook of Behavioral Operations offers a comprehensive resource for the study of how individuals make decisions in an operational context with contributions from experts in the field.

Sequential Effects and Bidder Heterogeneity in B2B Auctions

Sequential Effects and Bidder Heterogeneity in B2B Auctions PDF Author: Alex Scott
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 37

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Book Description
Heterogeneous bidding behavior by firms in business-to-business procurement auctions has recently been observed in contexts as wide-ranging as Dutch flower auctions and auctions for secondhand goods. But there has yet to be an empirical examination of what types of firms behave in which ways. We study a longitudinal dataset of spot auctions in which we observe exogenously-imposed business constraints on the bidding firms - some firms can perform work only using assets that they own and operate, while others must outsource work - i.e., brokers. These business constraints manifest themselves in strikingly different behavior by the bidding firms. Brokers bid often and with relatively high prices, while firms who operate assets bid infrequently, with low prices, and are highly affected by capacity constraints. The two types of firms have different response mechanisms in sequential auctions. Brokers adjust their prices in subsequent auctions based on whether they won or lost the previous auction, while firms who operate assets decide whether or not to place a bid. We examine other sources of heterogeneity and discuss implications for our focal industry.

The Double Auction Market

The Double Auction Market PDF Author: Daniel Friedman
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 0429961081
Category : Social Science
Languages : en
Pages : 456

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Book Description
This book focuses on markets organized as double auctions in which both buyers and sellers can submit bids and asks for standardized units of well-defined commodities and securities. It examines evidence from the laboratory and computer simulations.

Modeling Online Auctions

Modeling Online Auctions PDF Author: Wolfgang Jank
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
ISBN: 1118031865
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 321

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Book Description
Explore cutting-edge statistical methodologies for collecting, analyzing, and modeling online auction data Online auctions are an increasingly important marketplace, as the new mechanisms and formats underlying these auctions have enabled the capturing and recording of large amounts of bidding data that are used to make important business decisions. As a result, new statistical ideas and innovation are needed to understand bidders, sellers, and prices. Combining methodologies from the fields of statistics, data mining, information systems, and economics, Modeling Online Auctions introduces a new approach to identifying obstacles and asking new questions using online auction data. The authors draw upon their extensive experience to introduce the latest methods for extracting new knowledge from online auction data. Rather than approach the topic from the traditional game-theoretic perspective, the book treats the online auction mechanism as a data generator, outlining methods to collect, explore, model, and forecast data. Topics covered include: Data collection methods for online auctions and related issues that arise in drawing data samples from a Web site Models for bidder and bid arrivals, treating the different approaches for exploring bidder-seller networks Data exploration, such as integration of time series and cross-sectional information; curve clustering; semi-continuous data structures; and data hierarchies The use of functional regression as well as functional differential equation models, spatial models, and stochastic models for capturing relationships in auction data Specialized methods and models for forecasting auction prices and their applications in automated bidding decision rule systems Throughout the book, R and MATLAB software are used for illustrating the discussed techniques. In addition, a related Web site features many of the book's datasets and R and MATLAB code that allow readers to replicate the analyses and learn new methods to apply to their own research. Modeling Online Auctions is a valuable book for graduate-level courses on data mining and applied regression analysis. It is also a one-of-a-kind reference for researchers in the fields of statistics, information systems, business, and marketing who work with electronic data and are looking for new approaches for understanding online auctions and processes. Visit this book's companion website by clicking here

Price Information and Bidding Behavior in Repeated Second-Price Auctions

Price Information and Bidding Behavior in Repeated Second-Price Auctions PDF Author: John A. List
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
Examining panel data on bidding behavior in over forty second-price auction markets with repeated trials, we observe that (i) posted prices influence the behavior of the median naive bidder; (ii) posted prices do not affect the behavior of the median experienced bidder or the bidder for familiar goods; and (iii) anticipated strategic behavior wanes after two trials. The results suggest that while affiliation might exist in auctions for new goods, the repeated trial design with nonprice information removes the correlation of values and provides the experience that bidders need to understand the market mechanism.

Unobserved Heterogeneity in Auctions

Unobserved Heterogeneity in Auctions PDF Author: Philip A. Haile
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 31

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Book Description
A common concern in the empirical study of auctions is the likely presence of auction-specific factors that are common knowledge among bidders but unobserved to the econometrician. Such unobserved heterogeneity confounds attempts to uncover the underlying structure of demand and information, typically a primary feature of interest in an auction market. Unobserved heterogeneity presents a particular challenge in first-price auctions, where identification arguments rely on the econometrician's ability to reconstruct from observables the conditional probabilities that entered each bidder's equilibrium optimization problem; when bidders condition on unobservables, it is not obvious that this is possible. Here we discuss several approaches to identification developed in recent work on first-price auctions with unobserved heterogeneity. Despite the special challenges of this setting, all of the approaches build on insights developed in other areas of econometrics, including those on control functions, measurement error, and mixture models. Because each strategy relies on different combinations of model restrictions, technical assumptions, and data requirements, their relative attractiveness will vary with the application. However, this varied menu of results suggests both a type of robustness of identifiability and the potential for expanding the frontier with additional work.

Essays in Modeling the First Bid in Retail Secondary Market Online Auctions

Essays in Modeling the First Bid in Retail Secondary Market Online Auctions PDF Author: Babak Zafari
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description


Individual Behavior and Bidding Heterogeneity in Sealed Bid Auctions Where the Number of Bidders is Unknown

Individual Behavior and Bidding Heterogeneity in Sealed Bid Auctions Where the Number of Bidders is Unknown PDF Author: Mark Isaac
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
This article uses laboratory data from a series of first-price (FP) and second-price (SP) sealed bid auctions in which the number of bidders is unknown to test for possible deviations of individual behavior from theory and study the source of heterogeneity in bidding. In SP auctions we find a substantial amount of coincidence with theory. We observe systematic deviations from risk neutral bidding in FP auctions and show theoretically that these deviations are consistent with risk averse preferences. We find essentially no heterogeneity in bidding in SP auctions where risk preferences and the number of bidders do not affect the optimal bid, while in the FP auctions heterogeneity in bidding persists with experience. We find that heterogeneity in bidding in FP auctions is consistent with heterogeneity in risk preferences, the attempt to count the number of bidders in the auction, and bidder specific noise.