Abuse of Dominant Position: New Interpretation, New Enforcement Mechanisms?

Abuse of Dominant Position: New Interpretation, New Enforcement Mechanisms? PDF Author: Mark-Oliver Mackenrodt
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3540699651
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 210

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Book Description
As part of its review of competition law that started in the late 1990s, the European Commission proposes to revise its interpretation and application of the Treaty’s prohibition of abuses of dominant positions. Also, it has instigated a debate about the promotion of private enforcement of EC competition law. On the former subject, the Commission published a Discussion Paper in 2005; on the latter, a Green Paper in 2005, followed by a White Paper in 2008. The chapters in this volume critically appraise the Commission’s proposals, including the most recent ones. The authors also highlight the repercussions of the proposed ‘more economic approach’ to abuses of dominant positions on private litigants’ opportunities to bring damages actions in national courts for such abuses.

In Defense of Monopoly

In Defense of Monopoly PDF Author: Richard B. McKenzie
Publisher: University of Michigan Press
ISBN: 9780472116157
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 334

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Book Description
A provocative defense of market dominance

The Antitrust Paradox

The Antitrust Paradox PDF Author: Robert Bork
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781736089712
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 536

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Book Description
The most important book on antitrust ever written. It shows how antitrust suits adversely affect the consumer by encouraging a costly form of protection for inefficient and uncompetitive small businesses.

Market Dominance and Market Power

Market Dominance and Market Power PDF Author: T.V.S. Ramamohan Rao
Publisher: Cambridge Scholars Publishing
ISBN: 1527560066
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 122

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Book Description
This book presents several fundamentally new ideas. It shows that the notion of market dominance depends on the choices of firms. The fundamental idea here is to separate strategies that the firm wishes to pursue and those that it can achieve given the rival reactions. The book also highlights that consumers generally find it difficult to obtain appropriate information about the value of products when many similar products are sold on the market. Firms provide signals in the form of non-price strategies. The identification, by the consumer, of the maximum value of the product may nevertheless leave some room for firms to expand their market share beyond this. In addition, given the nature of the market, each firm has some market power with regard to consumers on the market and in its relationship with rival firms. This text presents a number of market power indices at the firm and strategy level combining these two dimensions. The book also considers issues of regulation of apps in cyberspace and discusses practical regulatory policies that have been developed to limit misuse of information in cyberspace.

Market definition and market power in the platform economy

Market definition and market power in the platform economy PDF Author: Jens-Uwe Franck
Publisher: Centre on Regulation in Europe asbl (CERRE)
ISBN:
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 96

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Book Description
With the rise of digital platforms and the natural tendency of markets involving platforms to become concentrated, competition authorities and courts are more frequently in a position to investigate and decide merger and abuse cases that involve platforms. This report provides guidance on how to define markets and on how to assess market power when dealing with two-sided platforms. DEFINITION Competition authorities and courts are well advised to uniformly use a multi-markets approach when defining markets in the context of two-sided platforms. The multi-markets approach is the more flexible instrument compared to the competing single-market approach that defines a single market for both sides of a platform, as the former naturally accounts for different substitution possibilities by the user groups on the two sides of the platform. While one might think of conditions under which a single-market approach could be feasible, the necessary conditions are so severe that it would only be applicable under rare circumstances. To fully appreciate business activities in platform markets from a competition law point of view, and to do justice to competition law’s purpose, which is to protect consumer welfare, the legal concept of a “market” should not be interpreted as requiring a price to be paid by one party to the other. It is not sufficient to consider the activities on the “unpaid side” of the platform only indirectly by way of including them in the competition law analysis of the “paid side” of the platform. Such an approach would exclude certain activities and ensuing positive or negative effects on consumer welfare altogether from the radar of competition law. Instead, competition practice should recognize straightforwardly that there can be “markets” for products offered free of charge, i.e. without monetary consideration by those who receive the product. ASSESSMENT The application of competition law often requires an assessment of market power. Using market shares as indicators of market power, in addition to all the difficulties in standard markets, raises further issues for two-sided platforms. When calculating revenue shares, the only reasonable option is to use the sum of revenues on all sides of the platform. Then, such shares should not be interpreted as market shares as they are aggregated over two interdependent markets. Large revenue shares appear to be a meaningful indicator of market power if all undertakings under consideration serve the same sides. However, they are often not meaningful if undertakings active in the relevant markets follow different business models. Given potentially strong cross-group external effects, market shares are less apt in the context of two-sided platforms to indicate market power (or the lack of it). Barriers to entry are at the core of persistent market power and, thus, the entrenchment of incumbent platforms. They deserve careful examination by competition authorities. Barriers to entry may arise due to users’ coordination failure in the presence of network effect. On two-sided platforms, users on both sides of the market have to coordinate their expectations. Barriers to entry are more likely to be present if an industry does not attract new users and if it does not undergo major technological change. Switching costs and network effects may go hand in hand: consumer switching costs sometimes depend on the number of platform users and, in this case, barriers to entry from consumer switching costs increase with platform size. Since market power is related to barriers to entry, the absence of entry attempts may be seen as an indication of market power. However, entry threats may arise from firms offering quite different services, as long as they provide a new home for users’ attention and needs.

Market Dominance and Antitrust Policy

Market Dominance and Antitrust Policy PDF Author: Michael A. Utton
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 1843767481
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 342

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Book Description
Market dominance - encompassing single firm dominance, overt and tacit collusion, mergers and vertical restraints - raises many complex analytical and policy issues, all of which continue to be the subject of theoretical research and policy reform. This second edition of a popular and comprehensive text extends the arguments and combines an analysis of the issues with a discussion of actual policy and case studies. This new edition addresses the recent fundamental changes in antitrust law, especially in the UK and the EU, and reviews some high profile and controversial cases such as the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger and the Microsoft monopoly. The author moves on to deal with several unresolved questions including the conflicts between trade and antitrust policy, the foreign take-over of domestic assets and extra-territorial claims made by certain countries.

The Economics of Imperfect Competition

The Economics of Imperfect Competition PDF Author: Joan Robinson
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 1349153206
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 359

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Book Description


Digital Dominance

Digital Dominance PDF Author: Martin Moore
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0190845120
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 441

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Book Description
Across the globe, Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple and Microsoft have accumulated power in ways that existing regulatory and intellectual frameworks struggle to comprehend. A consensus is emerging that the power of these new digital monopolies is unprecedented, and that it has important implications for journalism, politics, and society. It is increasingly clear that democratic societies require new legal and conceptual tools if they are to adequately understand, and if necessary check the economic might of these companies. Equally, that we need to better comprehend the ability of such firms to control personal data and to shape the flow of news, information, and public opinion. In this volume, Martin Moore and Damian Tambini draw together the world's leading researchers to examine the digital dominance of technologies platforms and look at the evidence behind the rising tide of criticism of the tech giants. In fifteen chapters, the authors examine the economic, political, and social impacts of Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, and Microsoft, in order to understand the different facets of their power and how it is manifested. Digital Dominance is the first interdisciplinary volume on this topic, contributing to a conversation which is critical to maintaining the health of democracies across the world.

Unrelenting Innovation

Unrelenting Innovation PDF Author: Gerard J. Tellis
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
ISBN: 1118352408
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 352

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Book Description
The hands-on guide for fostering relentless innovation within your company Gerard Tellis, a noted expert on innovation, advertising, and global markets, makes the compelling case that the culture of a firm is the crucial driver of an organization's innovativeness. In this groundbreaking book he describes the three traits and three practices necessary to create a culture of relentless innovation. Organizations must be willing to cannibalize successful products, embrace risk, and focus on the future. Organizations build these traits by providing incentives for enterprise, empowering product champions, and encouraging internal markets. Spelling out the critical role of culture, the author provides illustrative examples of organizations with winning cultures and explores the theory and evidence for each of the six components of culture. The book concludes with a discussion of why culture is superior to alternate theories for fostering innovation. Offers a groundbreaking take on innovation that is driven by a company's culture Shows what it takes to create a culture of innovation within any organization Based on a study of 770 companies across 15 countries, the origin of 90 radical innovations spanning over 100 years, and the evolution of 66 markets spanning over a 100 years Provides numerous mini cases to illustrate the workings of culture Written by Gerard Tellis director of the Center for Global Innovation This must-have resource clearly shows the role of culture in driving relentless innovation and how to foster it within any organization.

EU Competition Law, Data Protection and Online Platforms: Data as Essential Facility

EU Competition Law, Data Protection and Online Platforms: Data as Essential Facility PDF Author: Inge Graef
Publisher: Kluwer Law International B.V.
ISBN: 9041183256
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 342

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Book Description
All are agreed that the digital economy contributes to a dynamic evolution of markets and competition. Nonetheless, concerns are increasingly raised about the market dominance of a few key players. Because these companies hold the power to drive rivals out of business, regulators have begun to seek scope for competition enforcement in cases where companies claim that withholding data is needed to satisfy customers and cut costs. This book is the first focus on how competition law enforcement tools can be applied to refusals of dominant firms to give access data on online platforms such as search engines, social networks, and e-commerce platforms – commonly referred to as the ‘gatekeepers’ of the Internet. The question arises whether the denial of a dominant firm to grant competitors access to its data could constitute a ‘refusal to deal’ and lead to competition law liability under the so-called ‘essential facilities doctrine', according to which firms need access to shared knowledge in order to be able to compete. A possible duty to share data with rivals also brings to the forefront the interaction of competition law with data protection legislation considering that the required information may include personal data of individuals. Building on the refusal to deal concept, and using a multidisciplinary approach, the analysis covers such issues and topics as the following: – data portability; – interoperability; – data as a competitive advantage or entry barrier in digital markets; – market definition and dominance with respect to data; – disruptive versus sustaining innovation; – role of intellectual property regimes; – economic trade-off in essential facilities cases; – relationship of competition enforcement with data protection law and – data-related competition concerns in merger cases. The author draws on a wealth of relevant material, including EU and US decision-making practice, case law, and policy documents, as well as economic and empirical literature on the link between competition and innovation. The book concludes with a proposed framework for the application of the essential facilities doctrine to potential forms of abuse of dominance relating to data. In addition, it makes suggestions as to how data protection interests can be integrated into competition policy. An invaluable contribution to ongoing academic and policy discussions about how data-related competition concerns should be addressed under competition law, the analysis clearly demonstrates how existing competition tools for market definition and assessment of dominance can be applied to online platforms. It will be of immeasurable value to the many jurists, business persons, and academics concerned with this very timely subject.