Management Earnings Forecast Disclosure

Management Earnings Forecast Disclosure PDF Author: Nashwa Elgallab George
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Corporate profits
Languages : en
Pages : 138

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Book Description

Management Earnings Forecast Disclosure

Management Earnings Forecast Disclosure PDF Author: Nashwa Elgallab George
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Corporate profits
Languages : en
Pages : 138

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Book Description


Management Earnings Forecasts

Management Earnings Forecasts PDF Author: Hwa Deuk Yi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Corporate profits
Languages : en
Pages : 236

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Public Disclosure of Corporate Earnings Forecasts

Public Disclosure of Corporate Earnings Forecasts PDF Author: Francis A. Lees
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 56

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An Analysis of the Reliability of Management Earnings Forecasts Published in Alternative Formats and Investigation of Selected Management Forecast Disclosure Practices

An Analysis of the Reliability of Management Earnings Forecasts Published in Alternative Formats and Investigation of Selected Management Forecast Disclosure Practices PDF Author: William C. Boynton
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 354

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The Consequences of Management Earnings Forecast Regulation

The Consequences of Management Earnings Forecast Regulation PDF Author: Bin Ke
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 55

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Book Description
We examine the consequences of a management earnings forecast regulation implemented in a staggered manner. The regulation substantially increases the directly affected firms' frequency of management forecasts. Nevertheless, approximately 14% of the directly affected firms fail to comply with the regulation (noncompliant firms). The regulation helps increase the stock price informativeness of the directly affected firms that issue a forecast. The regulation also helps increase the stock price informativeness of the noncompliant firms (a spillover), but we find no evidence of a similar spillover for the firms that are not required to issue mandatory forecasts in the post-regulation period.

The Effect of Confirming Management Earnings Forecasts on Cost of Capital

The Effect of Confirming Management Earnings Forecasts on Cost of Capital PDF Author: Michael B. Clement
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 40

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Book Description
This study examines the market response to confirming forecasts. Confirming management forecasts are voluntary disclosures by management that corroborate existing market expectations about future earnings. The study of confirming forecasts is important because it can provide evidence on the relation between voluntary disclosure and cost of capital. We find that the market's reaction to confirming forecasts is significantly positive, indicating that benefits may accrue to firms that disclose such forecasts. In addition, while we find no significant change in the mean consensus forecasts (a proxy for earnings expectations) around the confirming forecast date, evidence indicates a significant reduction in the mean and median consensus analyst dispersion (a proxy for earnings uncertainty). Finally, we document a positive association between reduction of dispersion of analysts' forecasts and the magnitude of the stock market response.

Risk-Based Forecasting and Planning and Management Earnings Forecasts

Risk-Based Forecasting and Planning and Management Earnings Forecasts PDF Author: Christopher D. Ittner
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 67

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Book Description
This study examines the association between a firm's internal information environment and the accuracy of its externally-disclosed management earnings forecasts. Internally, firms use forecasts to plan for uncertain futures. The risk management literature argues that integrating risk-related information into forecasts and plans can improve a firm's ability to forecast future financial outcomes. We investigate whether this internal information manifests itself in the accuracy of external earnings guidance. Using detailed survey data and publicly-disclosed management earnings forecasts from a sample of publicly-traded U.S. companies, we find that more sophisticated risk-based forecasting and planning processes are associated with smaller earnings forecast errors and narrower forecast widths. These associations hold across a variety of different planning horizons (ranging from annual budgeting to long-term strategic planning), providing empirical support for the theoretical link between internal information quality and the quality of external disclosures.

Voluntary Management Earnings Forecasts

Voluntary Management Earnings Forecasts PDF Author: Hark-Ppin Yhim
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business forecasting
Languages : en
Pages : 286

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A Framework to Analyze Management's Voluntary Forecast Disclosure Decisions

A Framework to Analyze Management's Voluntary Forecast Disclosure Decisions PDF Author: Gillian Hian Heng Yeo
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business forecasting
Languages : en
Pages : 178

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Detailed Management Earnings Forecasts

Detailed Management Earnings Forecasts PDF Author: Kenneth J. Merkley
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 48

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Book Description
We provide archival evidence on how a particular type of supplementary information affects the credibility of management earnings forecasts. Managers often provide detailed forecasts of specific income statement line items to shed light on how they plan to achieve their bottom-line earnings targets. We assess the effect of this forecast disaggregation on the credibility of management earnings forecasts. Based on a relatively large hand-collected sample of 900 management earnings forecasts, we find that disaggregation increases analysts' sensitivity to the news in managers' earnings guidance, suggesting that analysts find the guidance more credible. More importantly, we identify several factors that influence this relation. First, disaggregation plays a more important role when earnings are otherwise more difficult to forecast. Second, disaggregation is more important after Regulation Fair Disclosure prohibited selective disclosure, especially for firms that were more affected because they had previously provided more private guidance. Finally, in contrast to common assertions in the prior literature, we find that in more recent years, disaggregation matters more for guidance that conveys bad news. Managers as well as researchers should be interested in evidence suggesting that financial analysts find disaggregation especially helpful in contexts where managers' credibility is particularly important.