Author: Lloyd C. Gardner
Publisher: New Press, The
ISBN: 1595583459
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 336
Book Description
From the launch of the "Shock and Awe" invasion in March 2003 through President George W. Bush's declaration of "Mission Accomplished" two months later, the war in Iraq was meant to demonstrate definitively that the United States had learned the lessons of Vietnam. This new book makes clear that something closer to the opposite is true--that U.S. foreign policy makers have learned little from the past, even as they have been obsessed with the "Vietnam Syndrome." Iraq and the Lessons of Vietnam brings together the country's leading historians of the Vietnam experience. Examining the profound changes that have occurred in the country and the military since the Vietnam War, celebrated historians Marilyn B. Young and Lloyd Gardner have assembled a distinguished group to consider how America has again found itself in the midst of a war in which there is no chance of a speedy victory or a sweeping regime change. Iraq and the Lessons of Vietnam explores how the "Vietnam Syndrome" fits into the contemporary debate about the purpose and exercise of American power in the world. With contributions from some of the most renowned analysts of American history and foreign policy, this is an essential recovery of the forgotten and misbegotten lessons of Vietnam. Contributors: Christian G. Appy Andrew J. Bacevich David Elliott Alex Danchev Elizabeth L. Hillman Gabriel Kolko Walter LaFeber Wilfried Mausbach Alfred W. McCoy Gareth Porter John Prados Marilyn B. Young
Iraq and the Lessons of Vietnam
Author: Lloyd C. Gardner
Publisher: New Press, The
ISBN: 1595583459
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 336
Book Description
From the launch of the "Shock and Awe" invasion in March 2003 through President George W. Bush's declaration of "Mission Accomplished" two months later, the war in Iraq was meant to demonstrate definitively that the United States had learned the lessons of Vietnam. This new book makes clear that something closer to the opposite is true--that U.S. foreign policy makers have learned little from the past, even as they have been obsessed with the "Vietnam Syndrome." Iraq and the Lessons of Vietnam brings together the country's leading historians of the Vietnam experience. Examining the profound changes that have occurred in the country and the military since the Vietnam War, celebrated historians Marilyn B. Young and Lloyd Gardner have assembled a distinguished group to consider how America has again found itself in the midst of a war in which there is no chance of a speedy victory or a sweeping regime change. Iraq and the Lessons of Vietnam explores how the "Vietnam Syndrome" fits into the contemporary debate about the purpose and exercise of American power in the world. With contributions from some of the most renowned analysts of American history and foreign policy, this is an essential recovery of the forgotten and misbegotten lessons of Vietnam. Contributors: Christian G. Appy Andrew J. Bacevich David Elliott Alex Danchev Elizabeth L. Hillman Gabriel Kolko Walter LaFeber Wilfried Mausbach Alfred W. McCoy Gareth Porter John Prados Marilyn B. Young
Publisher: New Press, The
ISBN: 1595583459
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 336
Book Description
From the launch of the "Shock and Awe" invasion in March 2003 through President George W. Bush's declaration of "Mission Accomplished" two months later, the war in Iraq was meant to demonstrate definitively that the United States had learned the lessons of Vietnam. This new book makes clear that something closer to the opposite is true--that U.S. foreign policy makers have learned little from the past, even as they have been obsessed with the "Vietnam Syndrome." Iraq and the Lessons of Vietnam brings together the country's leading historians of the Vietnam experience. Examining the profound changes that have occurred in the country and the military since the Vietnam War, celebrated historians Marilyn B. Young and Lloyd Gardner have assembled a distinguished group to consider how America has again found itself in the midst of a war in which there is no chance of a speedy victory or a sweeping regime change. Iraq and the Lessons of Vietnam explores how the "Vietnam Syndrome" fits into the contemporary debate about the purpose and exercise of American power in the world. With contributions from some of the most renowned analysts of American history and foreign policy, this is an essential recovery of the forgotten and misbegotten lessons of Vietnam. Contributors: Christian G. Appy Andrew J. Bacevich David Elliott Alex Danchev Elizabeth L. Hillman Gabriel Kolko Walter LaFeber Wilfried Mausbach Alfred W. McCoy Gareth Porter John Prados Marilyn B. Young
War with Iraq
Author: Buster C. Glosson
Publisher: Carolina Gardener
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 338
Book Description
Personal account by the U.S. Air Force general who planned and executed 1991 Persian Gulf War with emphasis on use of technology and new strategies as they apply to modern warfare.
Publisher: Carolina Gardener
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 338
Book Description
Personal account by the U.S. Air Force general who planned and executed 1991 Persian Gulf War with emphasis on use of technology and new strategies as they apply to modern warfare.
Harsh Lessons
Author: Ben Barry
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781138060968
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 164
Book Description
"Launched in the wake of 9/11, the US-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq forced painful transformations in Western militaries. As successful regime-change operations gave way to prolonged insurgencies, these forces confronted wars whose character rapidly developed in unanticipated directions. The US and its allies repeatedly failed to align national ends, ways and means to achieve stabilisation, reconstruction and political progress in Afghanistan and Iraq, before rediscovering counter-insurgency principles established in previous conflicts. The lessons of the wars are likely to continue shaping Western states' approach to intervention and warfare for years to come. This Adelphi book examines the military evolution of the conflicts, and their implications for the future character of war. It shows why combat remains the core military capability, and explains successful and unsuccessful adaptation by armed forces, especially the essential roles of leadership, culture and organisational agility in promoting 'learning under fire'. Written by the author of the British Army's report on post-conflict stabilisation in Iraq, the book is a valuable guide for policymakers, government officials, military officers and scholars seeking to understand the military legacy of a contentious and unpopular chapter in Western strategy." --Back cover
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781138060968
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 164
Book Description
"Launched in the wake of 9/11, the US-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq forced painful transformations in Western militaries. As successful regime-change operations gave way to prolonged insurgencies, these forces confronted wars whose character rapidly developed in unanticipated directions. The US and its allies repeatedly failed to align national ends, ways and means to achieve stabilisation, reconstruction and political progress in Afghanistan and Iraq, before rediscovering counter-insurgency principles established in previous conflicts. The lessons of the wars are likely to continue shaping Western states' approach to intervention and warfare for years to come. This Adelphi book examines the military evolution of the conflicts, and their implications for the future character of war. It shows why combat remains the core military capability, and explains successful and unsuccessful adaptation by armed forces, especially the essential roles of leadership, culture and organisational agility in promoting 'learning under fire'. Written by the author of the British Army's report on post-conflict stabilisation in Iraq, the book is a valuable guide for policymakers, government officials, military officers and scholars seeking to understand the military legacy of a contentious and unpopular chapter in Western strategy." --Back cover
Between War and Peace
Author: Victor Davis Hanson
Publisher: Random House
ISBN: 0307430693
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 306
Book Description
In his acclaimed collection An Autumn of War, the scholar and military historian Victor Davis Hanson expressed powerful and provocative views of September 11 and the ensuing war in Afghanistan. Now, in these challenging new essays, he examines the world’s ongoing war on terrorism, from America to Iraq, from Europe to Israel, and beyond. In direct language, Hanson portrays an America making progress against Islamic fundamentalism but hampered by the self-hatred of elite academics at home and the cynical self-interest of allies abroad. He sees a new and urgent struggle of evil against good, one that can fail only if “we convince ourselves that our enemies fight because of something we, rather than they, did.” Whether it’s a clear-cut defense of Israel as a secular democracy, a denunciation of how the U.N. undermines the U.S., a plea to drastically alter our alliance with Saudi Arabia, or a perception that postwar Iraq is reaching a dangerous tipping point, Hanson’s arguments have the shock of candor and the fire of conviction.
Publisher: Random House
ISBN: 0307430693
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 306
Book Description
In his acclaimed collection An Autumn of War, the scholar and military historian Victor Davis Hanson expressed powerful and provocative views of September 11 and the ensuing war in Afghanistan. Now, in these challenging new essays, he examines the world’s ongoing war on terrorism, from America to Iraq, from Europe to Israel, and beyond. In direct language, Hanson portrays an America making progress against Islamic fundamentalism but hampered by the self-hatred of elite academics at home and the cynical self-interest of allies abroad. He sees a new and urgent struggle of evil against good, one that can fail only if “we convince ourselves that our enemies fight because of something we, rather than they, did.” Whether it’s a clear-cut defense of Israel as a secular democracy, a denunciation of how the U.N. undermines the U.S., a plea to drastically alter our alliance with Saudi Arabia, or a perception that postwar Iraq is reaching a dangerous tipping point, Hanson’s arguments have the shock of candor and the fire of conviction.
The Iraq War
Author: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publisher: CSIS
ISBN: 9780892064328
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 596
Book Description
"In April of 2003, a stunned world looked on as the armed forces of the United States and Britain conducted a lightning-fast military campaign against Iraq. Confounding predictions of failure, the Anglo-American victory brought down not just the Iraqi regime, but also much of the conventional wisdom about modern war. But even as U.S. and British forces occupied Basra, Tikrit, and Mosul, the Iraqi nation slipped into anarchy - and new military and security challenges emerged." "In this book, respected military analyst Anthony Cordesman provides the first in-depth examination of the key issues swirling around the most significant U.S. war since Vietnam. Finding answers is essential if we are to understand the United States' awesome power and its place in a new age of international terror and regional conflict. Finding answers is also essential if we are to draw the proper lessons and understand the new challenges of conflict termination, peacemaking, and nation building."--BOOK JACKET.
Publisher: CSIS
ISBN: 9780892064328
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 596
Book Description
"In April of 2003, a stunned world looked on as the armed forces of the United States and Britain conducted a lightning-fast military campaign against Iraq. Confounding predictions of failure, the Anglo-American victory brought down not just the Iraqi regime, but also much of the conventional wisdom about modern war. But even as U.S. and British forces occupied Basra, Tikrit, and Mosul, the Iraqi nation slipped into anarchy - and new military and security challenges emerged." "In this book, respected military analyst Anthony Cordesman provides the first in-depth examination of the key issues swirling around the most significant U.S. war since Vietnam. Finding answers is essential if we are to understand the United States' awesome power and its place in a new age of international terror and regional conflict. Finding answers is also essential if we are to draw the proper lessons and understand the new challenges of conflict termination, peacemaking, and nation building."--BOOK JACKET.
Learning the Lessons of Modern War
Author: Thomas G. Mahnken
Publisher: Stanford University Press
ISBN: 1503612511
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 371
Book Description
Learning the Lessons of Modern War uses the study of the recent past to illuminate the future. More specifically, it examines the lessons of recent wars as a way of understanding continuity and change in the character and conduct of war. The volume brings together contributions from a group of well-known scholars and practitioners from across the world to examine the conduct of recent wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Middle East, South America, and Asia. The book's first section consists of chapters that explore the value of a contemporary approach to history and reflect on the value of learning lessons from the past. Its second section focuses on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Chapters on Iraq discuss the lessons of the Iraq War, the British perspective on the conflict, and the war as seen through the lens of Saddam Hussein's military. Chapters on Afghanistan discuss counterinsurgency operations during the war, Britain's experience in Afghanistan, raising and training Afghan forces, and U.S. interagency performance. The book's third section examines the lessons of wars involving Russia, Israel, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Georgia, and Colombia. It concludes by exploring overarching themes associated with the conduct of recent wars. Containing a foreword by former National Security Advisor Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster, Learning the Lessons of Modern War is an indispensable resource for international relations and security studies scholars, policymakers, and military professionals.
Publisher: Stanford University Press
ISBN: 1503612511
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 371
Book Description
Learning the Lessons of Modern War uses the study of the recent past to illuminate the future. More specifically, it examines the lessons of recent wars as a way of understanding continuity and change in the character and conduct of war. The volume brings together contributions from a group of well-known scholars and practitioners from across the world to examine the conduct of recent wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Middle East, South America, and Asia. The book's first section consists of chapters that explore the value of a contemporary approach to history and reflect on the value of learning lessons from the past. Its second section focuses on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Chapters on Iraq discuss the lessons of the Iraq War, the British perspective on the conflict, and the war as seen through the lens of Saddam Hussein's military. Chapters on Afghanistan discuss counterinsurgency operations during the war, Britain's experience in Afghanistan, raising and training Afghan forces, and U.S. interagency performance. The book's third section examines the lessons of wars involving Russia, Israel, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Georgia, and Colombia. It concludes by exploring overarching themes associated with the conduct of recent wars. Containing a foreword by former National Security Advisor Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster, Learning the Lessons of Modern War is an indispensable resource for international relations and security studies scholars, policymakers, and military professionals.
Why Intelligence Fails
Author: Robert Jervis
Publisher: Cornell University Press
ISBN: 0801457610
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 249
Book Description
The U.S. government spends enormous resources each year on the gathering and analysis of intelligence, yet the history of American foreign policy is littered with missteps and misunderstandings that have resulted from intelligence failures. In Why Intelligence Fails, Robert Jervis examines the politics and psychology of two of the more spectacular intelligence failures in recent memory: the mistaken belief that the regime of the Shah in Iran was secure and stable in 1978, and the claim that Iraq had active WMD programs in 2002. The Iran case is based on a recently declassified report Jervis was commissioned to undertake by CIA thirty years ago and includes memoranda written by CIA officials in response to Jervis's findings. The Iraq case, also grounded in a review of the intelligence community's performance, is based on close readings of both classified and declassified documents, though Jervis's conclusions are entirely supported by evidence that has been declassified. In both cases, Jervis finds not only that intelligence was badly flawed but also that later explanations—analysts were bowing to political pressure and telling the White House what it wanted to hear or were willfully blind—were also incorrect. Proponents of these explanations claimed that initial errors were compounded by groupthink, lack of coordination within the government, and failure to share information. Policy prescriptions, including the recent establishment of a Director of National Intelligence, were supposed to remedy the situation. In Jervis's estimation, neither the explanations nor the prescriptions are adequate. The inferences that intelligence drew were actually quite plausible given the information available. Errors arose, he concludes, from insufficient attention to the ways in which information should be gathered and interpreted, a lack of self-awareness about the factors that led to the judgments, and an organizational culture that failed to probe for weaknesses and explore alternatives. Evaluating the inherent tensions between the methods and aims of intelligence personnel and policymakers from a unique insider's perspective, Jervis forcefully criticizes recent proposals for improving the performance of the intelligence community and discusses ways in which future analysis can be improved.
Publisher: Cornell University Press
ISBN: 0801457610
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 249
Book Description
The U.S. government spends enormous resources each year on the gathering and analysis of intelligence, yet the history of American foreign policy is littered with missteps and misunderstandings that have resulted from intelligence failures. In Why Intelligence Fails, Robert Jervis examines the politics and psychology of two of the more spectacular intelligence failures in recent memory: the mistaken belief that the regime of the Shah in Iran was secure and stable in 1978, and the claim that Iraq had active WMD programs in 2002. The Iran case is based on a recently declassified report Jervis was commissioned to undertake by CIA thirty years ago and includes memoranda written by CIA officials in response to Jervis's findings. The Iraq case, also grounded in a review of the intelligence community's performance, is based on close readings of both classified and declassified documents, though Jervis's conclusions are entirely supported by evidence that has been declassified. In both cases, Jervis finds not only that intelligence was badly flawed but also that later explanations—analysts were bowing to political pressure and telling the White House what it wanted to hear or were willfully blind—were also incorrect. Proponents of these explanations claimed that initial errors were compounded by groupthink, lack of coordination within the government, and failure to share information. Policy prescriptions, including the recent establishment of a Director of National Intelligence, were supposed to remedy the situation. In Jervis's estimation, neither the explanations nor the prescriptions are adequate. The inferences that intelligence drew were actually quite plausible given the information available. Errors arose, he concludes, from insufficient attention to the ways in which information should be gathered and interpreted, a lack of self-awareness about the factors that led to the judgments, and an organizational culture that failed to probe for weaknesses and explore alternatives. Evaluating the inherent tensions between the methods and aims of intelligence personnel and policymakers from a unique insider's perspective, Jervis forcefully criticizes recent proposals for improving the performance of the intelligence community and discusses ways in which future analysis can be improved.
The Sheriff of Ramadi
Author: Dick Couch
Publisher: Naval Institute Press
ISBN: 1612514189
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 312
Book Description
In this ground-breaking book, best-selling author and former U.S. Navy SEAL Dick Couch reports on the actions of the SEAL Task Unit during the Battle of Ramadi in Iraq s al-Anbar Province between 2005 and 2007. When he began his research, the author thought he would be writing about the SEALs courage in the face of a losing cause. Instead, he discovered a startling success story whose importance has gone unrecognized in the war against al-Qaeda. Couch argues that the lessons of Ramadi, with SEALs fighting alongside regular forces in an urban war zone, call for using this strategy more widely. One of the most significant military engagements in the global war against terrorism since 9/11 and the most sustained and vicious engagement ever fought by SEALs, the Battle of Ramadi demonstrates both their code of brotherhood and ability to adapt in an urban battle space, which Couch identifies as the keys to the SEALs success on the battlefield. The story of PO2 Michael Monsoor, who was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for his bravery during the battle, is a compelling example of their extraordinary brotherhood. First published in hardcover in 2008, the book is now available in paperback for the first time.
Publisher: Naval Institute Press
ISBN: 1612514189
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 312
Book Description
In this ground-breaking book, best-selling author and former U.S. Navy SEAL Dick Couch reports on the actions of the SEAL Task Unit during the Battle of Ramadi in Iraq s al-Anbar Province between 2005 and 2007. When he began his research, the author thought he would be writing about the SEALs courage in the face of a losing cause. Instead, he discovered a startling success story whose importance has gone unrecognized in the war against al-Qaeda. Couch argues that the lessons of Ramadi, with SEALs fighting alongside regular forces in an urban war zone, call for using this strategy more widely. One of the most significant military engagements in the global war against terrorism since 9/11 and the most sustained and vicious engagement ever fought by SEALs, the Battle of Ramadi demonstrates both their code of brotherhood and ability to adapt in an urban battle space, which Couch identifies as the keys to the SEALs success on the battlefield. The story of PO2 Michael Monsoor, who was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for his bravery during the battle, is a compelling example of their extraordinary brotherhood. First published in hardcover in 2008, the book is now available in paperback for the first time.
Baghdad at Sunrise
Author: Peter R. Mansoor
Publisher: Yale University Press
ISBN: 0300142633
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 432
Book Description
An on-the-ground commander describes his brigade's first year in Iraq after the U.S. forces seized Baghdad in the spring of 2003, and explains what went right and wrong as the U.S. military confronted an insurgency, in a firsthand analysis of success and failure in Iraq.
Publisher: Yale University Press
ISBN: 0300142633
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 432
Book Description
An on-the-ground commander describes his brigade's first year in Iraq after the U.S. forces seized Baghdad in the spring of 2003, and explains what went right and wrong as the U.S. military confronted an insurgency, in a firsthand analysis of success and failure in Iraq.
Why We Lost
Author: Daniel P. Bolger
Publisher: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt
ISBN: 0544370481
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 565
Book Description
A high-ranking general's gripping insider account of the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and how it all went wrong. Over a thirty-five-year career, Daniel Bolger rose through the army infantry to become a three-star general, commanding in both theaters of the U.S. campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. He participated in meetings with top-level military and civilian players, where strategy was made and managed. At the same time, he regularly carried a rifle alongside rank-and-file soldiers in combat actions, unusual for a general. Now, as a witness to all levels of military command, Bolger offers a unique assessment of these wars, from 9/11 to the final withdrawal from the region. Writing with hard-won experience and unflinching honesty, Bolger makes the firm case that in Iraq and in Afghanistan, we lost -- but we didn't have to. Intelligence was garbled. Key decision makers were blinded by spreadsheets or theories. And, at the root of our failure, we never really understood our enemy. Why We Lost is a timely, forceful, and compulsively readable account of these wars from a fresh and authoritative perspective.
Publisher: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt
ISBN: 0544370481
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 565
Book Description
A high-ranking general's gripping insider account of the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and how it all went wrong. Over a thirty-five-year career, Daniel Bolger rose through the army infantry to become a three-star general, commanding in both theaters of the U.S. campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. He participated in meetings with top-level military and civilian players, where strategy was made and managed. At the same time, he regularly carried a rifle alongside rank-and-file soldiers in combat actions, unusual for a general. Now, as a witness to all levels of military command, Bolger offers a unique assessment of these wars, from 9/11 to the final withdrawal from the region. Writing with hard-won experience and unflinching honesty, Bolger makes the firm case that in Iraq and in Afghanistan, we lost -- but we didn't have to. Intelligence was garbled. Key decision makers were blinded by spreadsheets or theories. And, at the root of our failure, we never really understood our enemy. Why We Lost is a timely, forceful, and compulsively readable account of these wars from a fresh and authoritative perspective.