Author: David E. Johnson
Publisher: Rand Corporation
ISBN: 0833042416
Category : Study Aids
Languages : en
Pages : 265
Get Book Here
Book Description
The relative roles of U.S. ground and air power have shifted since the end of the Cold War. At the level of major operations and campaigns, the Air Force has proved capable of and committed to performing deep strike operations, which the Army long had believed the Air Force could not reliably accomplish. If air power can largely supplant Army systems in deep operations, the implications for both joint doctrine and service capabilities would be significant. To assess the shift of these roles, the author of this report analyzed post?Cold War conflicts in Iraq (1991), Bosnia (1995), Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001), and Iraq (2003). Because joint doctrine frequently reflects a consensus view rather than a truly integrated joint perspective, the author recommends that joint doctrine-and the processes by which it is derived and promulgated-be overhauled. The author also recommends reform for the services beyond major operations and campaigns to ensure that the United States attains its strategic objectives. This revised edition includes updates and an index.
Author: David Eugene Johnson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 104
Get Book Here
Book Description
The relative roles of U.S. ground and air power have shifted since the end of the Cold War. At the level of major operations and campaigns, the Air Force has proved capable of and committed to performing deep strike operations, which the Army long had believed the Air Force could not reliably accomplish. If air power can largely supplant Army systems in deep operations, the implications for both joint doctrine and service capabilities would be significant. To assess the shift of these roles, the author of this report analyzed post-Cold War conflicts in Iraq (1991), Bosnia (1995), Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001), and Iraq (2003). Because joint doctrine frequently reflects a consensus view rather than a truly integrated joint perspective, the author recommends that joint doctrine-and the processes by which it is derived and promulgated-be overhauled. The author also recommends reform for the services beyond major operations and campaigns to ensure that the United States attains its strategic objectives. This executive summary contains an abbreviated discussion of four of the cases examined: Iraq (1991), Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001), and Iraq (2003). It also incorporates modest changes from the larger monograph, based on suggestions made to the author since its publication.
Author: Thomas G. Mahnken
Publisher: Stanford University Press
ISBN: 1503612511
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 362
Get Book Here
Book Description
Learning the Lessons of Modern War uses the study of the recent past to illuminate the future. More specifically, it examines the lessons of recent wars as a way of understanding continuity and change in the character and conduct of war. The volume brings together contributions from a group of well-known scholars and practitioners from across the world to examine the conduct of recent wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Middle East, South America, and Asia. The book's first section consists of chapters that explore the value of a contemporary approach to history and reflect on the value of learning lessons from the past. Its second section focuses on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Chapters on Iraq discuss the lessons of the Iraq War, the British perspective on the conflict, and the war as seen through the lens of Saddam Hussein's military. Chapters on Afghanistan discuss counterinsurgency operations during the war, Britain's experience in Afghanistan, raising and training Afghan forces, and U.S. interagency performance. The book's third section examines the lessons of wars involving Russia, Israel, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Georgia, and Colombia. It concludes by exploring overarching themes associated with the conduct of recent wars. Containing a foreword by former National Security Advisor Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster, Learning the Lessons of Modern War is an indispensable resource for international relations and security studies scholars, policymakers, and military professionals.
Author: Elisa Lynn Carbone
Publisher: SAGE
ISBN: 9780761909750
Category : Education
Languages : en
Pages : 120
Get Book Here
Book Description
In this useful and practical book, Elisa Carbone offers a wealth of sound advice on how to deal with a large class, from the first day to end of term evaluations. Full of examples taken from many different disciplines, Teaching Large Classes will be an ideal companion for any teacher facing the challenge of the large introductory class.
Author: Alexander Melville Bell
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : English language
Languages : en
Pages : 94
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Alexander Melville Bell
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Speech (Visible)
Languages : en
Pages : 92
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Austin Guildford Schmidt
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Latin language
Languages : en
Pages : 218
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: James Clayton Armstrong
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 136
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: John Nagl
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing USA
ISBN: 0313077037
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 273
Get Book Here
Book Description
Armies are invariably accused of preparing to fight the last war. Nagl examines how armies learn during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared in organization, training, and mindset. He compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948-1960 with that developed in the Vietnam Conflict from 1950-1975, through use of archival sources and interviews with participants in both conflicts. In examining these two events, he argues that organizational culture is the key variable in determining the success or failure of attempts to adapt to changing circumstances. Differences in organizational culture is the primary reason why the British Army learned to conduct counterinsurgency in Malaya while the American Army failed to learn in Vietnam. The American Army resisted any true attempt to learn how to fight an insurgency during the course of the Vietnam Conflict, preferring to treat the war as a conventional conflict in the tradition of the Korean War or World War II. The British Army, because of its traditional role as a colonial police force and the organizational characteristics that its history and the national culture created, was better able to quickly learn and apply the lessons of counterinsurgency during the course of the Malayan Emergency. This is the first study to apply organizational learning theory to cases in which armies were engaged in actual combat.
Author: Great Britain
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 694
Get Book Here
Book Description
