International Environmental Agreements in Two-level Games PDF Download
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Author: Stephan Kroll
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Environmental policy
Languages : en
Pages : 202
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Book Description
Author: Stephan Kroll
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Environmental policy
Languages : en
Pages : 202
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Book Description
Author: Houda Haffoudhi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 26
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Book Description
International environmental agreements (IEAs) are increasingly important in a globalized economy. The aim of our paper is study the effect of political pressure groups-lobbies- on the size and stability of IEAs. To this purpose we use the framework of two-level games to explain how national political situation influences the decisions of governments at the international negotiations arena. we present an endogenous lobbying model in which we assume that lobbies try to influence the policy choice of governments by offering political contribution in return for policy compromise. Indeed, we use the “interest based explanation” of international environmental policy to describe the incentives of countries to join an agreement. This approach classifies countries in four categories: pushers, bystanders, intermediate and draggers. We found that, when government gives the same weight to contribution and to social welfare, the contributions from the industrial lobby give incentives to government (Pushers, intermediate) to participate in the grand coalition making it stable. Our results suggest that in order to sustain the grand coalition, weak global environmental agreements -- i.e. those involving small abatement targets-should be negotiated. The result is similar if governments are more interested by political contribution. However, if governments care less about political contribution than about social welfare, industrial contribution is not enough to limit the free riding incentives of each type of government. In this situation, pushers are the more expected to sustain a small stable coalition.
Author: Ilka Meyne
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 30
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Book Description
Author: Henry Tulkens
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9813141247
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 459
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Book Description
The science and management of environmental problems is a vast area, comprising both the natural and social sciences, and the multidisciplinary links often make these issues challenging to comprehend. Economics, Game Theory and International Environmental Agreements: The Ca' Foscari Lectures aims to introduce students to the multidimensional character of international environmental problems in general, and climate change in particular.Ecology, economics, game theory and diplomacy are called upon and brought together in the common framework of a basic mathematical model. Within that framework, and using tools from these four disciplines, the book develops a theory that aims to explain and promote cooperation in international environmental affairs.Other books on the topic tend to be research-oriented volumes of various papers. Instead, this is a book that offers a reasonably-sized synthesis of the multidimensional societal problems of transfrontier pollution, particularly of climate change. It uses mathematical modeling of economic and game theory concepts to examine these environmental issues and demonstrate many results in an accessible fashion. Readers interested in understanding the links between ecology and economics, as well as the connection between economics and institutional decision-making, will find in this text not only answers to many of their queries but also questions for further thinking.
Author: Steinar Andresen
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780415664622
Category : Environmental law, International
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
International environmental agreements provide a practical basis for countries to address environmental issues on a global scale. This book explores the workings and outcomes of these agreements, and analyses key questions of why some problems are dealt with successfully and others ignored. By examining fundamental policies and issues in environmental protection this text gives an easily comprehensible introduction to international environmental agreements, and discusses problems in three areas: air, water and on land. It traces the history of agreements in broad thematic areas related to long-distance air pollution, ozone-depleting and greenhouse gases, ocean management, biological diversity, agricultural plant diversity and forest stewardship. Drawing on experts in their respective fields, this book provides an insightful evaluation of the successes and failures, and analysis of the reasons for this. Concluding with an insightful examination of research to show how performance of agreements can be improved in the future, this volume is a vital contribution to our understanding of the politics associated with establishing international environmental consensus. International Environmental Agreements will be of interest to scholars, students and researchers in global environmental politics, international relations and political science. Steinar Andresen is Senior Research Fellow at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Norway, and formerly professor at the Dept. of Political Science, University of Oslo. Elin Lerum Boasson is Research Fellow at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Norway. Geir Hønneland is Research Director at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute and adjunct professor at the University of Tromsø.
Author: Laura Marsiliani
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9401703337
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 349
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Book Description
The volume contains papers presented at a conference "On the International Dimension of Environmental Policy". It deals with two issues: *international environmental agreements; *environmental policies in open economies. Both issues are hot topics. The debate on how to cope with global climate change has become increasingly heated and controversial, and the relationship between trade and the environment is on the WTO agenda. The book contains review papers in which leading scholars in the field summarise the state of the art and original research extending the state of the art. Most of the papers are theoretically oriented, but some papers also present empirical results, using new econometric methods and new data. The book contains material for those students of economics and researchers who wish to deepen their knowledge in the area of International Environmental Economics, but also for those who endeavour to break new ground in this important field of research.
Author: Carlo Carraro
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 216
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Book Description
This work presents important papers which examine international environmental negotiations and agreements. Issues discussed include: the problems of interactions between environmental policies and trade and industrial policies; the role of issue linkage in securing stability in environmental agreements; the role of an arbitrator in environmental negtiations where no supra-national authority exists, the consequences for the existence of self-enforcing agreements; and the relationship between environmental negotiations on trade liberalization and R&D co-operation.
Author: Santiago J. Rubio
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
This paper studies the impact of adaptation on the stability of an international emission agreement. To address this issue we solve a three-stage coalition formation game where in the first stage countries decide whether or not to sign the agreement. Then, in the second stage, signatories (playing together) and non-signatories (playing individually) select their levels of emissions. Finally, in the third stage, each country decides on its level of adaptation non co-operatively. We solve this game for two models. For both, it is assumed that damages are linear with respect to emissions which guarantee that emissions are strategic complements in the second stage of the game. However, for the first model adaptation reduces the marginal damages of emissions in a multiplicative way whereas for the second model the reduction occurs in an additive way. Our analysis shows that the models yield different predictions in terms of participation. In the first case, we find that the larger the gains of full cooperation, the larger the cooperation. However, in the second case, the unique stable agreement we find consists of three countries regardless of the gains of full cooperation. These results suggest that complementarity can play in favor of cooperation but that it is not a sufficient condition to obtain more participation in an emission agreement. Finally, we would like to point out that our research indicates that the way adaptation reduces damages plays a critical role over the outcome of the coalition formation game.
Author: Ulrich J. Wagner
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 48
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Book Description
International environmental agreements typically strive for the solution of a common property resource dilemma. Since the sovereignty of states precludes external enforcement, international environmental agreements must be self-enforcing. Game theoretical models explain why rewards and punishments imposed through the environmental externality generally fail to enforce full cooperation. Therefore, environmental treaties incorporate provisions that enhance the incentives for participation such as transfers, sanctions and linkage to other negotiation topics in international politics. Moreover, interaction with markets and governments as well as the rules and procedures adopted in the negotiation process influence the design and the effectiveness of an international environmental agreement.
Author: Jobst Heitzig
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Using Putnam's two-level game approach, we discuss the influence of domestic players that can veto the ratification of international environmental agreements on the breadth and depth of such treaties. We first show that in a symmetric Barrett-type payoff model, veto-players can restrict the bargaining set so that either all or only non-grand coalitions become “modest” endogenously, making the grand coalition stable and leading to either “broad but shallow” or “broad and deep” treaties, depending on the exact payoff function of the veto players. We then discuss the possibility of compensating veto-players via domestic policies and the involved timing and commitment problems, and present the novel policy scheme of “cap, insure & compensate” to overcome these problems. In this scheme, the government negotiates an international emissions cap, insures households against climate-related damages and uses the premium to compensate the domestic veto-player for its abatement costs, thus ensuring the ratification of the treaty. We finally analyze the performance of this scheme in a simple two-period model.
