Author: Timothy J. McGrew
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
ISBN:
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 216
Book Description
Publisher description
Internalism and Epistemology
Author: Timothy J. McGrew
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
ISBN:
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 216
Book Description
Publisher description
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
ISBN:
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 216
Book Description
Publisher description
Justification Without Awareness
Author: Michael Bergmann
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199275742
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 267
Book Description
Michael Bergmann provides a decisive refutation of internalism and a sustained defense of externalism, developing his theory of justification by imposing both a proper function and a no-defeater requirement.
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199275742
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 267
Book Description
Michael Bergmann provides a decisive refutation of internalism and a sustained defense of externalism, developing his theory of justification by imposing both a proper function and a no-defeater requirement.
Epistemology
Author: Hilary Kornblith
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
ISBN: 9780631221067
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 280
Book Description
This anthology brings together ten papers which have defined and advanced the debate between internalism and externalism in epistemology.
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
ISBN: 9780631221067
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 280
Book Description
This anthology brings together ten papers which have defined and advanced the debate between internalism and externalism in epistemology.
Free Will and Epistemology
Author: Robert Lockie
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing
ISBN: 1350029068
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 321
Book Description
In the first in-depth study of the transcendental argument for decades, Free Will and Epistemology defends a modern version of the famous transcendental argument for free will: that we could not be justified in undermining a strong notion of free will, as a strong notion of free will is required for any such process of undermining to be itself epistemically justified. By arguing for a conception of internalism that goes back to the early days of the internalist-externalist debates, it draws on work by Richard Foley, William Alston and Alvin Plantinga to explain the importance of epistemic deontology and its role in the transcendental argument. It expands on the principle that 'ought' implies 'can' and presents a strong case for a form of self-determination. With references to cases in the neuroscientific and cognitive-psychological literature, Free Will and Epistemology provides an original contribution to work on epistemic justification and the free will debate.
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing
ISBN: 1350029068
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 321
Book Description
In the first in-depth study of the transcendental argument for decades, Free Will and Epistemology defends a modern version of the famous transcendental argument for free will: that we could not be justified in undermining a strong notion of free will, as a strong notion of free will is required for any such process of undermining to be itself epistemically justified. By arguing for a conception of internalism that goes back to the early days of the internalist-externalist debates, it draws on work by Richard Foley, William Alston and Alvin Plantinga to explain the importance of epistemic deontology and its role in the transcendental argument. It expands on the principle that 'ought' implies 'can' and presents a strong case for a form of self-determination. With references to cases in the neuroscientific and cognitive-psychological literature, Free Will and Epistemology provides an original contribution to work on epistemic justification and the free will debate.
Epistemic Justification
Author: Laurence BonJour
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
ISBN: 9780631182849
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 250
Book Description
Ever since Plato it has been thought that one knows only if one's belief hits the mark of truth and does so with adequate justification. The issues debated by Laurence BonJour and Ernest Sosa concern mostly the nature and conditions of such epistemic justification, and its place in our understanding of human knowledge. Presents central issues pertaining to internalism vs. externalism and foundationalism vs. virtue epistemology in the form of a philosophical debate. Introduces students to fundamental questions within epistemology while engaging in contemporary debates. Written by two of today’s foremost epistemologists. Includes an extensive bibliography.
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
ISBN: 9780631182849
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 250
Book Description
Ever since Plato it has been thought that one knows only if one's belief hits the mark of truth and does so with adequate justification. The issues debated by Laurence BonJour and Ernest Sosa concern mostly the nature and conditions of such epistemic justification, and its place in our understanding of human knowledge. Presents central issues pertaining to internalism vs. externalism and foundationalism vs. virtue epistemology in the form of a philosophical debate. Introduces students to fundamental questions within epistemology while engaging in contemporary debates. Written by two of today’s foremost epistemologists. Includes an extensive bibliography.
Justification and the Truth-Connection
Author: Clayton Littlejohn
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107016126
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 279
Book Description
Presents and defends a bold new approach to the ethics of belief and to resolving the internalism-externalism debate in epistemology.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107016126
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 279
Book Description
Presents and defends a bold new approach to the ethics of belief and to resolving the internalism-externalism debate in epistemology.
Evidentialism
Author: Earl Conee
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199253722
Category : Knowledge, Theory of
Languages : en
Pages : 330
Book Description
Evidentialism is a theory of knowledge the essence of which is the traditional idea that the justification of factual knowledge is entirely a matter of evidence. The authors defend this theory, arguing evidentialism is an asset virtually everywhere in epistemology, from getting started to refuting skepticism.
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199253722
Category : Knowledge, Theory of
Languages : en
Pages : 330
Book Description
Evidentialism is a theory of knowledge the essence of which is the traditional idea that the justification of factual knowledge is entirely a matter of evidence. The authors defend this theory, arguing evidentialism is an asset virtually everywhere in epistemology, from getting started to refuting skepticism.
Normative Externalism
Author: Brian Weatherson
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0192576887
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 260
Book Description
Normative Externalism argues that it is not important that people live up to their own principles. What matters, in both ethics and epistemology, is that they live up to the correct principles: that they do the right thing, and that they believe rationally. This stance, that what matters are the correct principles, not one's own principles, has implications across ethics and epistemology. In ethics, it undermines the ideas that moral uncertainty should be treated just like factual uncertainty, that moral ignorance frequently excuses moral wrongdoing, and that hypocrisy is a vice. In epistemology, it suggests we need new treatments of higher-order evidence, and of peer disagreement, and of circular reasoning, and the book suggests new approaches to each of these problems. Although the debates in ethics and in epistemology are often conducted separately, putting them in one place helps bring out their common themes. One common theme is that the view that one should live up to one's own principles looks less attractive when people have terrible principles, or when following their own principles would lead to riskier or more aggressive action than the correct principles. Another common theme is that asking people to live up to their principles leads to regresses. It can be hard to know what action or belief complies with one's principles. And now we can ask, in such a case should a person do what they think their principles require, or what their principles actually require? Both answers lead to problems, and the best way to avoid these problems is to simply say people should follow the correct principles.
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0192576887
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 260
Book Description
Normative Externalism argues that it is not important that people live up to their own principles. What matters, in both ethics and epistemology, is that they live up to the correct principles: that they do the right thing, and that they believe rationally. This stance, that what matters are the correct principles, not one's own principles, has implications across ethics and epistemology. In ethics, it undermines the ideas that moral uncertainty should be treated just like factual uncertainty, that moral ignorance frequently excuses moral wrongdoing, and that hypocrisy is a vice. In epistemology, it suggests we need new treatments of higher-order evidence, and of peer disagreement, and of circular reasoning, and the book suggests new approaches to each of these problems. Although the debates in ethics and in epistemology are often conducted separately, putting them in one place helps bring out their common themes. One common theme is that the view that one should live up to one's own principles looks less attractive when people have terrible principles, or when following their own principles would lead to riskier or more aggressive action than the correct principles. Another common theme is that asking people to live up to their principles leads to regresses. It can be hard to know what action or belief complies with one's principles. And now we can ask, in such a case should a person do what they think their principles require, or what their principles actually require? Both answers lead to problems, and the best way to avoid these problems is to simply say people should follow the correct principles.
Plato’s ›Theaetetus‹ Revisited
Author: Beatriz Bossi
Publisher: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG
ISBN: 3110715473
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 323
Book Description
This book meets the need to revise the standard interpretations of an apparently aporetic dialogue, full of eloquent silences and tricky suggestions, as it explores, among many other topics, the dramatis personae, including Plato's self-references behind the scene and the role of Socrates on stage, the question of method and refutation and the way dialectics plays a part in the dialogue. More especifically, it contains a set of papers devoted to perception and Plato's criticism of Heraclitus and Protagoras. A section deals with the problem of the relation between knowledge and thinking, including the the aviary model and the possibility of error. It also emphasizes some positive contributions to the classical Platonic doctrines and his philosophy of education. The reception of the dialogue in antiquity and the medieval age closes the analysis. Representing different hermeneutical traditions, prestigious scholars engage with these issues in divergent ways, as they shed new light on a complex controversial work.
Publisher: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG
ISBN: 3110715473
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 323
Book Description
This book meets the need to revise the standard interpretations of an apparently aporetic dialogue, full of eloquent silences and tricky suggestions, as it explores, among many other topics, the dramatis personae, including Plato's self-references behind the scene and the role of Socrates on stage, the question of method and refutation and the way dialectics plays a part in the dialogue. More especifically, it contains a set of papers devoted to perception and Plato's criticism of Heraclitus and Protagoras. A section deals with the problem of the relation between knowledge and thinking, including the the aviary model and the possibility of error. It also emphasizes some positive contributions to the classical Platonic doctrines and his philosophy of education. The reception of the dialogue in antiquity and the medieval age closes the analysis. Representing different hermeneutical traditions, prestigious scholars engage with these issues in divergent ways, as they shed new light on a complex controversial work.
The Epistemic Role of Consciousness
Author: Declan Smithies
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199917671
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 457
Book Description
What is the role of consciousness in our mental lives? Declan Smithies argues here that consciousness is essential to explaining how we can acquire knowledge and justified belief about ourselves and the world around us. On this view, unconscious beings cannot form justified beliefs and so they cannot know anything at all. Consciousness is the ultimate basis of all knowledge and epistemic justification. Smithies builds a sustained argument for the epistemic role of phenomenal consciousness which draws on a range of considerations in epistemology and the philosophy of mind. His position combines two key claims. The first is phenomenal mentalism, which says that epistemic justification is determined by the phenomenally individuated facts about your mental states. The second is accessibilism, which says that epistemic justification is luminously accessible in the sense that you're always in a position to know which beliefs you have epistemic justification to hold. Smithies integrates these two claims into a unified theory of epistemic justification, which he calls phenomenal accessibilism. The book is divided into two parts, which converge on this theory of epistemic justification from opposite directions. Part 1 argues from the bottom up by drawing on considerations in the philosophy of mind about the role of consciousness in mental representation, perception, cognition, and introspection. Part 2 argues from the top down by arguing from general principles in epistemology about the nature of epistemic justification. These mutually reinforcing arguments form the basis for a unified theory of the epistemic role of phenomenal consciousness, one that bridges the gap between epistemology and philosophy of mind.
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199917671
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 457
Book Description
What is the role of consciousness in our mental lives? Declan Smithies argues here that consciousness is essential to explaining how we can acquire knowledge and justified belief about ourselves and the world around us. On this view, unconscious beings cannot form justified beliefs and so they cannot know anything at all. Consciousness is the ultimate basis of all knowledge and epistemic justification. Smithies builds a sustained argument for the epistemic role of phenomenal consciousness which draws on a range of considerations in epistemology and the philosophy of mind. His position combines two key claims. The first is phenomenal mentalism, which says that epistemic justification is determined by the phenomenally individuated facts about your mental states. The second is accessibilism, which says that epistemic justification is luminously accessible in the sense that you're always in a position to know which beliefs you have epistemic justification to hold. Smithies integrates these two claims into a unified theory of epistemic justification, which he calls phenomenal accessibilism. The book is divided into two parts, which converge on this theory of epistemic justification from opposite directions. Part 1 argues from the bottom up by drawing on considerations in the philosophy of mind about the role of consciousness in mental representation, perception, cognition, and introspection. Part 2 argues from the top down by arguing from general principles in epistemology about the nature of epistemic justification. These mutually reinforcing arguments form the basis for a unified theory of the epistemic role of phenomenal consciousness, one that bridges the gap between epistemology and philosophy of mind.