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Author: Richard P. McLean
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
We develop an auction model for the case of interdependent values and multidimensional signals in which agents' signals are correlated. We provide conditions under which a modification of the Vickrey auction which includes payments to the bidders will result in an ex post efficient outcome. Furthermore, we provide a definition of informational size such that the necessary payments to bidders will be arbitrarily small if agents are sufficiently informationally small.
Author: Richard P. McLean
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
We develop an auction model for the case of interdependent values and multidimensional signals in which agents' signals are correlated. We provide conditions under which a modification of the Vickrey auction which includes payments to the bidders will result in an ex post efficient outcome. Furthermore, we provide a definition of informational size such that the necessary payments to bidders will be arbitrarily small if agents are sufficiently informationally small.
Author: Richard Mclean
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Author: Paul Milgrom
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139449168
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 378
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Book Description
This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Author: Vijay Krishna
Publisher: Elsevier
ISBN: 0080475965
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 318
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Book Description
Auction Theory is the standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions. The book develops the main concepts of auction theory from scratch in a self-contained and theoretically rigorous manner. It explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information through detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory. This book complements its superb presentation of auction theory with clear and concise proofs of all results on bidding strategies, efficiency, and revenue maximization. It provides discussions on auction-related subjects, including private value auctions; the Revenue Equivalence Principle; auctions with interdependent values; the Revenue Ranking (Linkage) Principle; mechanism design with interdependent values; bidding rings; multiple object auctions; equilibrium and efficiency with private values; and nonidentical objects. This book is essential reading for graduate students taking courses on auction theory, the economics of information, or the economics of incentives, as well as for any serious student of auctions. It will also appeal to professional economists or business analysts working in contract theory, experimental economics, industrial organization, and microeconomic theory. *The standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions*Explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information*Uses accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory
Author: John Rust
Publisher: Westview Press
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 476
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Book Description
"Proceedings of the Workshop on Double Auction Markets, held June, 1991 in Santa Fe, New Mexico." Includes bibliographical references and index.
Author: Flavio M. Menezes
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 38
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Book Description
Author: Econometric Society. World Congress
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 0521871522
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 431
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Book Description
Publisher description
Author: Leigh Tesfatsion
Publisher: Elsevier
ISBN: 0080459870
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 905
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Book Description
The explosive growth in computational power over the past several decades offers new tools and opportunities for economists. This handbook volume surveys recent research on Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE), the computational study of economic processes modeled as dynamic systems of interacting agents. Empirical referents for "agents" in ACE models can range from individuals or social groups with learning capabilities to physical world features with no cognitive function. Topics covered include: learning; empirical validation; network economics; social dynamics; financial markets; innovation and technological change; organizations; market design; automated markets and trading agents; political economy; social-ecological systems; computational laboratory development; and general methodological issues. *Every volume contains contributions from leading researchers *Each Handbook presents an accurate, self-contained survey of a particular topic *The series provides comprehensive and accessible surveys
Author: Dirk Bergemann
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9814452165
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 471
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Book Description
Foreword by Eric Maskin (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2007)This volume brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris have been working on for the past decade. The collection is preceded by a comprehensive introductory essay, specifically written for this volume with the aim of providing the readers with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers.The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, namely a single unit auction with interdependent values. It is our hope that the use of this example facilitates the presentation of the results and that it brings the main insights within the context of an important economic mechanism, namely the generalized second price auction.
Author: Henner Gimpel
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3540775544
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 242
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Book Description
This book contains a selection of papers presented at the International Seminar "Negotiation and Market Engineering", held at Dagstuhl Castle, Germany, in November 2006. The 17 revised full papers presented were carefully selected and reviewed. The papers deal with the complexity of negotiations, auctions, and markets as economic, social, and IT systems. The authors give a broad overview on the major issues to be addressed and the methodologies used to approach them.
