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Author: Mun Chui
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 202
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Book Description
Author: Mun Chui
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 202
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Book Description
Author: Paul Milgrom
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139449168
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 378
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Book Description
This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Author: Gary Biglaiser
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
We study an incentive auction in which multiple principals bid for the exclusive services, or effort, of a single agent. Each principal has private information about her valuation for these services, and the agent has private information about his disutility of providing them. We characterize the equilibrium of this auction and examine the agent's incentives to reveal information about his type. We show that the effort level taken by the agent is smaller than in the standard auction for a known agent type and greater than in the single-principal, single-agent model.
Author: Sander Onderstal
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Government auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 46
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Author: Paul R. Milgrom
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
A "core-selecting auction mechanism" is a direct mechanism for a multi-item allocation problem that selects a core allocation with respect to the bidders' reported values and the auctioneer's exogenously given preferences. For every profile of others' reports, a bidder has a best reply that is a truncation report. For every "bidder optimal" core imputation, there exists a profile of truncation reports that is a full-information Nash equilibrium for every core-selecting auction with those payoffs. Among core-selecting auctions, the incentives to deviate from truthful reporting are minimal at every preference profile if and only if the auction always selects a bidder optimal allocation with respect to the reported preferences. Finally, a core-selecting auction that selects a minimum revenue core allocation is a bidder optimal auction and make the seller's revenue a non-decreasing function of the bids, which eliminates distortions that can otherwise occur in the process of bidder application and qualification. All these results have analogues in two-sided matching theory.
Author: United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Broadband communication systems
Languages : en
Pages : 128
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Book Description
Author: John H. Kagel
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691218951
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 419
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Book Description
An invaluable account of how auctions workâand how to make them work Few forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a new focus on common value auctions and the "winner's curse." In such auctions the value of each item is about the same to all bidders, but different bidders have different information about the underlying value. Virtually all auctions have a common value element; among the burgeoning modern-day examples are those organized by Internet companies such as eBay. Winners end up cursing when they realize that they won because their estimates were overly optimistic, which led them to bid too much and lose money as a result. The authors first unveil a fresh survey of experimental data on the winner's curse. Melding theory with the econometric analysis of field data, they assess the design of government auctions, such as the spectrum rights (air wave) auctions that continue to be conducted around the world. The remaining chapters gauge the impact on sellers' revenue of the type of auction used and of inside information, show how bidders learn to avoid the winner's curse, and present comparisons of sophisticated bidders with college sophomores, the usual guinea pigs used in laboratory experiments. Appendixes refine theoretical arguments and, in some cases, present entirely new data. This book is an invaluable, impeccably up-to-date resource on how auctions work--and how to make them work.
Author: United States. Congress
Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
ISBN: 9781981490127
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 126
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Book Description
Crafting a successful incentive auction : stakeholders' perspectives : hearing before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United States Senate, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, first session, December 10, 2013.
Author: United States. Congress
Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
ISBN: 9781977550149
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 126
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Book Description
Crafting a successful incentive auction : stakeholders' perspectives
Author: Dirk Bergemann
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 60
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Book Description
