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Author: Beth Elaine Allen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 34
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Book Description
Author: Beth Elaine Allen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 34
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Beth Allen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 38
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Book Description
Author: Ulrich Schwalbe
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642584772
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 151
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Book Description
and should therefore constitute a part of every area of economic 3 theory. The spectrum covered by information economics today ranges from Stigler's search theory4 to industrial economics, including oligopoly theory, innovation, as well as research and develop 5 ment. However, the area information economics is most closely connected with is the theory of optimal contracts, mainly ana 6 lyzed in principal-agent models. Contract theory deals primar ily with the question of how optimal arrangements (contracts) for the purchase and sale of commodities and services between two or more agents should be structured. In these models, it is often assumed that the parties to the contract are informed differently or asymmetrically about relevant variables (e. g. the health of one party in the case of insurance contracts, or the effort in relation to employment contracts). As a result of this asymmetric in formation, phenomena such as moral hazard, adverse selection, signaling, and screening may arise. Frequently, results from con tract theory are referred to when making statements about the effects of asymmetric information on an economy. Models of this kind are often used to explain phenomena such as fixed wages or unemployment, among others. 7 However, such conclusions must be treated with caution for two reasons. In the first place, in these models, a contract (explicit or implicit) is determined by the solution of an optimization prob lem.
Author: Robert J. Aumann
Publisher: American Mathematical Soc.
ISBN: 9780821805251
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 306
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Book Description
Since the publication of "Theory of Games and Economic Behavior" by von Neumann and Morgenstern, the concept of games has played an increasing role in economics. It also plays a role of growing importance in other sciences, including biology, political science, and psychology. Many scientists have made seminal advances and continue to be leaders in the field, including Harsanyi, Shapley, Shubik, and Selten. Professor Robert Aumann, in addition to his important contributions to game theory and economics, made a number of significant contributions to mathematics. This volume provides a collection of essays in mathematical economics and game theory, including cutting-edge research on noncooperative game theory and its foundations, bargaining theory, and general equilibrium theory. Also included is a reprint of Aumann's classic paper, "Acceptable Points in General Cooperative n-Person Games" and of the oft-cited, yet hard to find, paper by Maschler, "The Worth of a Cooperative Enterprise to Each Member". This book illustrates the wide range of applications of mathematics to economics, game theory, and social choice. The volume is dedicated to Professor Robert J. Aumann, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel, for his contributions in mathematics and social sciences.
Author: Rafael Rob
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 36
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Author: Dionysius Glycopantis
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3540269797
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 656
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Book Description
One of the main problems in current economic theory is to write contracts which are Pareto optimal, incentive compatible, and also implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic, noncooperative game. The question arises whether it is possible to provide Walrasian type or cooperative equilibrium concepts which have these properties. This volume contains original contributions on noncooperative and cooperative equilibrium notions in economies with differential information and provides answers to the above questions. Moreover, issues of stability, learning and continuity of alternative equilibria are also examined.
Author: Charalambos D. Aliprantis
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3662058588
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 733
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Book Description
A collection of papers dealing with a broad range of topics in mathematical economics, game theory and economic dynamics. The contributions present both theoretical and applied research. The volume is dedicated to Mordecai Kurz. The papers were presented in a special symposium co-hosted by the Stanford University Department of Economics and by the Stanford Institute of Economic Policy Research in August 2002.
Author: Sergiu Hart
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642604544
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 331
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Book Description
Issues relating to the emergence, persistence, and stability of cooperation among social agents of every type are widely recognized to be of paramount importance. They are also analytically difficult and intellectually challenging. This book, arising from a NATO Advanced Study Institute held at SUNY in 1994, is an up-to-date presentation of the contribution of game theory to the subject. The contributors are leading specialists who focus on the problem from the many different angles of game theory, including axiomatic bargaining theory, the Nash program of non-cooperative foundations, game with complete information, repeated and sequential games, bounded rationality methods, evolutionary theory, experimental approaches, and others. Together they offer significant progress in understanding cooperation.
Author: William A. Barnett
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521443401
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 438
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Book Description
Parts three and four are devoted to algebraic and combinatorial aspects of social choice theory, including analyses of Arrow's Theorem, consensus functions, and the role of geometry. Part five deals with the application of cooperative game theory to social choice.
Author: Roger D. Lagunoff
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 54
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Book Description
