Author: Jiyong Eom
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 288
Book Description
Incentives for Utility-based Energy Efficiency Programs in California
Author: Jiyong Eom
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 288
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 288
Book Description
Shareholder Incentives for Utility-Based Energy Efficiency Programs in California
Author: Jiyong Eom
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 41
Book Description
Energy efficiency is increasingly being recognized as a resource warranting aggressive public investment. The State of California has committed an unprecedented sum of $2.2 billion in ratepayer funds to utility-based energy efficiency programs from 2006 through 2008; the State finalized in 2007 the determination of the shared-savings incentive mechanism for the 2006-2008 programs and beyond. This study seeks to examine whether the adopted incentive mechanism would ensure an efficient delivery of the programs, and what reforms, if any, could be proposed to meet this end. I develop a game theory model for the implementation of the programs, in which a regulator adopts an energy savings target and a shared-savings incentive mechanism before a utility firm proposes program funding, gets the proposal authorized, and begins to manage the programs. The study reveals that each utility firm requires a certain minimum level of incentive rate, in order for the mechanism to encourage the firm to achieve the adopted energy savings target, eventually bringing non-negative bill savings to its customers. It also reveals that a higher-than-minimum incentive rate can achieve not only a greater net social benefit but also greater bill savings for customers. Model-based analysis of California energy efficiency programs suggests that a higher-than-adopted incentive rate is warranted and that social efficiency would be improved by customizing incentive mechanisms for individual utilities and updating them on a regular basis.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 41
Book Description
Energy efficiency is increasingly being recognized as a resource warranting aggressive public investment. The State of California has committed an unprecedented sum of $2.2 billion in ratepayer funds to utility-based energy efficiency programs from 2006 through 2008; the State finalized in 2007 the determination of the shared-savings incentive mechanism for the 2006-2008 programs and beyond. This study seeks to examine whether the adopted incentive mechanism would ensure an efficient delivery of the programs, and what reforms, if any, could be proposed to meet this end. I develop a game theory model for the implementation of the programs, in which a regulator adopts an energy savings target and a shared-savings incentive mechanism before a utility firm proposes program funding, gets the proposal authorized, and begins to manage the programs. The study reveals that each utility firm requires a certain minimum level of incentive rate, in order for the mechanism to encourage the firm to achieve the adopted energy savings target, eventually bringing non-negative bill savings to its customers. It also reveals that a higher-than-minimum incentive rate can achieve not only a greater net social benefit but also greater bill savings for customers. Model-based analysis of California energy efficiency programs suggests that a higher-than-adopted incentive rate is warranted and that social efficiency would be improved by customizing incentive mechanisms for individual utilities and updating them on a regular basis.
Shareholder Incentives for Utility-Delivered Energy Efficiency Programs in California
Author: Jiyong Eom
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
The State of California has committed an unprecedented sum of $2.2 billion in ratepayer funds to utility-delivered energy efficiency programs from 2006 through 2008; the State finalized in 2007 the determination of the shared-savings incentive mechanism for the 2006-2008 programs and beyond. This study seeks to examine whether the adopted incentive mechanism would ensure an efficient delivery of the programs, and what reforms, if any, could be proposed to meet this end. We develop an economic model for the implementation of the programs, in which a regulator adopts an energy savings target and a shared-savings incentive mechanism before a utility firm proposes program funding, gets it authorized, and begins to manage it. The study reveals that each utility firm requires a certain minimum incentive rate to ensure that the firm will be encouraged to achieve the energy savings target, eventually bringing non-negative bill savings to its customers. It also reveals that depending on market and regulatory circumstances, a higher-than-minimum incentive rate can be warranted to achieve not only a greater net social benefit but also greater bill savings for customers. Model-based analysis of California energy efficiency programs suggests that a higher-than-adopted incentive rate is warranted and that social efficiency would be improved by customizing incentive mechanisms for individual utilities and updating them on a regular basis.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
The State of California has committed an unprecedented sum of $2.2 billion in ratepayer funds to utility-delivered energy efficiency programs from 2006 through 2008; the State finalized in 2007 the determination of the shared-savings incentive mechanism for the 2006-2008 programs and beyond. This study seeks to examine whether the adopted incentive mechanism would ensure an efficient delivery of the programs, and what reforms, if any, could be proposed to meet this end. We develop an economic model for the implementation of the programs, in which a regulator adopts an energy savings target and a shared-savings incentive mechanism before a utility firm proposes program funding, gets it authorized, and begins to manage it. The study reveals that each utility firm requires a certain minimum incentive rate to ensure that the firm will be encouraged to achieve the energy savings target, eventually bringing non-negative bill savings to its customers. It also reveals that depending on market and regulatory circumstances, a higher-than-minimum incentive rate can be warranted to achieve not only a greater net social benefit but also greater bill savings for customers. Model-based analysis of California energy efficiency programs suggests that a higher-than-adopted incentive rate is warranted and that social efficiency would be improved by customizing incentive mechanisms for individual utilities and updating them on a regular basis.
Ratepayer-funded Energy-efficiency Programs in a Restructured Electricity Industry
Author: Joseph H. Eto
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Electric utilities
Languages : en
Pages : 82
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Electric utilities
Languages : en
Pages : 82
Book Description
A Compendium of Utility-sponsored Energy Efficiency Rebate Programs
Author: Consumer Energy Council of America. Research Foundation
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Electric power
Languages : en
Pages : 292
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Electric power
Languages : en
Pages : 292
Book Description
Energy-Efficiency Program Evaluations
Author: Noah Kaufman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
We analyze the evaluations of California energy-efficiency programs to assess the effectiveness of these evaluations in: 1) improving our understanding of their performance and 2) providing a check on utility incentives to overstate energy savings. We find that third-party evaluations are useful tools to achieve both ends because the programs largely did not meet their energy-savings projections, and the utility-reported savings estimates are systematically higher than the evaluated savings estimates. We also find evidence that the choice of the third-party evaluator was influential in determining the estimate of evaluated savings.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
We analyze the evaluations of California energy-efficiency programs to assess the effectiveness of these evaluations in: 1) improving our understanding of their performance and 2) providing a check on utility incentives to overstate energy savings. We find that third-party evaluations are useful tools to achieve both ends because the programs largely did not meet their energy-savings projections, and the utility-reported savings estimates are systematically higher than the evaluated savings estimates. We also find evidence that the choice of the third-party evaluator was influential in determining the estimate of evaluated savings.
A Compendium of Major California Conservation Programs
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Architecture and energy conservation
Languages : en
Pages : 222
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Architecture and energy conservation
Languages : en
Pages : 222
Book Description
Decisions of the Public Utilities Commission of the State of California
Author: California Public Utilities Commission
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Public utilities
Languages : en
Pages : 888
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Public utilities
Languages : en
Pages : 888
Book Description
Achieving Cost-effective Energy Efficiency for California
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Energy conservation
Languages : en
Pages : 50
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Energy conservation
Languages : en
Pages : 50
Book Description
Integrated Energy Policy Report ... Update
Author: California Energy Commission. Integrated Energy Policy Report Committee
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Energy conservation
Languages : en
Pages : 264
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Energy conservation
Languages : en
Pages : 264
Book Description