Optimal Incentive Contracts with Multiple Agents PDF Download
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Author: Joel S. Demski
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 58
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Book Description
Author: Joel S. Demski
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 58
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Book Description
Author: Ching-to Ma
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Commercial agents
Languages : en
Pages : 40
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Author: Ching-to Ma
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Incentives in industry
Languages : en
Pages : 40
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Book Description
Author: Nabil I. Al-Najjar
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business ethics
Languages : en
Pages : 23
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Author: Jacques Paul Lawarrée
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 418
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Author: Qi Luo
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 17
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Book Description
Incentive contracts with multiple agents is a classical decentralized decision-making problem with asymmetric information. Contract design aims to incentivize noncooperative agents to act in the principal's interest over a planning horizon. We extend the single-agent incentive contract to a multiagent setting with history-dependent terminal conditions. Our contributions include: (a) Finding sufficient conditions for the existence of optimal multiagent incentive contracts and conditions under which they form a unique Nash Equilibrium; (b) Showing that the optimal multiagent incentive contracts can be solved by a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation with equilibrium constraints; (c) Proposing a backward iterative algorithm to solve the problem.
Author: Rudolf Kerschbaumer
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Ola Kvaløy
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Author: Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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The paper introduces the problem of unawareness into Principal-Agent theory and discusses optimal incentive contracts when the agent may be unaware of her action space. Depending on the agent's default behavior, it can be optimal for the principal to propose an incomplete contract (that keeps the agent unaware) or a complete contract. The key tradeoff is that of enlarging the agent's choice set versus adding costly incentive constraints. If agents differ in their unawareness, optimal contracts show a self-reinforcing pattern: if there are few unaware agents in the economy optimal contracts promote awareness, if unawareness is wide-spread optimal contracts shroud the contracting environment, thus keeping the agent unaware.
Author: Jean-Jacques Laffont
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 1400829453
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 436
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Book Description
Economics has much to do with incentives--not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents. This book focuses on the principal-agent model, the "simple" situation where a principal, or company, delegates a task to a single agent through a contract--the essence of management and contract theory. How does the owner or manager of a firm align the objectives of its various members to maximize profits? Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors devote the bulk of their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability. Offering an unprecedented look at a subject vital to industrial organization, labor economics, and behavioral economics, this book is set to become the definitive resource for students, researchers, and others who might find themselves pondering what contracts, and the incentives they embody, are really all about.
