Hotelling-Bertrand Duopoly Competition Under Firm-Specific Network Effects PDF Download
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Author: Marco Tolotti
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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When dealing with consumer choices, social pressure plays a crucial role; also in the context of market competition, the impact of network/social effects has been largely recognized. However, the effects of firm-specific social recognition on market equilibria has never been addressed so far. In this paper, we consider a duopoly where competing firms are differentiated solely by the level of social (or network) externality they induce on consumers' perceived utility. We fully characterize the subgame perfect Nash equilibria in locations, prices and market shares. Under a scenario of weak social externality, the firms opt for maximal differentiation and the one with the highest social recognition has a relative advantage in terms of profits. Surprisingly, this outcome is not persistent; excessive social recognition may lead to adverse coordination of consumers: the strongest firm can eventually be thrown out of the market with positive probability. This scenario is related to a Pareto inefficient trap of no differentiation.
Author: Marco Tolotti
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
When dealing with consumer choices, social pressure plays a crucial role; also in the context of market competition, the impact of network/social effects has been largely recognized. However, the effects of firm-specific social recognition on market equilibria has never been addressed so far. In this paper, we consider a duopoly where competing firms are differentiated solely by the level of social (or network) externality they induce on consumers' perceived utility. We fully characterize the subgame perfect Nash equilibria in locations, prices and market shares. Under a scenario of weak social externality, the firms opt for maximal differentiation and the one with the highest social recognition has a relative advantage in terms of profits. Surprisingly, this outcome is not persistent; excessive social recognition may lead to adverse coordination of consumers: the strongest firm can eventually be thrown out of the market with positive probability. This scenario is related to a Pareto inefficient trap of no differentiation.
Author: Irina Suleymanova
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Ningyuan Chen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 90
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Book Description
We consider two firms selling products to a market of network-connected customers. Each firm is selling one product and the two products are substitutable. The customers make purchases based on the multinomial logit model and the firms compete for their purchasing probabilities. We characterize possible Nash equilibria for homogeneous network interactions and identical firms: when the network effects are weak, there is a symmetric equilibrium that the two firms evenly split the market; when the network effects are strong, there exist two asymmetric equilibria additionally, in which one firm dominates the market; interestingly, when the product quality is low and the network effects are neither too weak nor too strong, the resulting market equilibrium is never symmetric although the firms are ex ante symmetric. We extend these results along multiple directions. First, when the products have heterogeneous qualities, the firm selling inferior product can still retain market dominance in equilibrium due to the strong network effects. Second, when the network effects are heterogeneous, customers with higher social influences or larger price sensitivities are more likely to purchase either product in the symmetric equilibrium. Third, when the network consists of two communities, market segmentation may arise. Fourth, we extend to the dynamic game when the network effects build up over time to explain the first-mover advantage.
Author: Lijia Ge
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
In this paper, we formulate a differential game model to investigate firms' competition in both price and product R&D. The significant features of our research include: (i) incorporating the factor of network effects into the framework of continuous dynamic competition; (ii) considering the consumers' adaptive learning about the network size in the spirit of behavioral economics. Our analysis mainly suggests: (i) The network effects and consumers' adaptive learning comprehensively have negative effects on the result of price competition but has nothing to do with the result of R&D competition under duopoly, which is not true as the number of firms increases; (ii) the incentive to acquire competitors' state information is increasing with the intensity of network effects and the consumers' learning speed; (iii) when we consider the competition among more than three firms under feedback information structure, the competition intensity has negative effect on the steady-state quality stock; (iv) in a market where the consumers show strong price sensitivity, the product quality is under-provided compared with the first-best optimal level regardless of the choice of solution concept.
Author: Paul Belleflamme
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139485245
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 725
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Book Description
Industrial Organization: Markets and Strategies provides an up-to-date account of modern industrial organization that blends theory with real-world applications. Written in a clear and accessible style, it acquaints the reader with the most important models for understanding strategies chosen by firms with market power and shows how such firms adapt to different market environments. It covers a wide range of topics including recent developments on product bundling, branding strategies, restrictions in vertical supply relationships, intellectual property protection, and two-sided markets, to name just a few. Models are presented in detail and the main results are summarized as lessons. Formal theory is complemented throughout by real-world cases that show students how it applies to actual organizational settings. The book is accompanied by a website containing a number of additional resources for lecturers and students, including exercises, answers to review questions, case material and slides.
Author: Simon P. Anderson
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262011280
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 454
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Book Description
"The discrete choice approach provides an ideal framework for describing the demands for differentiated products and can be used for studying most product differentiation models in the literature. By introducing extra dimensions of product heterogeneity, the framework also provides richer models of firm location and product selection."--BOOK JACKET.
Author: Richard Schmalensee
Publisher: North Holland
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 1002
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Book Description
Determinants of firm and market organization; Analysis of market behavior; Empirical methods and results; International issues and comparision; government intervention in the Marketplace.
Author: Xavier Vives
Publisher: MIT Press (MA)
ISBN: 9780262220606
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 446
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Book Description
Applies a modern game-theoretic approach to develop a theory of oligopoly pricing. The text relates classic contributions to the field of modern game theory and discusses basic game-theoretic tools and equilibrium, paying particular attention to developments in the theory of supermodular games.
Author: Claude d’Aspremont
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 303063602X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 160
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Book Description
This book provides a methodology for the analysis of oligopolistic markets from an equilibrium viewpoint, considering competition within and between groups of firms. It proposes a well-founded measure of competitive toughness that can be used in empirically relevant applications. This measure reflects the weight put by each firm on competition for market share relative to competition for market size – two dimensions of competition involving conflicting and convergent interests, respectively. It further explores several applications, such as the effect of tougher competition on innovation and of output market power on the emergence of involuntary unemployment, as well as the importance of strategic interactions for investment decisions. Relative to the dominant model of monopolistic competition, The Economics of Competition, Collusion and In-between aims to explore an alternative tractable model of firm competition opening the application of oligopoly theory to many fields in economics where general equilibrium features are crucial. It will be relevant to those interested in applied industrial organization, trade, macroeconomics (in particular macrodynamics) and quantitative economics.
Author: Mr.Giovanni Dell'Ariccia
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 145195154X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 32
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Book Description
The paper analyzes the effects of informational asymmetries on the market structure of the banking industry in a multi-period model of spatial competition. All lenders face uncertainty with regard to borrowers’ creditworthiness, but, in the process of lending, incumbent banks gather proprietary information about their clients, acquiring an advantage over potential entrants. These informational asymmetries are an important determinant of the industry structure and may represent a barrier to entry for new banks. The paper shows that, in contrast with traditional models of horizontal differentiation, the steady-state equilibrium is characterized by a finite number of banks even in the absence of fixed costs.
