Horizontal Merger and the Efficacy of Divestiture

Horizontal Merger and the Efficacy of Divestiture PDF Author: Roy Thomas Savoian
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consolidation and merger of corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 632

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Horizontal Merger and the Efficacy of Divestiture

Horizontal Merger and the Efficacy of Divestiture PDF Author: Roy Thomas Savoian
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consolidation and merger of corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 632

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Book Description


Mergers, Sell-Offs, and Economic Efficiency

Mergers, Sell-Offs, and Economic Efficiency PDF Author: David J. Ravenscraft
Publisher: Brookings Institution Press
ISBN: 0815723172
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 305

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Book Description
This book covers the consolidation and merger of corporations and corporate divestiture in the United States.

Federal Trade Commission and United States Department of Justice Commentary on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines

Federal Trade Commission and United States Department of Justice Commentary on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines PDF Author:
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428953299
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 71

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Looking Back with Interest (Rates)

Looking Back with Interest (Rates) PDF Author: Joshua Lee Palmer
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 128

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Book Description
In the following three essays I use quantitative evidence to address the effectiveness of horizontal merger policy in the United States in protecting the competitive balance of markets. Since the enactment of the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890, the Federal Government has attempted to protect the public from increased prices, reduced innovation, and other adverse effects that may occur when firms are able to exercise market power. Horizontal mergers, in which firms that were previously direct competitors combine to operate as a single entity, are of particular concern to the Antitrust Authorities (mainly the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission) as these mergers necessarily remove a competitor from the market. Surprisingly, there are relatively few empirical studies that investigate whether the Antitrust Authorities are able to accurately identify the potentially anticompetitive mergers, or whether once identified, the proposed remedies are appropriate to alleviate concerns over gains in market power. I provide empirical work on these two issues. In the first essay, I consider the question of how the antitrust agencies identify potentially troublesome mergers based on pre-merger information. I use pre-merger data from the commercial banking industry to implement a model proposed in the literature to be an improvement over the current merger application screening tool. I find that relative to the current screen the proposed model reduced the number of mergers flagged as being competitively troublesome. This result is important given the time and resource constraints that antitrust agencies face when evaluating merger applications. To test whether the proposed model was not to lax, I combine pre- and post-merger data and implement a difference-in-differences method to estimate the actual merger affects. I then check to see whether mergers estimated to have resulted in price effects were identified by the proposed model and find that all of the mergers estimated to have resulted in statistically significant price increases were flagged by the proposed model. In my second essay, I turn to the question of whether branch divestitures are sufficient market power remedies in bank mergers. In particular, I combine data on pre- and post-merger market conditions with data on the Federal Reserve Board's (FRB) stated post-merger expectations to investigate how well divestiture remedies alleviate market power concerns. I identify mergers that involved the divestitures of bank branches in at least one of the banking markets in which the merging banks competed prior to the merger. I then divide the sample of merger markets into two subsamples, one in which divestitures occurred and one in which no divestitures occurred and compare the interest rates banks paid depositors in divestiture markets to the rates paid to depositors in non-divestiture markets. I find that in the second year after the merger the interest rate spread between divestiture and non-divestiture markets was over 135 percent larger on deposit accounts than the pre-merger spread and remained almost 40% higher in the third year following the merger. As a result, depositors in divestiture markets were relatively worse off than depositors in non-divestiture markets following the merger. This evidence suggests that the divestitures may not have been sufficient market power remedies. In the final chapter I address a troubling aspect of antitrust policy. Namely, despite its long history and recognized importance, a deficiency of the empirical evidence required to accurately assess the effectiveness of antitrust policy has persisted. I identify publicly available data sets on pre- and post-merger market data, as well as publicly available data on specific post-merger market predictions made by the Federal Reserve Board at the time of the merger application review that can be collected to address this deficiency. I then check to see how the FRB's pro forma estimates of the post-merger market shares underlying their review process compare to the post-merger market shares observed in the data. I find that pro forma market shares consistently overestimate the post-merger market share of the surviving bank, a finding that is troublesome to the extent that it reflects a restriction in output by the merged bank. I conclude that the findings reaffirm the warnings from a number of economists that assumptions underlying merger policy need to be analyzed and argue that the availability of data useful for such analyses should be viewed by the profession and policy makers as rendering the deficiency of empirical evidence on antitrust policy as irresponsible and unacceptable.

The Effectiveness of Antitrust Policy Towards Horizontal Mergers

The Effectiveness of Antitrust Policy Towards Horizontal Mergers PDF Author: David B. Audretsch
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 176

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Structural Remedies in Network Industries

Structural Remedies in Network Industries PDF Author: Yongjoon Park
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
Asset divestitures are often negotiated to alleviate anticompetitive concerns created by horizontal mergers. I develop a structural model to evaluate the effectiveness of alternative slot divestiture schemes in the US airline industry, focusing on the divestiture of slots at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA), which the government required as a condition of the American/US Airways merger. Departing from the existing literature, my model accounts for how the number of slots allocated to a route segment affects carrier costs, how passengers going to many different destinations may use the same segments, and how carriers choose to allocate slots to segments. I use counterfactuals to show that slot divestitures can result in the re-allocation of surplus between consumers; to estimate the proportion of slots that the merged American would have needed to divest to maximize total welfare; and, to evaluate the effects of allocating divested slots to different types of carriers. I find that the proposed divestiture raised consumer surplus significantly ($112M per year) compared to approving the merger without divestiture, but that it re-allocated surplus between consumers in different markets. I also find that the policy of only allowing the slots to be divested to low-cost carriers raised consumer surplus relative to the policy of only allowing the slots to be divested to legacy carriers.

Corporate Divestitures

Corporate Divestitures PDF Author: William J. Gole
Publisher: Wiley
ISBN: 0470293489
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 336

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Book Description
Providing practical application of best practices employed in the divestiture process, Corporate Divestitures provides you with detailed guidance on how your corporation should handle a divestiture. It provides a structured approach that emphasizes disciplined execution and illustrative documents and application aids that can be adapted for use in real-world situations.

The Economic Assessment of Mergers Under European Competition Law

The Economic Assessment of Mergers Under European Competition Law PDF Author: Daniel Gore
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107007720
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 559

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Book Description
Provides a clear, concise and practical overview of the key economic techniques and evidence employed in European merger control.

Remedies in EU Competition Law

Remedies in EU Competition Law PDF Author: Damien Gerard
Publisher: Kluwer Law International B.V.
ISBN: 9403522445
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 347

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Book Description
By their nature, remedies are central to competition law enforcement and represent the yardstick against which the efficiency of the overall system can be measured. Yet very rarely have remedies been treated in a horizontal and comprehensive manner from the combined perspectives of substance, process and policy. The present volume, developed in partnership with the College of Europe’s Global Competition Law Centre (GCLC), provides coherent, practical, and authoritative commentaries by leading experts from the GCLC’s incomparable network. The contributions – originally presented at the 2019 GCLC annual conference – examine remedies to assess the overall effectiveness of competition law enforcement in merger, antitrust and State aid matters. The overall topic is presented under five headings: objectives and limitations of remedies; types of remedies in competition law enforcement; implementation and process; ex post assessment of remedies and policy lessons; and national and international approaches. The high-profile and wide-ranging group of authors includes the Director-General of the European Commission’s competition department, lawyers from major international firms, and well-known economists and academics specialising in competition law. With a sharp focus on how to make competition rules work well in today’s digital environment, this systematic and coherent analysis illuminates an issue that we need to fully grasp and understand in order to make sense of competition policy, law and enforcement in the years and decades to come.

Antitrust Law Journal

Antitrust Law Journal PDF Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Energy policy
Languages : en
Pages : 1076

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Book Description