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Author: Lei Xuan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Executives
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
The first essay examines how board structure affects manager dismissal decisions in mutual funds. We first find some evidence suggesting that the likelihood of managerial replacement is higher when fund boards are more independent and receive lower levels of compensation. Manager turnover is more likely when funds underperform the objective average. We then investigate the manager turnover decision conditional on the funds experiencing a merger. We find that funds with more independent boards are more likely to employ target managers with a track record of superior performance. Overall, these results suggest that more independent boards make manager retention/replacement decisions in the interests of their shareholders. The second essay studies the relationship between managerial ownership and mutual fund performance. We first document that almost half of the mutual fund managers own shares in their funds, though the absolute amount of investment is modest. Fund future performance is positively related to the level of manager ownership. Manager ownership is higher in equity funds than bond funds, in funds with better past performance, smaller sizes, and where managers have been in charge for a longer time period. When we decompose manager ownership into predicted and residual parts, we find that both components are significant in explaining fund future performance. Our findings suggest that managerial ownership has desirable incentive attributes for mutual fund investors. The third essay investigates how managerial ownership affects the investment behavior of portfolio managers. We first examine the disposition effect exhibited by different fund managers, and find that those with positive ownership show significantly less disposition effect. Specifically, they sell losers faster and hold on to winner stocks for a longer period. Disposition effect is less pronounced in bigger funds, funds with smaller boards, and funds with higher percentage of board independence. We then test the relation between managerial ownership and the tournament behavior, investigating how the degree of managers manipulation of fund volatilities in the latter part of a year is related to their personal stakes in the funds. However, we do not find evidence suggesting the existence of such a relationship.
Author: Lei Xuan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Executives
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
The first essay examines how board structure affects manager dismissal decisions in mutual funds. We first find some evidence suggesting that the likelihood of managerial replacement is higher when fund boards are more independent and receive lower levels of compensation. Manager turnover is more likely when funds underperform the objective average. We then investigate the manager turnover decision conditional on the funds experiencing a merger. We find that funds with more independent boards are more likely to employ target managers with a track record of superior performance. Overall, these results suggest that more independent boards make manager retention/replacement decisions in the interests of their shareholders. The second essay studies the relationship between managerial ownership and mutual fund performance. We first document that almost half of the mutual fund managers own shares in their funds, though the absolute amount of investment is modest. Fund future performance is positively related to the level of manager ownership. Manager ownership is higher in equity funds than bond funds, in funds with better past performance, smaller sizes, and where managers have been in charge for a longer time period. When we decompose manager ownership into predicted and residual parts, we find that both components are significant in explaining fund future performance. Our findings suggest that managerial ownership has desirable incentive attributes for mutual fund investors. The third essay investigates how managerial ownership affects the investment behavior of portfolio managers. We first examine the disposition effect exhibited by different fund managers, and find that those with positive ownership show significantly less disposition effect. Specifically, they sell losers faster and hold on to winner stocks for a longer period. Disposition effect is less pronounced in bigger funds, funds with smaller boards, and funds with higher percentage of board independence. We then test the relation between managerial ownership and the tournament behavior, investigating how the degree of managers manipulation of fund volatilities in the latter part of a year is related to their personal stakes in the funds. However, we do not find evidence suggesting the existence of such a relationship.
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Financial Services. Subcommittee on Capital Markets and Government Sponsored Enterprises
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 268
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Book Description
Author: R. Glenn Hubbard
Publisher: Columbia University Press
ISBN: 0231151829
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 254
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Book Description
Mutual funds form the bedrock of retirement savings in the United States, and, considering their rapid growth over recent decades, are sure to become even more financially critical in the coming decades. Because the size of fees paid by investors to mutual fund advisers can strongly affect the return on investment, these fees have become contentious in Congress and the courts, with many arguing that investment advisers grow rich at the expense of investors. This groundbreaking book not only conceptualizes a new economic model for the industry but uses this model to test price competition between investment advisers. Its highly experienced authors track the growth of the industry over the past twenty-five years and present the arguments and evidence both for and against theories of adviser malfeasance, as well as the assertion that market forces fail to protect investors' returns from excessive fees. The volume briefly reviews the regulatory history of mutual fund fees and leading case decisions addressing excessive fees. It also reveals the extent to which the governance structure of mutual funds impacts fund performance. There is no greater text for those who seek to understand today's mutual fund industry, including investors, money managers, fund directors, securities lawyers, economists, and those concerned with regulatory policy toward mutual funds
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Financial Services. Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 120
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Book Description
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Financial Services. Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 250
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Book Description
Distributed to some depository libraries in microfiche.
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Financial Services. Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 366
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Book Description
Author: William A. Birdthistle
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 1784715050
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 477
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Book Description
With fifty trillion in worldwide assets, the growth of mutual funds is a truly global phenomenon and deserves a broad international analysis. Local political economies and legal regimes create different regulatory preferences for the oversight of these funds, and academics, public officials and legal practitioners wishing to understand the global investing environment will require a keen awareness of these international differences. The contributors, leading scholars in the field of investment law from around the world, provide a current legal analysis of funds from a variety of perspectives and using an array of methodologies that consider the large fundamental questions governing the role and regulation of investment funds. This volume also explores the identity and behavior of investors as well as issues surrounding less orthodox funds, such as money market funds, ETFs, and private funds. This Handbook will provide legal and financial scholars, academics, lawyers and regulators with a vital tool for working with mutual funds. Contributors include: W.A. Birdthistle, M. Bullard, I.H-Y Chiu, B. Clarke, Q. Curtis, D.A. DeMott, J. Fanto, J.E. Fisch, P. Hanrahan, L.P.Q. Johnson, W.A. Kaal, A.K. Krug, A.B. Laby, J.D. Morley, A. Palmiter, I. Ramsay, E.D. Roiter, M. White, D.A. Zetzsche
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Financial Services. Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 354
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Book Description
Author: Mohammed Khair Alshaleel
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
ISBN: 1000634906
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 272
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Book Description
This book provides a detailed analysis of mutual fund regulations and governance in the UK from the investor protection perspective. It comprehensively describes mutual funds by their function, social utility, and legal attributes, examining the level of protection provided to retail investors under existing regulations. Mutual funds are externally managed with fund ownership separated out from their management, which carries a potential conflict of interest between the self-interests of the fund management and each fund’s investors. The book provides an in-depth analysis of this agency problem in the mutual fund industry, comparing the competing governance models in the UK and the US and the supervision of management activities. In the UK, it investigates the main governance mechanisms, including disclosure, the effectiveness of voting rights, and the role of the Financial Conduct Authority in protecting investors. It also considers the role of prudential regulations in protecting mutual fund investors, with a particular focus on risk management and mutual fund liquidity crisis. The book further investigates the impact of the withdrawal of the UK from the European Union (Brexit) on the industry and what this means for the future of the undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) in the UK. The concept of mutual funds is still not clearly understood, so this book will clearly define the different legal and practical aspects of mutual funds. It will be the first substantial study of mutual fund governance mechanisms under the existing mutual fund laws and regulations in the UK.
Author: Antoine Bouveret
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1513582321
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 48
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Book Description
This paper assesses liquidity risk for the United States (U.S.) bond mutual funds industry and performs a range of analyses to identify which fund categories are more vulnerable to distress than others, and how sales from funds can impact financial stability. We develop a new measure to identify vulnerable categories based on expected outflows labelled ‘Flows in Distress’. Overall, most U.S. mutual funds are resilient yet high yield (HY) and loan funds would face a liquidity shortfall when faced with severe redemption shocks. Combined sales from funds can have a sizeable price impact. Finally, our contagion analysis using data on fund flows and returns shows that Investment Grade (IG) corporate bonds funds, municipal bond funds and government bond funds are more likely to spread distress to other fund categories than HY, EM and loan funds. When the first type of funds experiences stress, other funds categories are likely to experience stress as well.
