Author: Alberto Artosi
Publisher:
ISBN: 9788880915775
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 264
Book Description
From Practical Reason to Legal Computer Science
Author: Alberto Artosi
Publisher:
ISBN: 9788880915775
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 264
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN: 9788880915775
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 264
Book Description
From Practical Reason to Legal Computer Science: Practical reason, history of deontics, computer law
Author: Alberto Artosi
Publisher: CLUEB Editrice Bologna
ISBN:
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 208
Book Description
Publisher: CLUEB Editrice Bologna
ISBN:
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 208
Book Description
From Practical Reason to Legal Computer Science
Author: Alberto Artosi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Artificial intelligence
Languages : en
Pages : 444
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Artificial intelligence
Languages : en
Pages : 444
Book Description
Legal Systems and Legal Science
Author: Marijan Pavčnik
Publisher: Franz Steiner Verlag
ISBN: 9783515070744
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 156
Book Description
Res. en inglés.
Publisher: Franz Steiner Verlag
ISBN: 9783515070744
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 156
Book Description
Res. en inglés.
Author:
Publisher: IOS Press
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 7289
Book Description
Publisher: IOS Press
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 7289
Book Description
Scientific Models of Legal Reasoning
Author: Scott Brewer
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1136524762
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 425
Book Description
First published in 1998. This five-volume series contains some of this century's most influential or thought provoking articles on the subject of legal argument that have appeared in Anglo-American philosophy journals and law reviews. This volume offers a collection of essays by philosophers and legal scholars on economics, artificial intelligence and the physical sciences.
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1136524762
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 425
Book Description
First published in 1998. This five-volume series contains some of this century's most influential or thought provoking articles on the subject of legal argument that have appeared in Anglo-American philosophy journals and law reviews. This volume offers a collection of essays by philosophers and legal scholars on economics, artificial intelligence and the physical sciences.
Rule of Law
Author: International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy. World Congress
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 412
Book Description
Partial proceedings of the 17th World Congress of the International Association of Legal and Social Philosophy, held in Bologna, June 16-21, 1995.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 412
Book Description
Partial proceedings of the 17th World Congress of the International Association of Legal and Social Philosophy, held in Bologna, June 16-21, 1995.
Law for Computer Scientists and Other Folk
Author: Mireille Hildebrandt
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198860870
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 341
Book Description
This book introduces law to computer scientists and other folk. Computer scientists develop, protect, and maintain computing systems in the broad sense of that term, whether hardware (a smartphone, a driverless car, a smart energy meter, a laptop, or a server), software (a program, an application programming interface or API, a module, code), or data (captured via cookies, sensors, APIs, or manual input). Computer scientists may be focused on security (e.g. cryptography), or on embedded systems (e.g. the Internet of Things), or on data science (e.g. machine learning). They may be closer to mathematicians or to electrical or electronic engineers, or they may work on the cusp of hardware and software, mathematical proofs and empirical testing. This book conveys the internal logic of legal practice, offering a hands-on introduction to the relevant domains of law, while firmly grounded in legal theory. It bridges the gap between two scientific practices, by presenting a coherent picture of the grammar and vocabulary of law and the rule of law, geared to those with no wish to become lawyers but nevertheless required to consider the salience of legal rights and obligations. Simultaneously, this book will help lawyers to review their own trade. It is a volume on law in an onlife world, presenting a grounded argument of what law does (speech act theory), how it emerged in the context of printed text (philosophy of technology), and how it confronts its new, data-driven environment. Book jacket.
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198860870
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 341
Book Description
This book introduces law to computer scientists and other folk. Computer scientists develop, protect, and maintain computing systems in the broad sense of that term, whether hardware (a smartphone, a driverless car, a smart energy meter, a laptop, or a server), software (a program, an application programming interface or API, a module, code), or data (captured via cookies, sensors, APIs, or manual input). Computer scientists may be focused on security (e.g. cryptography), or on embedded systems (e.g. the Internet of Things), or on data science (e.g. machine learning). They may be closer to mathematicians or to electrical or electronic engineers, or they may work on the cusp of hardware and software, mathematical proofs and empirical testing. This book conveys the internal logic of legal practice, offering a hands-on introduction to the relevant domains of law, while firmly grounded in legal theory. It bridges the gap between two scientific practices, by presenting a coherent picture of the grammar and vocabulary of law and the rule of law, geared to those with no wish to become lawyers but nevertheless required to consider the salience of legal rights and obligations. Simultaneously, this book will help lawyers to review their own trade. It is a volume on law in an onlife world, presenting a grounded argument of what law does (speech act theory), how it emerged in the context of printed text (philosophy of technology), and how it confronts its new, data-driven environment. Book jacket.
The Logic of Legal Requirements
Author: Jordi Ferrer Beltrán
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199661642
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 434
Book Description
Does the law contain implicit exceptions to its own rules? If so, what consequence does that have for understanding the relationship between law and morality? This collection gathers leading legal philosophers to analyse the logical structure of legal norms, advancing the understanding of the general philosophy of law.
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199661642
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 434
Book Description
Does the law contain implicit exceptions to its own rules? If so, what consequence does that have for understanding the relationship between law and morality? This collection gathers leading legal philosophers to analyse the logical structure of legal norms, advancing the understanding of the general philosophy of law.
Legal Directives and Practical Reasons
Author: Noam Gur
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0199659877
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 257
Book Description
This book investigates law's interaction with practical reasons. What difference can legal requirements-e.g. traffic rules, tax laws, or work safety regulations-make to normative reasons relevant to our action? Do they give reasons for action that should be weighed among all other reasons? Or can they, instead, exclude and take the place of some other reasons? The book critically examines some of the existing answers and puts forward an alternative understanding of law's interaction with practical reasons. At the outset, two competing positions are pitted against each other: Joseph Raz's view that (legitimate) legal authorities have pre-emptive force, namely that they give reasons for action that exclude some other reasons; and an antithesis, according to which law-making institutions (even those that meet prerequisites of legitimacy) can at most provide us with reasons that compete in weight with opposing reasons for action. These two positions are examined from several perspectives, such as justified disobedience cases, law's conduct-guiding function in contexts of bounded rationality, and the phenomenology associated with authority. It is found that, although each of the above positions offers insight into the conundrum at hand, both suffer from significant flaws. These observations form the basis on which an alternative position is put forward and defended. According to this position, the existence of a reasonably just and well-functioning legal system constitutes a reason that fits neither into a model of ordinary reasons for action nor into a pre-emptive paradigm-it constitutes a reason to adopt an (overridable) disposition that inclines its possessor towards compliance with the system's requirements.
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0199659877
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 257
Book Description
This book investigates law's interaction with practical reasons. What difference can legal requirements-e.g. traffic rules, tax laws, or work safety regulations-make to normative reasons relevant to our action? Do they give reasons for action that should be weighed among all other reasons? Or can they, instead, exclude and take the place of some other reasons? The book critically examines some of the existing answers and puts forward an alternative understanding of law's interaction with practical reasons. At the outset, two competing positions are pitted against each other: Joseph Raz's view that (legitimate) legal authorities have pre-emptive force, namely that they give reasons for action that exclude some other reasons; and an antithesis, according to which law-making institutions (even those that meet prerequisites of legitimacy) can at most provide us with reasons that compete in weight with opposing reasons for action. These two positions are examined from several perspectives, such as justified disobedience cases, law's conduct-guiding function in contexts of bounded rationality, and the phenomenology associated with authority. It is found that, although each of the above positions offers insight into the conundrum at hand, both suffer from significant flaws. These observations form the basis on which an alternative position is put forward and defended. According to this position, the existence of a reasonably just and well-functioning legal system constitutes a reason that fits neither into a model of ordinary reasons for action nor into a pre-emptive paradigm-it constitutes a reason to adopt an (overridable) disposition that inclines its possessor towards compliance with the system's requirements.