Frege's Puzzle

Frege's Puzzle PDF Author: Nathan U. Salmon
Publisher: Ridgeview Publishing Company
ISBN: 9780924922053
Category : Psychology
Languages : en
Pages : 194

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Book Description
The nature of the information content of declarative sentences is a central topic in the philosophy of language. The natural view that a sentence like "John loves Mary" contains information in which two individuals occur as constituents is termed the naive theory, and is one that has been abandoned by most contemporary scholars. This theory was refuted originally by philosopher Gottlob Frege. His argument that the naive theory did not work is termed Frege's puzzle, and his rival account of information content is termed the orthodox theory. In this detailed study, Nathan Salmon defends a version of the naive theory and presents a proposal for its extension that provides a better picture of information content than the orthodox theory gives. He argues that a great deal of what has generally been taken for granted in the philosophy of language over the past few decades is either mistaken or unsupported, and consequently, much current research is focused on the wrong set of questions. Salmon dissolves Frege's puzzle as it is usually formulated and demonstrates how it can be reconstructed and strengthened to yield a more powerful objection to the naive theory. He then defends the naive theory against the new Frege puzzle by presenting an idea that yields both a surprisingly rich and powerful extension of the naive theory and a better picture of information content than that of the original orthodox theory. Nathan Salmon is Professor of Philosophy, University of California at Santa Barbara. A Bradford Book.

Frege's Puzzle

Frege's Puzzle PDF Author: Nathan U. Salmon
Publisher: Ridgeview Publishing Company
ISBN: 9780924922053
Category : Psychology
Languages : en
Pages : 194

Get Book Here

Book Description
The nature of the information content of declarative sentences is a central topic in the philosophy of language. The natural view that a sentence like "John loves Mary" contains information in which two individuals occur as constituents is termed the naive theory, and is one that has been abandoned by most contemporary scholars. This theory was refuted originally by philosopher Gottlob Frege. His argument that the naive theory did not work is termed Frege's puzzle, and his rival account of information content is termed the orthodox theory. In this detailed study, Nathan Salmon defends a version of the naive theory and presents a proposal for its extension that provides a better picture of information content than the orthodox theory gives. He argues that a great deal of what has generally been taken for granted in the philosophy of language over the past few decades is either mistaken or unsupported, and consequently, much current research is focused on the wrong set of questions. Salmon dissolves Frege's puzzle as it is usually formulated and demonstrates how it can be reconstructed and strengthened to yield a more powerful objection to the naive theory. He then defends the naive theory against the new Frege puzzle by presenting an idea that yields both a surprisingly rich and powerful extension of the naive theory and a better picture of information content than that of the original orthodox theory. Nathan Salmon is Professor of Philosophy, University of California at Santa Barbara. A Bradford Book.

Frege's "On Sense and Reference". Elaborating Gottlob Frege’s Puzzles

Frege's Author: Sabrina Fiel Abade
Publisher: GRIN Verlag
ISBN: 3346610268
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 9

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Book Description
Seminar paper from the year 2022 in the subject Philosophy - Theoretical (Realisation, Science, Logic, Language), grade: 1,0, University of Luxembourg, language: English, abstract: While talking to someone, both may be speaking of the same thing, without realizing that they are doing so. When I am talking about the Morning Star, and someone else is talking about the Evening Star, are we both talking about the same thing? Or are we talking about two different things, as we are using different names for the thing we are talking about? To start an analysis on this topic, this paper will elaborate Frege’s Puzzle’s, which he introduces at the beginning of "On sense and reference". He talks about two puzzles, one concerning identity statements, and the other, concerning propositional attitude reports. As he himself elaborates those puzzles, he will also try to find the solution to those puzzles. To understand his solution to the Puzzles, I will elaborate his solutions, giving various definitions, which are necessary to have a great understanding of what is being argued for. While his first puzzle is especially based on proper names, his second puzzle, will concern entire declarative sentences and forms of argumentation. After having a clear understanding of what the problem with identity is, and how Frege claims to have solved it, we will see how one could oppose to Frege’s resolution to the puzzle. Analyzing multiple reproaches, would go beyond the scope of this paper. Therefore, we will only focus on a claim stated by Glezako Stravoula, saying that Frege started his argumentation wrong, by supposing that a=a can be known a priori.

Frege: Sense and Reference One Hundred Years Later

Frege: Sense and Reference One Hundred Years Later PDF Author: John Biro
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9401104115
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 228

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Book Description
Gottlob Frege's Über Sinn und Bedeutung (`On Sense and Reference'), has come to be seen, in the century since its publication in 1892, as one of the seminal texts of analytic philosophy. It, along with the rest of Frege's writings on logic and mathematics, came to mark out a whole new domain of inquiry. This volume bears witness to the continuing importance and influence of that agenda. It contains original papers written by leading Frege scholars for the conference held in 1992 in Karlovy Vary to celebrate the publication of Frege's essay. The fourteen essays show how the questions Frege discusses in that essay connect intimately with issues much debated in current philosophy of language and philosophy of mind.

Frege's Puzzle

Frege's Puzzle PDF Author: Nathan U. Salmon
Publisher: MIT Press (MA)
ISBN:
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 224

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Book Description
The nature of the information content of declarative sentences is a central topic in the philosophy of language. The natural view that a sentence like "John loves Mary" contains information in which two individuals occur as constituents is termed the naive theory, and is one that has been abandoned by most contemporary scholars. This theory was refuted originally by philosopher Gottlob Frege. His argument that the naive theory did not work is termed Frege's puzzle, and his rival account of information content is termed the orthodox theory. In this detailed study, Nathan Salmon defends a version of the naive theory and presents a proposal for its extension that provides a better picture of information content than the orthodox theory gives. He argues that a great deal of what has generally been taken for granted in the philosophy of language over the past few decades is either mistaken or unsupported, and consequently, much current research is focused on the wrong set of questions. Salmon dissolves Frege's puzzle as it is usually formulated and demonstrates how it can be reconstructed and strengthened to yield a more powerful objection to the naive theory. He then defends the naive theory against the new Frege puzzle by presenting an idea that yields both a surprisingly rich and powerful extension of the naive theory and a better picture of information content than that of the original orthodox theory. Nathan Salmon is Professor of Philosophy, University of California at Santa Barbara. A Bradford Book.

Thinking and Being

Thinking and Being PDF Author: Irad Kimhi
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 0674985281
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 169

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Book Description
Opposing a long-standing orthodoxy of the Western philosophical tradition running from ancient Greek thought until the late nineteenth century, Frege argued that psychological laws of thought—those that explicate how we in fact think—must be distinguished from logical laws of thought—those that formulate and impose rational requirements on thinking. Logic does not describe how we actually think, but only how we should. Yet by thus sundering the logical from the psychological, Frege was unable to explain certain fundamental logical truths, most notably the psychological version of the law of non-contradiction—that one cannot think a thought and its negation simultaneously. Irad Kimhi’s Thinking and Being marks a radical break with Frege’s legacy in analytic philosophy, exposing the flaws of his approach and outlining a novel conception of judgment as a two-way capacity. In closing the gap that Frege opened, Kimhi shows that the two principles of non-contradiction—the ontological principle and the psychological principle—are in fact aspects of the very same capacity, differently manifested in thinking and being. As his argument progresses, Kimhi draws on the insights of historical figures such as Aristotle, Kant, and Wittgenstein to develop highly original accounts of topics that are of central importance to logic and philosophy more generally. Self-consciousness, language, and logic are revealed to be but different sides of the same reality. Ultimately, Kimhi’s work elucidates the essential sameness of thinking and being that has exercised Western philosophy since its inception.

Frege Explained

Frege Explained PDF Author: Joan Weiner
Publisher: Open Court
ISBN: 0812697529
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 198

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Book Description
What is the number one? How can we be sure that 2+2=4? These apparently ssimple questions have perplexed philosophers for thousands of years, but discussion of them was transformed by the German philosopher Gottlob Frege (1848-1925). Frege (pronounced Fray-guh)believed that arithmetic and all mathematics are derived from logic, and to prove this he developed a completely new approach to logic and numbers. Joan Weiner presents a very clear outline of Frege's life and ideas, showing how his thinking evolved through successive books and articles.

Gottlob Frege: Frege's philosophy of thought and language

Gottlob Frege: Frege's philosophy of thought and language PDF Author: Michael Beaney
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
ISBN: 9780415306058
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 436

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Book Description
This collection brings together recent scholarship on Frege, including new translations of German material which is made available to Anglophone scholars for the first time.

The Magic Prism

The Magic Prism PDF Author: Howard Wettstein
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 9780198036425
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 262

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Book Description
The late 20th century saw great movement in the philosophy of language, often critical of the fathers of the subject--Gottlieb Frege and Bertrand Russell--but sometimes supportive of (or even defensive about) the work of the fathers. Howard Wettstein's sympathies lie with the critics. But he says that they have often misconceived their critical project, treating it in ways that are technically focused and that miss the deeper implications of their revolutionary challenge. Wettstein argues that Wittgenstein--a figure with whom the critics of Frege and Russell are typically unsympathetic--laid the foundation for much of what is really revolutionary in this late 20th century movement. The subject itself should be of great interest, since philosophy of language has functioned as a kind of foundation for much of 20th century philosophy. But in fact it remains a subject for specialists, since the ideas are difficult and the mode of presentation is often fairly technical. In this book, Wettstein brings the non-specialist into the conversation (especially in early chapters); he also reconceives the debate in a way that avoids technical formulation. The Magic Prism is intended for professional philosophers, graduate students, and upper division undergraduates.

Taking Frege at His Word

Taking Frege at His Word PDF Author: Joan Weiner
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0198865473
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 346

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Book Description
This study offers a new interpretation of the writings of Gottlob Frege. It advances our understanding of the history of analytic philosophy, and shows that Frege's writings have important significance for the way we should approach contemporary problems concerning language, logic, and mathematics.

Semantic Relationism

Semantic Relationism PDF Author: Kit Fine
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
ISBN: 1405196696
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 155

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Book Description
Introducing a new and ambitious position in the field, Kit Fine’s Semantic Relationism is a major contribution to the philosophy of language. A major contribution to the philosophy of language, now available in paperback Written by one of today’s most respected philosophers Argues for a fundamentally new approach to the study of representation in language and thought Proposes that there may be representational relationships between expressions or elements of thought that are not grounded in the intrinsic representational features of the expressions or elements themselves Forms part of the prestigious new Blackwell/Brown Lectures in Philosophy series, based on an ongoing series of lectures by today’s leading philosophers