Formal Models of Crisis Bargaining PDF Download
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Author: William Spaniel
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1009318543
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 375
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Book Description
The first comprehensive textbook on crisis bargaining for graduate and advanced undergraduate students, and a reference for researchers.
Author: William Spaniel
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1009318543
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 375
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Book Description
The first comprehensive textbook on crisis bargaining for graduate and advanced undergraduate students, and a reference for researchers.
Author: Scott Gehlbach
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1108482066
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 289
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Book Description
An accessible treatment of important formal models of domestic politics, fully updated and now including a chapter on nondemocracy.
Author: Kevin A. Clarke
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0195382196
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 233
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Book Description
Political scientists use models to investigate and illuminate causal mechanisms, generate comparative data, and more. But how do we justify and rationalize the method? Why test predictions from a deductive, and thus truth-preserving, system? Primo and Clarke tackle these central questions in this novel work of methodology.
Author: I. William Zartman
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521856645
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 360
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Book Description
This volume examines the point where the concepts and practices of escalation and negotiation meet.
Author: Michael P. Colaresi
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139468790
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 281
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Book Description
International conflict is neither random nor inexplicable. It is highly structured by antagonisms between a relatively small set of states that regard each other as rivals. Examining the 173 strategic rivalries in operation throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this book identifies the differences rivalries make in the probability of conflict escalation and analyzes how they interact with serial crises, arms races, alliances and capability advantages. The authors distinguish between rivalries concerning territorial disagreement (space) and rivalries concerning status and influence (position) and show how each leads to markedly different patterns of conflict escalation. They argue that rivals are more likely to engage in international conflict with their antagonists than non-rival pairs of states and conclude with an assessment of whether we can expect democratic peace, economic development and economic interdependence to constrain rivalry-induced conflict.
Author: Scott Wolford
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1108612903
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 469
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Book Description
The Great War is an immense, confusing and overwhelming historical conflict - the ideal case study for teaching game theory and international relations. Using thirteen historical puzzles, from the outbreak of the war and the stability of attrition, to unrestricted submarine warfare and American entry into the war, this book provides students with a rigorous yet accessible training in game theory. Each chapter shows, through guided exercises, how game theoretical models can explain otherwise challenging strategic puzzles, shedding light on the role of individual leaders in world politics, cooperation between coalitions partners, the effectiveness of international law, the termination of conflict, and the challenges of making peace. Its analytical history of World War I also surveys cutting edge political science research on international relations and the causes of war. Written by a leading game theorist known for his expertise of the war, this textbook includes useful student features such as chapter key terms, contemporary maps, a timeline of events, a list of key characters and additional end-of-chapter game-theoretic exercises.
Author: Anne E. Sartori
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691134006
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 175
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Book Description
Why are countries often able to communicate critical information using diplomacy? Why do countries typically use diplomacy honestly, despite incentives to bluff? Why are they often able to deter attacks using merely verbal threats? International relations theory is largely pessimistic about the prospects for effective diplomacy, yet leaders nevertheless expend much time and energy trying to resolve conflicts through verbal negotiations and public statements. Deterrence by Diplomacy challenges standard understandings of deterrence by analyzing it as a form of talk and reaches conclusions about the effectiveness of diplomacy that are much more optimistic. Anne Sartori argues that diplomacy works precisely because it is so valuable. States take pains to use diplomacy honestly most of the time because doing so allows them to maintain reputations for honesty, which in turn enhance their ability to resolve future disputes using diplomacy rather than force. So, to maintain the effectiveness of their diplomacy, states sometimes acquiesce to others' demands when they might have been able to attain their goals through bluffs. Sartori theorizes that countries obtain a "trade" of issues over time; they get their way more often when they deem the issues more important, and concede more often when they deem the issues less important. Departing from traditional theory, this book shows that rather than always fighting over small issues to show resolve, states can make their threats more credible by sometimes honestly acquiescing over lesser issues--by not crying "wolf."
Author: Glenn Herald Snyder
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Crisis management
Languages : en
Pages : 86
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Book Description
Author: Carol Mershon
Publisher: University of Michigan Press
ISBN: 0472054236
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 257
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Book Description
A formal model in the social sciences builds explanations when it structures the reasoning underlying a theoretical argument, opens venues for controlled experimentation, and can lead to hypotheses. Yet more importantly, models evaluate theory, build theory, and enhance conjectures. Formal Modeling in Social Science addresses the varied helpful roles of formal models and goes further to take up more fundamental considerations of epistemology and methodology. The authors integrate the exposition of the epistemology and the methodology of modeling and argue that these two reinforce each other. They illustrate the process of designing an original model suited to the puzzle at hand, using multiple methods in diverse substantive areas of inquiry. The authors also emphasize the crucial, though underappreciated, role of a narrative in the progression from theory to model. Transparency of assumptions and steps in a model means that any analyst will reach equivalent predictions whenever she replicates the argument. Hence, models enable theoretical replication, essential in the accumulation of knowledge. Formal Modeling in Social Science speaks to scholars in different career stages and disciplines and with varying expertise in modeling.
Author: Kenneth A. Schultz
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521796699
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 326
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Book Description
Kenneth Schultz explores the effects of democratic politics on the use and success of coercive diplomacy. He argues that open political competition between the government and opposition parties influences the decision to use threats in international crises, how rival states interpret those threats, and whether or not crises can be settled short of war. The relative transparency of their political processes means that, while democratic governments cannot easily conceal domestic constraints against using force, they can also credibly demonstrate resolve when their threats enjoy strong domestic support. As a result, compared to their non-democratic counterparts, democracies are more selective about making threats, but those they do make are more likely to be successful - that is, to gain a favorable outcome without resort to war. Schultz develops his argument through a series of game-theoretic models and tests the resulting hypothesis using both statistical analyses and historical case studies.
