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Author: George J. Mailath
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0195300793
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 664
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Book Description
Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
Author: George J. Mailath
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0195300793
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 664
Get Book Here
Book Description
Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
Author: Drew Fudenberg
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9812818472
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 417
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Book Description
This book brings together the joint work of Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (through 2008) on the closely connected topics of repeated games and reputation effects, along with related papers on more general issues in game theory and dynamic games. The unified presentation highlights the recurring themes of their work.
Author: Juan Escobar
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 130
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Book Description
Author: George J. Mailath
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198041217
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 664
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Book Description
Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
Author: Yale University. Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 530
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Book Description
Author: Anna R. Karlin
Publisher: American Mathematical Soc.
ISBN: 1470419823
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 400
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Book Description
We live in a highly connected world with multiple self-interested agents interacting and myriad opportunities for conflict and cooperation. The goal of game theory is to understand these opportunities. This book presents a rigorous introduction to the mathematics of game theory without losing sight of the joy of the subject. This is done by focusing on theoretical highlights (e.g., at least six Nobel Prize winning results are developed from scratch) and by presenting exciting connections of game theory to other fields such as computer science (algorithmic game theory), economics (auctions and matching markets), social choice (voting theory), biology (signaling and evolutionary stability), and learning theory. Both classical topics, such as zero-sum games, and modern topics, such as sponsored search auctions, are covered. Along the way, beautiful mathematical tools used in game theory are introduced, including convexity, fixed-point theorems, and probabilistic arguments. The book is appropriate for a first course in game theory at either the undergraduate or graduate level, whether in mathematics, economics, computer science, or statistics. The importance of game-theoretic thinking transcends the academic setting—for every action we take, we must consider not only its direct effects, but also how it influences the incentives of others.
Author: Cédric Villani
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3540710507
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 970
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Book Description
At the close of the 1980s, the independent contributions of Yann Brenier, Mike Cullen and John Mather launched a revolution in the venerable field of optimal transport founded by G. Monge in the 18th century, which has made breathtaking forays into various other domains of mathematics ever since. The author presents a broad overview of this area, supplying complete and self-contained proofs of all the fundamental results of the theory of optimal transport at the appropriate level of generality. Thus, the book encompasses the broad spectrum ranging from basic theory to the most recent research results. PhD students or researchers can read the entire book without any prior knowledge of the field. A comprehensive bibliography with notes that extensively discuss the existing literature underlines the book’s value as a most welcome reference text on this subject.
Author: Robert J. Aumann
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262011471
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 372
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Book Description
The basic model studied throughout the book is one in which players ignorant about the game being played must learn what they can from the actions of the others.
Author: Cynthia Dwork
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781601988188
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 286
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Book Description
The problem of privacy-preserving data analysis has a long history spanning multiple disciplines. As electronic data about individuals becomes increasingly detailed, and as technology enables ever more powerful collection and curation of these data, the need increases for a robust, meaningful, and mathematically rigorous definition of privacy, together with a computationally rich class of algorithms that satisfy this definition. Differential Privacy is such a definition. The Algorithmic Foundations of Differential Privacy starts out by motivating and discussing the meaning of differential privacy, and proceeds to explore the fundamental techniques for achieving differential privacy, and the application of these techniques in creative combinations, using the query-release problem as an ongoing example. A key point is that, by rethinking the computational goal, one can often obtain far better results than would be achieved by methodically replacing each step of a non-private computation with a differentially private implementation. Despite some powerful computational results, there are still fundamental limitations. Virtually all the algorithms discussed herein maintain differential privacy against adversaries of arbitrary computational power -- certain algorithms are computationally intensive, others are efficient. Computational complexity for the adversary and the algorithm are both discussed. The monograph then turns from fundamentals to applications other than query-release, discussing differentially private methods for mechanism design and machine learning. The vast majority of the literature on differentially private algorithms considers a single, static, database that is subject to many analyses. Differential privacy in other models, including distributed databases and computations on data streams, is discussed. The Algorithmic Foundations of Differential Privacy is meant as a thorough introduction to the problems and techniques of differential privacy, and is an invaluable reference for anyone with an interest in the topic.
Author: Steve Y. Oudot
Publisher: American Mathematical Soc.
ISBN: 1470434431
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 229
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Book Description
Persistence theory emerged in the early 2000s as a new theory in the area of applied and computational topology. This book provides a broad and modern view of the subject, including its algebraic, topological, and algorithmic aspects. It also elaborates on applications in data analysis. The level of detail of the exposition has been set so as to keep a survey style, while providing sufficient insights into the proofs so the reader can understand the mechanisms at work. The book is organized into three parts. The first part is dedicated to the foundations of persistence and emphasizes its connection to quiver representation theory. The second part focuses on its connection to applications through a few selected topics. The third part provides perspectives for both the theory and its applications. The book can be used as a text for a course on applied topology or data analysis.
