Finitely Repeated Games: a Generalized Nash Folk Theorem PDF Download
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Author: Julio González Díaz
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 11
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Book Description
Author: Julio González Díaz
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 11
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Book Description
Author: Drew Fudenberg
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9812818464
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 417
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Book Description
This book brings together the joint work of Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (through 2008) on the closely connected topics of repeated games and reputation effects, along with related papers on more general issues in game theory and dynamic games. The unified presentation highlights the recurring themes of their work.
Author: George J. Mailath
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 40
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Author: Jack Robles
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 29
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Author: Johannes Hörner
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Author: Robert J. Aumann
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262011471
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 372
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Book Description
The basic model studied throughout the book is one in which players ignorant about the game being played must learn what they can from the actions of the others.
Author: Krittanai Laohakunakorn
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
We study sequential equilibrium payoffs of a repeated game with local interaction and local monitoring. An undirected network determines both the interaction and the monitoring structure. When players do not discount the future, a sequentially rational Nash threats folk theorem holds without any restrictions on the network structure. To prove this result, we construct strategies that support as a sequential equilibrium any payoff vector which is a convex combination (with rational weights) of stage game payoffs and is such that each player is strictly better off than under a Nash equilibrium of the stage game. No form of communication or coordination device is required. On the other hand, when players discount the future, the folk theorem cannot hold in our setting unless further restrictions are made either on payoffs or the network structure.
Author: Ghislain-Herman Demeze-Jouatsa
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Nimrod Megiddo
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 1461226481
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 209
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Book Description
This volume presents a collection of papers on game theory dedicated to Michael Maschler. Through his dedication and contributions to game theory, Maschler has become an important figure particularly in the area of cooperative games. Game theory has since become an important subject in operations research, economics and management science. As befits such a volume, the main themes covered are cooperative games, coalitions, repeated games, and a cost allocation games. All the contributions are authoritative surveys of a particular topic, so together they will present an invaluable overview of the field to all those working on game theory problems.
Author: Luca Anderlini
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 76
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Book Description
