Author: Dan Egonsson
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1351815067
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 287
Book Description
This title was first published in 28/11/2001: The broad label ’practical philosophy’ brings together such topics as ethics and metaethics as well as philosophy of law, society, art and religion. In practical philosophy, theory of value and action is basic, and woven into our understanding of all practical and ethical reasoning. New essays from leading international philosophers illustrate that substantial results in the subdisciplines of practical philosophy require insights into its core issues: the nature of actions, persons, values and reasons. This anthology is published in honour of Ingmar Persson on his fiftieth birthday.
Exploring Practical Philosophy: From Action to Values
Author: Dan Egonsson
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1351815067
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 287
Book Description
This title was first published in 28/11/2001: The broad label ’practical philosophy’ brings together such topics as ethics and metaethics as well as philosophy of law, society, art and religion. In practical philosophy, theory of value and action is basic, and woven into our understanding of all practical and ethical reasoning. New essays from leading international philosophers illustrate that substantial results in the subdisciplines of practical philosophy require insights into its core issues: the nature of actions, persons, values and reasons. This anthology is published in honour of Ingmar Persson on his fiftieth birthday.
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1351815067
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 287
Book Description
This title was first published in 28/11/2001: The broad label ’practical philosophy’ brings together such topics as ethics and metaethics as well as philosophy of law, society, art and religion. In practical philosophy, theory of value and action is basic, and woven into our understanding of all practical and ethical reasoning. New essays from leading international philosophers illustrate that substantial results in the subdisciplines of practical philosophy require insights into its core issues: the nature of actions, persons, values and reasons. This anthology is published in honour of Ingmar Persson on his fiftieth birthday.
Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 14
Author: Russ Shafer-Landau
Publisher:
ISBN: 0198841442
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 262
Book Description
Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersections of ethical theory with metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The essays included in the series provide an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves with the current state of play in metaethics would do well to start here.
Publisher:
ISBN: 0198841442
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 262
Book Description
Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersections of ethical theory with metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The essays included in the series provide an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves with the current state of play in metaethics would do well to start here.
Reason and Value
Author: R. Jay Wallace
Publisher: Clarendon Press
ISBN: 0191532177
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 442
Book Description
Reason and Value collects 15 new papers by leading contemporary philosophers on themes from the work of Joseph Raz. Raz has made major contributions in a wide range of areas, including jurisprudence, political philosophy, and the theory of practical reason; but all of his work displays a deep engagement with central themes in moral philosophy. The subtlety and power of Raz's reflections on ethical topics make his writings a fertile source for anyone working in this area. Especially significant are his explorations of the connections between practical reason and the theory of value, which constitute a sustained and penetrating treatment of a set of issues at the very center of moral philosophy as it is practiced today. The contributors to the volume acknowledge the importance of Raz's contributions by engaging critically with his positions and offering independent perspectives on the topics that he has addressed. The volume aims both to honour Raz's accomplishments in the area of ethical theorizing, and to contribute to an enhanced appreciation of the significance of his work for the subject. Contributors: Michael E. Bratman, John Broome, Ruth Chang, Jonathan Dancy, Harry Frankfurt, Ulrike Heuer, Philip Pettit, Peter Railton, Donald H. Regan, T. M. Scanlon, Samuel Scheffler, Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Michael Smith, Michael Stocker, Michael Thompson, R. Jay Wallace.
Publisher: Clarendon Press
ISBN: 0191532177
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 442
Book Description
Reason and Value collects 15 new papers by leading contemporary philosophers on themes from the work of Joseph Raz. Raz has made major contributions in a wide range of areas, including jurisprudence, political philosophy, and the theory of practical reason; but all of his work displays a deep engagement with central themes in moral philosophy. The subtlety and power of Raz's reflections on ethical topics make his writings a fertile source for anyone working in this area. Especially significant are his explorations of the connections between practical reason and the theory of value, which constitute a sustained and penetrating treatment of a set of issues at the very center of moral philosophy as it is practiced today. The contributors to the volume acknowledge the importance of Raz's contributions by engaging critically with his positions and offering independent perspectives on the topics that he has addressed. The volume aims both to honour Raz's accomplishments in the area of ethical theorizing, and to contribute to an enhanced appreciation of the significance of his work for the subject. Contributors: Michael E. Bratman, John Broome, Ruth Chang, Jonathan Dancy, Harry Frankfurt, Ulrike Heuer, Philip Pettit, Peter Railton, Donald H. Regan, T. M. Scanlon, Samuel Scheffler, Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Michael Smith, Michael Stocker, Michael Thompson, R. Jay Wallace.
Oxford Studies in Metaethics
Author: Russ Shafer-Landau
Publisher: OUP Oxford
ISBN: 0191562149
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 335
Book Description
Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersection of ethical theory and metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The essays included in the series provide an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves with the current state of play in metaethics would do well to start here.
Publisher: OUP Oxford
ISBN: 0191562149
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 335
Book Description
Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersection of ethical theory and metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The essays included in the series provide an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves with the current state of play in metaethics would do well to start here.
The Good, the Right, Life and Death
Author: Jason R. Raibley
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1351888706
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 458
Book Description
Fred Feldman, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, is widely recognized for his subtle defense of hedonistic consequentialism and for his plain-spoken and exact philosophical style. This book collects new and original articles from an international team of scholars to celebrate his philosophical contributions. The three main topics of the book - moral goodness, moral rightness and the ethical and metaphysical puzzles posed by death - are topics that have occupied Professor Feldman throughout his philosophical career. Each contribution advances the state of the art in analytical ethics and metaphysics through critical analysis of previous work and the formulation of new positions. As a collection, these essays represent a sustained reflection on the merits and limitations of a whole, integrated research program in moral philosophy: hedonistic consequentialism.
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1351888706
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 458
Book Description
Fred Feldman, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, is widely recognized for his subtle defense of hedonistic consequentialism and for his plain-spoken and exact philosophical style. This book collects new and original articles from an international team of scholars to celebrate his philosophical contributions. The three main topics of the book - moral goodness, moral rightness and the ethical and metaphysical puzzles posed by death - are topics that have occupied Professor Feldman throughout his philosophical career. Each contribution advances the state of the art in analytical ethics and metaphysics through critical analysis of previous work and the formulation of new positions. As a collection, these essays represent a sustained reflection on the merits and limitations of a whole, integrated research program in moral philosophy: hedonistic consequentialism.
Instrumental Rationality
Author: John Brunero
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0191063940
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 240
Book Description
Rationality requires that we intend the means that we believe are necessary for achieving our ends. Instrumental Rationality explores the formulation and status of this requirement of means-ends coherence. In particular, it is concerned with understanding what means-ends coherence requires of us as believers and agents, and why. Means-ends coherence is a genuine requirement of rationality and cannot be explained away as a myth, confused with a disjunction of requirements to have, or not have, specific attitudes. Nor is means-ends coherence strongly normative, such that we always ought to be means-ends coherent. A promising strategy for assessing why this requirement should exist is to consider the constitutive aim of intention. Just as belief has a constitutive aim (truth) that can explain some of the theoretical requirements of consistency and coherence governing beliefs, intention has a constitutive aim (here called "controlled action") that can explain some of the requirements of consistency and coherence governing intentions. We can therefore better understand means-ends coherence by understanding the constitutive aims of both of the attitudes governed by the requirement, intention, and belief.
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0191063940
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 240
Book Description
Rationality requires that we intend the means that we believe are necessary for achieving our ends. Instrumental Rationality explores the formulation and status of this requirement of means-ends coherence. In particular, it is concerned with understanding what means-ends coherence requires of us as believers and agents, and why. Means-ends coherence is a genuine requirement of rationality and cannot be explained away as a myth, confused with a disjunction of requirements to have, or not have, specific attitudes. Nor is means-ends coherence strongly normative, such that we always ought to be means-ends coherent. A promising strategy for assessing why this requirement should exist is to consider the constitutive aim of intention. Just as belief has a constitutive aim (truth) that can explain some of the theoretical requirements of consistency and coherence governing beliefs, intention has a constitutive aim (here called "controlled action") that can explain some of the requirements of consistency and coherence governing intentions. We can therefore better understand means-ends coherence by understanding the constitutive aims of both of the attitudes governed by the requirement, intention, and belief.
The Normative and the Evaluative
Author: Rach Cosker-Rowland
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0192570234
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 377
Book Description
Many have been attracted to the idea that for something to be good there just have to be reasons to favour it. This view has come to be known as the buck-passing account of value. According to this account, for pleasure to be good there need to be reasons for us to desire and pursue it. Likewise for liberty and equality to be values there have to be reasons for us to promote and preserve them. Extensive discussion has focussed on some of the problems that the buck-passing account faces, such as the 'wrong kind of reason' problem. Less attention, however, has been paid as to why we should accept the buck-passing account or what the theoretical pay-offs and other implications of accepting it are. The Normative and the Evaluative provides the first comprehensive motivation and defence of the buck-passing account of value. Rach Cosker-Rowland argues that the buck-passing account explains several important features of the relationship between reasons and value, as well as the relationship between the different varieties of value, in a way that its competitors do not. He shows that alternatives to the buck-passing account are inconsistent with important views in normative ethics, uninformative, and at odds with the way in which we should see practical and epistemic normativity as related. In addition, he extends the buck-passing account to provide an account of moral properties as well as all other normative and deontic properties and concepts, such as fittingness and 'ought', in terms of reasons.
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0192570234
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 377
Book Description
Many have been attracted to the idea that for something to be good there just have to be reasons to favour it. This view has come to be known as the buck-passing account of value. According to this account, for pleasure to be good there need to be reasons for us to desire and pursue it. Likewise for liberty and equality to be values there have to be reasons for us to promote and preserve them. Extensive discussion has focussed on some of the problems that the buck-passing account faces, such as the 'wrong kind of reason' problem. Less attention, however, has been paid as to why we should accept the buck-passing account or what the theoretical pay-offs and other implications of accepting it are. The Normative and the Evaluative provides the first comprehensive motivation and defence of the buck-passing account of value. Rach Cosker-Rowland argues that the buck-passing account explains several important features of the relationship between reasons and value, as well as the relationship between the different varieties of value, in a way that its competitors do not. He shows that alternatives to the buck-passing account are inconsistent with important views in normative ethics, uninformative, and at odds with the way in which we should see practical and epistemic normativity as related. In addition, he extends the buck-passing account to provide an account of moral properties as well as all other normative and deontic properties and concepts, such as fittingness and 'ought', in terms of reasons.
Contrastive Reasons
Author: Justin Snedegar
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0191089044
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 172
Book Description
Justin Snedegar develops and defends contrastivism about reasons. This is the view that normative reasons are fundamentally reasons for or against actions or attitudes only relative to sets of alternatives. Simply put, reasons are always reasons to do one thing rather than another, instead of simply being reasons to do something, full stop. Work on reasons has become central to several areas of philosophy, but besides a couple of exceptions, this view has not been discussed. Contrastive Reasons makes the case that this is a mistake. Snedegar develops three kinds of arguments for contrastivism. First, contrastivism gives us the best account of our ordinary discourse about reasons. Second, contrastivism best makes sense of widespread ideas about what reasons are, including the idea that they favor the things they are reasons for and the idea that they involve the promotion of certain kinds of objectives. Third, contrastivism has attractive applications in different areas of normative philosophy in which reasons are important. These include debates in normative ethics about whether better than might be intransitive and debates in both epistemology and practical reasoning about the rationality of withholding or suspending belief and intention.
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0191089044
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 172
Book Description
Justin Snedegar develops and defends contrastivism about reasons. This is the view that normative reasons are fundamentally reasons for or against actions or attitudes only relative to sets of alternatives. Simply put, reasons are always reasons to do one thing rather than another, instead of simply being reasons to do something, full stop. Work on reasons has become central to several areas of philosophy, but besides a couple of exceptions, this view has not been discussed. Contrastive Reasons makes the case that this is a mistake. Snedegar develops three kinds of arguments for contrastivism. First, contrastivism gives us the best account of our ordinary discourse about reasons. Second, contrastivism best makes sense of widespread ideas about what reasons are, including the idea that they favor the things they are reasons for and the idea that they involve the promotion of certain kinds of objectives. Third, contrastivism has attractive applications in different areas of normative philosophy in which reasons are important. These include debates in normative ethics about whether better than might be intransitive and debates in both epistemology and practical reasoning about the rationality of withholding or suspending belief and intention.
The Nature of Moral Responsibility
Author: Randolph K. Clarke
Publisher:
ISBN: 0199998078
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 321
Book Description
What is it to be morally responsible for something? Recent philosophical work reveals considerable disagreement on the question. This volume presents twelve original essays from participants in these debates. The contributors include prominent established figures as well as several outstanding younger philosophers.
Publisher:
ISBN: 0199998078
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 321
Book Description
What is it to be morally responsible for something? Recent philosophical work reveals considerable disagreement on the question. This volume presents twelve original essays from participants in these debates. The contributors include prominent established figures as well as several outstanding younger philosophers.
Concern, Respect, and Cooperation
Author: Garrett Cullity
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0192535064
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 468
Book Description
Three things often recognized as central to morality are concern for others' welfare, respect for their self-expression, and cooperation in worthwhile collective activity. When philosophers have proposed theories of the substance of morality, they have typically looked to one of these three sources to provide a single, fundamental principle of morality - or they have tried to formulate a master-principle for morality that combines these three ideas in some way. In Concern, Respect, and Cooperation, Garrett Cullity urges us to think of them instead as three independently important foundations of morality. The overall aim is to illuminate the structure of morality by showing how its complex content is generated from a relatively simple set of underlying elements - with the complexity resulting from the various ways in which one part of morality can derive from another, and the various ways in which they can interact. Plural-foundation moral theories are sometimes criticized for having nothing helpful to say about cases in which their fundamental norms conflict. Responding to this, Cullity concludes with three detailed applications of his theory: to the questions surrounding paternalism, the use of others as means, and our moral responsibilities as consumers.
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0192535064
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 468
Book Description
Three things often recognized as central to morality are concern for others' welfare, respect for their self-expression, and cooperation in worthwhile collective activity. When philosophers have proposed theories of the substance of morality, they have typically looked to one of these three sources to provide a single, fundamental principle of morality - or they have tried to formulate a master-principle for morality that combines these three ideas in some way. In Concern, Respect, and Cooperation, Garrett Cullity urges us to think of them instead as three independently important foundations of morality. The overall aim is to illuminate the structure of morality by showing how its complex content is generated from a relatively simple set of underlying elements - with the complexity resulting from the various ways in which one part of morality can derive from another, and the various ways in which they can interact. Plural-foundation moral theories are sometimes criticized for having nothing helpful to say about cases in which their fundamental norms conflict. Responding to this, Cullity concludes with three detailed applications of his theory: to the questions surrounding paternalism, the use of others as means, and our moral responsibilities as consumers.