Author: Taisuke Nakata
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Fiscal policy
Languages : en
Pages : 38
Book Description
We study optimal time-consistent monetary and fiscal policy in a New Keynesian model where occasional declines in agents' confidence give rise to persistent liquidity trap episodes. Insights from widely-studied fundamental-driven liquidity traps are not a useful guide for enhancing welfare in this model. Raising the inflation target, appointing an inflation-conservative central banker, or allowing for the use of government spending as an additional stabilization tool can exacerbate deflationary pressures and demand deficiencies during the liquidity trap episodes. However, appointing a policymaker who is sufficiently less concerned with government spending stabilization than society eliminates expectations-driven liquidity traps.
Expectations-driven Liquidity Traps
Author: Taisuke Nakata
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Fiscal policy
Languages : en
Pages : 38
Book Description
We study optimal time-consistent monetary and fiscal policy in a New Keynesian model where occasional declines in agents' confidence give rise to persistent liquidity trap episodes. Insights from widely-studied fundamental-driven liquidity traps are not a useful guide for enhancing welfare in this model. Raising the inflation target, appointing an inflation-conservative central banker, or allowing for the use of government spending as an additional stabilization tool can exacerbate deflationary pressures and demand deficiencies during the liquidity trap episodes. However, appointing a policymaker who is sufficiently less concerned with government spending stabilization than society eliminates expectations-driven liquidity traps.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Fiscal policy
Languages : en
Pages : 38
Book Description
We study optimal time-consistent monetary and fiscal policy in a New Keynesian model where occasional declines in agents' confidence give rise to persistent liquidity trap episodes. Insights from widely-studied fundamental-driven liquidity traps are not a useful guide for enhancing welfare in this model. Raising the inflation target, appointing an inflation-conservative central banker, or allowing for the use of government spending as an additional stabilization tool can exacerbate deflationary pressures and demand deficiencies during the liquidity trap episodes. However, appointing a policymaker who is sufficiently less concerned with government spending stabilization than society eliminates expectations-driven liquidity traps.
Expectations-Driven Liquidity Traps
Author: Taisuke Nakata
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Optimal Inflation Target with Expectations-driven Liquidity Traps
Author: Philip Coyle
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Fiscal Stimulus In Expectations-Driven Liquidity Traps
Author: Joep Lustenhouwer
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
I study liquidity traps in a model where agents have heterogeneous expectations and finite planning horizons. Backward-looking agents base their expectations on past observations, while forward-looking agents have fully rational expectations. Liquidity traps that are fully or partly driven by expectations can arise due to pessimism of backward-looking agents. Only when planning horizons are finite, these liquidity traps can be of longer duration without ending up in a deflationary spiral. I further find that fiscal stimulus in the form of an increase in government spending or a cut in consumption taxes can be very effective in mitigating the liquidity trap. A feedback mechanism of heterogeneous expectations causes fiscal multipliers to be the largest when the majority of agents is backward-looking but there also is a considerable fraction of agents that are forward-looking. Labor tax cuts are always deflationary and are not an effective tool in a liquidity trap.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
I study liquidity traps in a model where agents have heterogeneous expectations and finite planning horizons. Backward-looking agents base their expectations on past observations, while forward-looking agents have fully rational expectations. Liquidity traps that are fully or partly driven by expectations can arise due to pessimism of backward-looking agents. Only when planning horizons are finite, these liquidity traps can be of longer duration without ending up in a deflationary spiral. I further find that fiscal stimulus in the form of an increase in government spending or a cut in consumption taxes can be very effective in mitigating the liquidity trap. A feedback mechanism of heterogeneous expectations causes fiscal multipliers to be the largest when the majority of agents is backward-looking but there also is a considerable fraction of agents that are forward-looking. Labor tax cuts are always deflationary and are not an effective tool in a liquidity trap.
Fiscal Policy in an Expectations Driven Liquidity Trap
Author: Karel Mertens
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Fiscal policy
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Fiscal policy
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Liquidity Traps in a World Economy
Author: Robert Kollmann
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Avoiding Liquidity Traps
Author: Jess Benhabib
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Once the zero bound on nominal interest rates is taken into account, Taylor-type interest rate feedback rules give rise to unintended self-fulfilling decelerating inflation paths and aggregate fluctuations driven by arbitrary revisions in expectations. These undesirable equilibria exhibit the essential features of liquidity traps since monetary policy is ineffective in bringing about the government's goals regarding the stability of output and prices. This paper proposes several fiscal and monetary policies that preserve the appealing features of Taylor rules, such as local uniqueness of equilibrium near the inflation target, and at the same time rule out the deflationary expectations that can lead an economy into a liquidity trap.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Once the zero bound on nominal interest rates is taken into account, Taylor-type interest rate feedback rules give rise to unintended self-fulfilling decelerating inflation paths and aggregate fluctuations driven by arbitrary revisions in expectations. These undesirable equilibria exhibit the essential features of liquidity traps since monetary policy is ineffective in bringing about the government's goals regarding the stability of output and prices. This paper proposes several fiscal and monetary policies that preserve the appealing features of Taylor rules, such as local uniqueness of equilibrium near the inflation target, and at the same time rule out the deflationary expectations that can lead an economy into a liquidity trap.
Liquidity Trap and Excessive Leverage
Author: Mr.Anton Korinek
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1498356397
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 49
Book Description
We investigate the role of macroprudential policies in mitigating liquidity traps driven by deleveraging, using a simple Keynesian model. When constrained agents engage in deleveraging, the interest rate needs to fall to induce unconstrained agents to pick up the decline in aggregate demand. However, if the fall in the interest rate is limited by the zero lower bound, aggregate demand is insufficient and the economy enters a liquidity trap. In such an environment, agents' exante leverage and insurance decisions are associated with aggregate demand externalities. The competitive equilibrium allocation is constrained inefficient. Welfare can be improved by ex-ante macroprudential policies such as debt limits and mandatory insurance requirements. The size of the required intervention depends on the differences in marginal propensity to consume between borrowers and lenders during the deleveraging episode. In our model, contractionary monetary policy is inferior to macroprudential policy in addressing excessive leverage, and it can even have the unintended consequence of increasing leverage.
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1498356397
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 49
Book Description
We investigate the role of macroprudential policies in mitigating liquidity traps driven by deleveraging, using a simple Keynesian model. When constrained agents engage in deleveraging, the interest rate needs to fall to induce unconstrained agents to pick up the decline in aggregate demand. However, if the fall in the interest rate is limited by the zero lower bound, aggregate demand is insufficient and the economy enters a liquidity trap. In such an environment, agents' exante leverage and insurance decisions are associated with aggregate demand externalities. The competitive equilibrium allocation is constrained inefficient. Welfare can be improved by ex-ante macroprudential policies such as debt limits and mandatory insurance requirements. The size of the required intervention depends on the differences in marginal propensity to consume between borrowers and lenders during the deleveraging episode. In our model, contractionary monetary policy is inferior to macroprudential policy in addressing excessive leverage, and it can even have the unintended consequence of increasing leverage.
Tax Rules to Prevent Expectations-driven Liquidity Trap
Author: Yoichiro Tamanyu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Credit Channels in a Liquidity Trap
Author: Karel Mertens
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Credit
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
We study liquidity trap dynamics driven by nonfundamental shifts in expectations in a model with nominal rigidities, housing, credit frictions and a Taylor rule. Highly leveraged borrowing through nominal debt backed by real estate collateral greatly magnifies the decline in output and house prices during a liquidity trap recession. The amplification mechanism is much smaller when there is no feedback from house prices to the borrowing constraint, when debt is real rather nominal, and when leverage is small. We argue that the liquidity trap dynamics share some important features with the recent US recession and that high levels of leverage may have made the economy sensitive to expectations induced liquidity traps.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Credit
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
We study liquidity trap dynamics driven by nonfundamental shifts in expectations in a model with nominal rigidities, housing, credit frictions and a Taylor rule. Highly leveraged borrowing through nominal debt backed by real estate collateral greatly magnifies the decline in output and house prices during a liquidity trap recession. The amplification mechanism is much smaller when there is no feedback from house prices to the borrowing constraint, when debt is real rather nominal, and when leverage is small. We argue that the liquidity trap dynamics share some important features with the recent US recession and that high levels of leverage may have made the economy sensitive to expectations induced liquidity traps.