Existence of Equilibria in Incomplete Information Games with Disturbed Payoffs PDF Download
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Author: Brian John Crone
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 212
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Author: Brian John Crone
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 212
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Author: Johannes Horner
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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We characterize belief-free equilibria in infinitely repeated games with incomplete information with N ge 2 players and arbitrary information structures. This characterization involves a new type of individual rational constraint linking the lowest equilibrium payoffs across players. The characterization is tight: we define a set of payoffs that contains all the belief-free equilibrium payoffs; conversely, any point in the interior of this set is a belief-free equilibrium payoff vector when players are sufficiently patient. Further, we provide necessary conditions and sufficient conditions on the information structure for this set to be non-empty, both for the case of known-own payoffs, and for arbitrary payoffs.
Author: Nabil I. Al-Najjar
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Equilibrium (Economics)
Languages : en
Pages : 52
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Author: Yaron Azrieli
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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We consider games with incomplete information a la Harsanyi, where the payoff of a player depends on an unknown state of nature as well as on the profile of chosen actions. As opposed to the standard model, players' preferences over state--contingent utility vectors are represented by arbitrary functionals. The definitions of Nash and Bayes equilibria naturally extend to this generalized setting. We characterize equilibrium existence in terms of the preferences of the participating players. It turns out that, given continuity and monotonicity of the preferences, equilibrium exists in every game if and only if all players are averse to uncertainty (i.e., all the functionals are quasi--concave). We further show that if the functionals are either homogeneous or translation invariant then equilibrium existence is equivalent to concavity of the functionals.
Author: Helmut Meister
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642502784
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 127
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The approach presented in this book combines two aspects of generalizations of the noncooperative game as developed by Nash. First, players choose their acts dependent on certain information variables, and second there are constraints on the sets of decisions for players. After the derivation of a general (Nash)equilibrium existence theorem, some results from purification theory are used to prove the existence of an approximate equilibrium in pure strategies, that is in nonrandomized decision functions. For some types of payoff-functions and constraints, these games prove to have an (exact) equilibrium in pure strategies. The reason for considering constrained games with incomplete information is that, apart from their game-theoretic importance, they have rather widespread application. Market games with a continuum of traders as well as some statistical decision problems are covered with this approach.
Author: Eric van Damme
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 364296978X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 331
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Book Description
The last decade has seen a steady increase in the application of concepts from noncooperative game theory to such diverse fields as economics, political science, law, operations research, biology and social psychology. As a byproduct of this increased activity, there has been a growing awareness of the fact that the basic noncooperative solution concept, that of Nash equilibrium, suffers from severe drawbacks. The two main shortcomings of this concept are the following: (i) In extensive form games, a Nash strategy may prescribe off the equilibrium path behavior that is manifestly irrational. (Specifically, Nash equilibria may involve incredible threats), (ii) Nash equilibria need not be robust with respect to small perturbations in the data of the game. Confronted with the growing evidence to the detriment of the Nash concept, game theorists were prompted to search for more refined equilibrium notions with better properties and they have come up with a wide array of alternative solution concepts. This book surveys the most important refinements that have been introduced. Its objectives are fourfold (i) to illustrate desirable properties as well as drawbacks of the various equilibrium notions by means of simple specific examples, (ii) to study the relationships between the various refinements, (iii) to derive simplifying characterizations, and (iv) to discuss the plausibility of the assumptions underlying the concepts.
Author: R. Calvert
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
ISBN: 1136459693
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 73
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Surveys the models of political phenomena that incorporate imperfect information, concentrating on 'full-rationality' approaches as opposed to bounded rationality models.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Dissertations, Academic
Languages : en
Pages : 684
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Author: Erik Jan Balder
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 38
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Author: Michael R. Baye
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 62
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