Executive Compensation, Size, Profit, and Cost in the Electric Utility Industry PDF Download
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Author:
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Languages : en
Pages : 168
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Book Description
Author: Ben Johnson (M.S.)
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Category : Electric industry workers
Languages : en
Pages : 336
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Author:
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 168
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Author: Paul L. Joskow
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Category : Administrative agencies
Languages : en
Pages : 31
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Book Description
This study explores the effect of regulatory and political constraints on the level of CEO compensation for 87 state-regulated electric utilities during 1978-1990. The results suggest that political pressures may constrain top executive pay levels in this industry. First, CEOs of firms operating in regulatory environments characterized by investment banks as relatively pro-consumer' receive lower compensation than do CEOs of firms in environments ranked as more friendly to investors. Second, CEO pay is lower for utilities with relatively high or rising rates, or a higher proportion of industrial sales, consistent with earlier research that describes political pressures on electricity rates. Finally, attributes of the commission appointment and tenure rules affect CEO compensation in ways consistent with the political constraint hypothesis: for example, pay is lower in states with elected commissioners than in states where commissioners are appointed by the governor, all else equal. Despite apparently effective pressure to constrain pay levels in this sector, however, we find no evidence of related intra-industry variation in the sensitivity of pay to firm financial performance
Author: Paul L. Joskow
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 33
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Book Description
This study explores the effect of regulatory and political constraints on the level of CEO compensation for 87 state-regulated electric utilities during 1978-1990. The results suggest that political pressures may constrain top executive pay levels in this industry. First, CEOs of firms operating in regulatory environments characterized by investment banks as relatively `pro-consumer' receive lower compensation than do CEOs of firms in environments ranked as more friendly to investors. Second, CEO pay is lower for utilities with relatively high or rising rates, or a higher proportion of industrial sales, consistent with earlier research that describes political pressures on electricity rates. Finally, attributes of the commission appointment and tenure rules affect CEO compensation in ways consistent with the political constraint hypothesis: for example, pay is lower in states with elected commissioners than in states where commissioners are appointed by the governor, all else equal. Despite apparently effective pressure to constrain pay levels in this sector, however, we find no evidence of related intra-industry variation in the sensitivity of pay to firm financial performance.
Author: David Adam Nislick
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Category : Electric utilities
Languages : en
Pages : 414
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Author:
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Category : Executives
Languages : en
Pages : 300
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Author: Stephen Bryan
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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This study tests whether firms in the electric utility industry alter their compensation policies in response to the recent and dramatic changes that the 1992 Energy Policy Act imposes on their operating and regulatory environment. The 1992 Act intensifies competition in the utility industry by opening up the generation and wholesale markets for electric power, thereby providing greater managerial incentives to improve utilities' operating efficiency. Our evidence shows that utilities significantly increased (by almost 70%) the CEO cash compensation-earnings performance sensitivity in the post-1992 period compared to the pre-1992 period. Additionally, an analysis for non-utility firms does not indicate such a high increase in the CEO cash compensation-earnings sensitivity over the same period. Further, electric utilities that diversify into unregulated operations and that operate in a less severe regulatory environment exhibit an even greater increase in the CEO cash compensation-earnings sensitivity over the same period of time. Unlike the generation and wholesale sectors of the utility industry, however, rate-setting, capital investments, and retail operations remain regulated, thereby limiting managerial discretion in exploiting future investment opportunities. Consequently, we find that the sensitivity of utility CEO stock-based compensation (stock option compensation and stock ownership) to stock performance does not increase in the post-1992 period relative to the pre-1992 period. Finally, our comparison of electric utilities to independent power producers (IPPs), which have less constrained investment opportunities, shows that the average proportion of CEO stock option compensation for IPPs is six times greater than that for electric utility CEOs.
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Category : Power resources
Languages : en
Pages : 708
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Author:
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Category : Executives
Languages : en
Pages : 448
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Author: Steven Balsam
Publisher: Academic Press
ISBN: 9780120771264
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 410
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Book Description
General readers have no idea why people should care about what executives are paid and why they are paid the way they are. That's the reason that The Wall Street Journal, Fortune, Forbes, and other popular and practitioner publications have regular coverage on them. This book not only proposes a reason - executives need incentives in order to maximize firm value (economists call this agency theory) - it also describes the nature and design of executive compensation practices. Those incentives can take the form of benefits (salary, stock options), or prerquisites (reflecting the status of the executive within the organizational culture.
