Exclusive Dealing and Vertical Integration in Interlocking Relationships PDF Download
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Author: Volker Nocke
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition, Imperfect
Languages : en
Pages : 63
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Book Description
We develop a model of interlocking bilateral relationships between upstream firms (manufacturers) that produce differentiated goods and downstream firms (retailers) that compete imperfectly for consumers. Contract offers and acceptance decisions are private information to the contracting parties. We show that both exclusive dealing and vertical integration between a manufacturer and a retailer lead to vertical foreclosure, to the detriment of consumers and society. Finally, we show that firms have indeed an incentive to sign such contracts or to integrate vertically.
Author: Volker Nocke
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition, Imperfect
Languages : en
Pages : 63
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Book Description
We develop a model of interlocking bilateral relationships between upstream firms (manufacturers) that produce differentiated goods and downstream firms (retailers) that compete imperfectly for consumers. Contract offers and acceptance decisions are private information to the contracting parties. We show that both exclusive dealing and vertical integration between a manufacturer and a retailer lead to vertical foreclosure, to the detriment of consumers and society. Finally, we show that firms have indeed an incentive to sign such contracts or to integrate vertically.
Author: Myung-Joong Kwon
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Author: Roger D. Blair
Publisher: Academic Press
ISBN: 1483261093
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 224
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Book Description
Law and Economics of Vertical Integration and Control focuses on the processes, methodologies, and approaches involved in the law and economics of vertical integration and control. The publication first elaborates on transaction costs, fixed proportions and contractual alternatives, and variable proportions and contractual alternatives. Discussions focus on sales revenue royalties, ownership integration, output royalties, important product-specific services, successive monopoly, advantages and limitations of internal transfers, and transaction cost determinants. The text then examines vertical integration under uncertainty and vertical integration without contractual alternatives. The book ponders on legal treatment of ownership integration and per se illegal contractual controls. Topics include tying arrangements, public policy assessment, resale price maintenance, vertical integration and the Sherman Act, market foreclosure doctrine, and the 1982 Merger Guidelines. The text also takes a look at contractual controls that are not illegal per se, alternative legal rules, and antitrust policy. The publication is a dependable reference for researchers interested in the law and economics of vertical integration and control.
Author: Yongmin Chen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Antitrust law
Languages : en
Pages : 40
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Book Description
Author: Patrick Rey
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 63
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Book Description
Author: Edward C. Gallick
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Restraint of trade
Languages : en
Pages : 168
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Book Description
Author: Seung-cheol Lee
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 113
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Book Description
Author: Seung-Cheol Lee
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 226
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Book Description
Author: Edward C. Gallick
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Author: Lei Shao (Ph. D.)
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 398
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Book Description
This dissertation explains new phenomena in platform industries such as wireless communication, video game, online video streaming, e-commerce, mobile app, and etc. It extends the frontier of economic studies in IT industry and gains new insights about classic industrial organization topics such as vertical integration, non-linear pricing, and product differentiation. The three chapters study platforms incentives to use exclusive contracts and the effects of exclusive dealings on consumer welfare in two-sided markets. Each focuses on a different aspect. The first chapter of my dissertation studies a different pro-competitive effect of exclusive contracts other than preventing free riding or inefficient contracting. In two-sided markets, when content providers have heterogeneous interaction benefits (i.e. some content providers benefits more from their interactions with consumers), platforms could use exclusive contracts in addition to non-exclusive contracts to "price discriminate" content providers. This could increase the number of participating content providers, which increases both consumer welfare and social welfare through the network effects. The second chapter of my dissertation investigates the effects of content heterogeneity on platforms' competition strategies and explains why many two-sided markets do not tip. Exclusive content appealing to the general public could enhance network effects. On the other hand, exclusive distinctive content could differentiate platforms. Thus, if there exists sufficiently contrasting content, both platforms would choose differentiation in equilibrium in order to soften competition and popular content would turn out to be non-exclusive so that the market does not tip. The third chapter of my dissertation explains why even though exclusive dealing has many benefits to firms, platforms in two-sided markets do not use "forced exclusivity" contracts. Instead, they negotiate both exclusive and non-exclusive contracts with content providers and let content providers decide which type of contract to sign. In addition, smaller bargaining power of platforms, difference in amounts of proprietary content, or consumer surplus per content makes content providers more willing to sign non-exclusive contracts.
