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Author: Johan Arifin Sulaeman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Institutional investors
Languages : en
Pages : 240
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Book Description
In this dissertation, I explore the determinants and implications of the preferences of institutional investors. First, I examine whether institutional investors' preference for local investments is related to informational advantage. Analyzing the equity holdings of a large sample of actively managed mutual funds, I find evidence consistent with the mutual fund industry having a perception that local funds have an informational advantage. However, the portfolio of mutual funds' local holdings does not display significant superior performance relative to the portfolio of their distant holdings. Using a parsimonious model, I hypothesize that the profitability of local informational advantage will be low due to the price impact of trading when there is a relatively large population of local agents who trade on similar private information. Consistent with this hypothesis, I find that funds do earn superior returns on local stocks for which local capital is limited and hence the price impact of local trades is likely to be small. Second, I examine the preferences of institutional investors for firm policies and the relationship between these preferences and firm decisions. I find that institutional investors exhibit systematic differences in their preferences for financial and investment policies. Furthermore, these preferences are related to subsequent changes in the financial and investment policies of the firms they invest. In particular, a firm is more likely to decrease (increase) its leverage ratio if its current leverage is higher (lower) than the preferences of its institutional shareholders. A firm is also more likely to increase (decrease) its investment if its current investment ratio is lower (higher) than the preferences of its institutional shareholders. These findings suggest that the preferences of institutional shareholders are important determinants of corporate policies.
Author: Johan Arifin Sulaeman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Institutional investors
Languages : en
Pages : 240
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Book Description
In this dissertation, I explore the determinants and implications of the preferences of institutional investors. First, I examine whether institutional investors' preference for local investments is related to informational advantage. Analyzing the equity holdings of a large sample of actively managed mutual funds, I find evidence consistent with the mutual fund industry having a perception that local funds have an informational advantage. However, the portfolio of mutual funds' local holdings does not display significant superior performance relative to the portfolio of their distant holdings. Using a parsimonious model, I hypothesize that the profitability of local informational advantage will be low due to the price impact of trading when there is a relatively large population of local agents who trade on similar private information. Consistent with this hypothesis, I find that funds do earn superior returns on local stocks for which local capital is limited and hence the price impact of local trades is likely to be small. Second, I examine the preferences of institutional investors for firm policies and the relationship between these preferences and firm decisions. I find that institutional investors exhibit systematic differences in their preferences for financial and investment policies. Furthermore, these preferences are related to subsequent changes in the financial and investment policies of the firms they invest. In particular, a firm is more likely to decrease (increase) its leverage ratio if its current leverage is higher (lower) than the preferences of its institutional shareholders. A firm is also more likely to increase (decrease) its investment if its current investment ratio is lower (higher) than the preferences of its institutional shareholders. These findings suggest that the preferences of institutional shareholders are important determinants of corporate policies.
Author: Ligang Zhong
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 436
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Book Description
In this dissertation, I investigate the impact of institutional investors on security prices and corporate policies, and offer a new perspective on the vital role that institutional investors play in the modern capital market. Specifically, on the impact on security price movements, I design a new measure of stock-level sentiment based on mutual fund publically disclosed portfolio information and provide a new dimension to better predict stock returns. A trading strategy based on the new sentiment metrics can generate an annualized alpha of 21.27%. The abnormal returns cannot be explained by the time-varying expected returns and transaction costs, and can be best explained by mutual fund overreactions. Hence, my findings can be interpreted as a new anomaly in a new era-when institutional investors are the marginal traders. On the impact on corporate policy side, I document two pieces of new empirical evidence on the importance of long-term institutional holdings: the entrenchment effect of long-term institutional holdings in the context of corporate financing decisions and the active monitoring role of long-term institutional investors in the context of international firms' accounting qualities. Combined with previous studies which favour a long-term institutional investor, the evidence on the cost side of long-term holding I document here can serve as the first call for an optimal investment horizon for firms operating in the U.S.
Author: Xiaorong Ma
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781360996561
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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This dissertation, "Three Essays on Information Production and Monitoring Role of Institutional Investors" by Xiaorong, Ma, 马笑蓉, was obtained from The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong) and is being sold pursuant to Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License. The content of this dissertation has not been altered in any way. We have altered the formatting in order to facilitate the ease of printing and reading of the dissertation. All rights not granted by the above license are retained by the author. Abstract: This thesis includes one essay about the information production of institutional investors and two essays about the monitoring role of institutional investors. The first essay empirically examines the association between investor base and information production in the context of stock splits. Using the proportion of 13F filers as the proxy for the size of investor base, we show that three proxies for stock price informativeness, adjusted probability of information-based trading (AdjPIN), price non-synchronicity and probability of information-based trading (PIN), decrease significantly due to enlarged investor base after stock splits. It suggests that institutional investors are less incentivized to gather firm specific information when firm''s investor base expands, which is consistent with the "risk sharing hypothesis," proposed by Peress (2010). Furthermore, we find that the change of the price informativeness around splits is negatively related to the magnitude of positive return drifts following splits. This result is consistent with the notion that less information incorporated in stock prices results in a sluggish response by the market to corporate event. The second essay empirically identifies an external corporate governance mechanism through which the institutional trading improves firm value and disciplines managers from conducting value-destroying behaviors. We propose a reward-punishment intensity (RPI) measure based on institutional investors'' absolute position changes, and find it is positively associated with firm''s subsequent Tobin''s Q. Importantly, we find that firms with higher RPI exhibit less subsequent empire building and earnings management. It suggests that the improved firm values can be attributed to the discipline effect of institutional trading on managers, which is in line with the argument of "Governance Through Trading." Furthermore, we find that the exogenous liquidity shock of decimalization augments the governance effect of institutional trading. We also find that the discipline effect is more pronounced for firms with lower institutional ownership concentration, higher stock liquidity, and higher managers'' wealth-performance sensitivity, which further supports the notion that institutional trading could exert discipline on a manager. The third essay focuses on a particular type of institutional investor, short sellers, and explores the discipline effect of short selling on managerial empire building. Employing short-selling data from 2002-2012, we find a significantly negative association between the lending supply in the short-selling market and the subsequent abnormal capital investment. Besides, we find a positively significant association between the lending supply and the mergers and acquisitions announcement returns of acquiring firms. These results suggest that the short-selling potential could deter managers from conducting over-investment and value-destroying acquisitions. In addition, the discipline effect is stronger for firms with higher managers'' wealth-performance-sensitivity, for firms with lower financial constraints, and for stock-financed acquisition deals. Finally, firms with higher lending supply also have higher Tobin''s Q in the subsequent year. These results indicate that short-selling is another important external governance force. DOI: 10.5353/th_b5066226 Subjects: Institutional i
Author: Nida Abdioglu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 171
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Book Description
This thesis investigates the investment preferences of institutional investors in the United States (US). In the second chapter, I analyse the impact of both firm and country-level determinants of foreign institutional investment. I find that the governance quality in a foreign institutional investor's (FII) home country is a determinant of their decision to invest in the US market. My findings indicate that investors who come from countries with governance setups similar to that of the US invest more in the United States. The investment levels though, are more pronounced for countries with governance setups just below that of the US. My results are consistent with both the 'flight to quality' and 'familiarity' arguments, and help reconcile prior contradictory empirical evidence. At the firm level, I present unequivocal evidence in favour of the familiarity argument. FII domiciled in countries with high governance quality prefer to invest in US firms with high corporate governance quality. In the third chapter, I investigate the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on foreign institutional investment in the United States. I find that, post-SOX, FII increase their equity holdings in US listed firms. This result is mainly driven by passive, non-monitoring FII, who have the most to gain from the SOX-led reduction in firm information asymmetry, and the consequent reduction in the value of private information. The enactment of SOX appears to have changed the firm-level investment preferences of FII towards firms that would not be their traditional investment targets based on prudent man rules, e.g., smaller and riskier firms. In contrast to the extant literature, which mostly documents a negative SOX effect for the US markets, my chapter provides evidence of a positive SOX effect, namely the increase in foreign investment. In the fourth chapter, I examine the effect of SOX on the relation between firm innovation and institutional ownership. I find that US firms investing in innovation attract more institutional capital post-SOX. Prior literature highlights two SOX effects that could cause this result: a decreased level of information asymmetry (direct effect) and increased market liquidity (indirect effect). My findings support the direct effect, as I find that the positive relation between innovation and institutional ownership is driven by passive and dedicated institutional investors. A reduction in firms' information asymmetry is beneficial for these investors while they gain less from increased market liquidity. Overall, my results indicate that SOX is an important policy that has strengthened the institutional investor's support for firm innovation.
Author: Roberto Tubaldi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Author: Haoyu Xu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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My thesis consists two studies on financial markets and institutional investors. In Chapter 2, I study the trades immediately after the market open and immediately before the market close. The trades in the morning positively predict future returns and cause price continuation. The trades in the afternoon negatively predict future returns and cause price reversals. The momentum trading strategies based on morning returns and the reversal trading strategies based on afternoon returns generate significant abnormal returns, which cannot be explained by standard risk factors including momentum and reversal factors. The results provide strong evidence that trades in the morning are mostly information driven and trades in the afternoon are mostly liquidity driven. In Chapter 3, we explore the properties of equity mutual funds that experience a loss of assets after poor performance. We document that both inflows and outflows are less sensitive to performance because performance-sensitive investors leave or decide not to invest after bad performance. Consistent with the idea that attrition measures the sorting of performance-sensitive investors, we find that attrition has less of an impact on the fundâ s flow-performance sensitivity for institutional funds where there is less dispersion in investor performance-sensitivity. Also, attrition has no effect on the flow- performance sensitivity when attrition arises after good performance or investors invest for non-performance reasons.
Author: Rasha Ashraf
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Antitakeover strategies
Languages : en
Pages :
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The first essay analyzes mutual funds' proxy voting records on shareholder proposals. The results indicate that mutual funds support shareholder proposals and vote against management for proposals that are likely to increase shareholders' wealth and rights, in firms with weaker external monitoring mechanisms, in firms with entrenched management, and when funds have longer investment horizon. Mutual funds mostly take management sides on executive compensation related proposals, when they have higher ownership concentration, and when they belong to bigger fund families. The results further indicate that there is a positive reputational effect for the funds undertaking a monitoring role. Moreover, mutual funds reduce holdings when they disapprove of managements' policy, but before doing so they take on an activist role by supporting shareholder proposals. The second essay investigates institutional investors' trading behavior of acquiring firm stocks surrounding merger activities. We label investment companies and independent investment advisors as active institutions and banks, nonbank trusts and insurance companies as passive institutions. We find active institutions increase holdings of acquiring firm stocks for mergers with higher wealth implications. However, active institutions overreact to stock mergers at the announcement, which they appear to correct at the resolution quarter of the merger. The trading behavior of passive institutions suggests that these institutions disregard the market response of merger announcement in trading acquiring firm stocks at the announcement quarter. The passive institutions gradually update their beliefs and trade on the basis of merger wealth effect at the resolution quarter. The third essay examines relation between executive compensation structure with the existing level and changes of takeover defense mechanisms of firms. According to "managerial entrenchment hypothesis," higher managerial power from adoption of takeover defense mechanisms would lead to generating higher rents for executives. "Efficient contracting hypothesis" argue that higher anti-takeover provisions would contribute in achieving efficient contracting by deferring compensation into the future due to the low possibility of hostile takeover. The results support managerial entrenchment hypothesis with regard to existing level of takeover defense mechanisms. With regard to changes in anti-takeover provisions, the existing level of managerial power influence the future pay structure.
Author: Narjess Boubakri
Publisher: Emerald Group Publishing
ISBN: 1780522436
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 402
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Book Description
Examines various issues concerning the strategies of institutional investors, the role of institutional investors in corporate governance, their impact on local and international capital markets, as well as the emergence of sovereign and other asset management funds and their interactions with micro and macro economic and market environments.
Author: Theodor Baums
Publisher: Walter de Gruyter
ISBN: 9783110136432
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 732
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Book Description
The volume contains 23 articles by international experts, both scholars and practioners dealing with the development of institutional investors (such as banks, insurances, investment companies, pension funds etc.), their investment and voting policies, the impact on managements of the companies concerned and related issues. The consequences of the international development on capital markets as well as policy implications for the respective national legislations are treated.
Author: Jian Huang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Financial institutions
Languages : en
Pages : 89
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