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Author: Ye-Na Park
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 157
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Author: Ye-Na Park
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 157
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Author: Alan David Krause
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Tax incidence
Languages : en
Pages : 194
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This research consists of independent essays in the areas of tax reform, optimal tax, and tax incidence, but the work also highlights the relationships between these distinct fields.
Author: Pulin Behari Nayak
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Taxation
Languages : en
Pages : 139
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Author: Catarina Luis Monteiro dos Reis
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 110
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This thesis studies the optimal income tax scheme in four different settings. Chapter 1 focuses on the implications of lack of commitment for the optimal labor and capital income tax rates. It finds that it is optimal to converge to zero capital income taxes and positive labor income taxes in the long run. The government will follow the optimal plan as long as its debt is low enough, which implies that the lack of commitment may lead to some asset accumulation in the short run. Chapter 2 determines the optimal tax schedule when education is endogenous and observable, in a setting where agents have heterogeneous abilities. It finds that, for each ability level, it is optimal to subsidize monetary educational costs at the same marginal rate at which income is being taxed. Chapter 3 finds that when entrepreneurial labor income cannot be observed separately from capital income, then it is optimal to have positive capital taxation in the long run. Chapter 4 finds that if human capital expenses are unobservable, then in the optimal plan human capital accumulation will be distorted in the long run.
Author: Florian Scheuer
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 144
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Author: Michael Gerald Smart
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 222
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Author: Mehrab Kiarsi
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ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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This dissertation consists of three essays on optimal fiscal and monetary policies. In the first two essays, I consider New Keynesian frameworks with frictional labor markets, money and distortionary income tax rates. In the first one, I study the joint determination of optimal fiscal and monetary policy and the role of worker's bargaining power on this determination. In the second one, I study the effects of worker's bargaining power on the welfare costs of three monetary policy rules, which are: inflation targeting and simple monetary rules that respond to output and labor market tightness, with and without interest-rate smoothing. In the third essay, I study the optimality of the Friedman rule in monetary economies where demand for money is motivated by firms, originated in a cash-in-advance constraint. In the first essay, I find that when the worker's bargaining power is low, the Ramsey-optimal policy calls for a significantly high optimal annual rate of inflation, in excess of 9.5%, that is also highly volatile, in excess of 7.4%. The Ramsey government uses inflation to induce efficient fluctuations in labor markets, despite the fact that changing prices is costly and despite the presence of time-varying labor taxes. The quantitative results clearly show that the planner relies more heavily on inflation, not taxes, in smoothing distortions in the economy over the business cycle. Indeed, there is a quite clear trade-off between the optimal inflation rate and its volatility and the optimal income tax rate and its variability. The smaller is the degree of price stickiness, the higher are the optimal inflation rate and inflation volatility and the lower are the optimal income tax rate and income tax volatility. For a ten times smaller degree of price stickiness, the optimal rate of inflation and its volatility rise remarkably, over 58% and 10%, respectively, and the optimal income tax rate and its volatility decline dramatically. These results are significant given that in the frictional labor market models without fiscal policy and money, or in the Walrasian-based New Keynesian frameworks with even a rich array of real and nominal rigidities and for even a miniscule degree of price stickiness, price stability appears to be the central goal of optimal monetary policy. Absent fiscal policy and money demand frictions, optimal rate of inflation falls to very near zero, with a volatility about 97 percent lesser, consistent with the literature. In the second essay, I show how the quantitative results imply that worker's bargaining weight and welfare costs of monetary rules are related negatively. That is, the lower the bargaining power of workers, the larger the welfare losses of monetary rules. However, in a sharp contrast to the literature, the rules that respond to output and labor market tightness feature considerably lower welfare costs than the inflation targeting rule. This is specifically the case for the rule that responds to labor market tightness. The welfare costs also remarkably decline by increasing the size of the output coefficient in the monetary rules. My findings indicate that by raising the worker's bargaining power to the Hosios level and higher, welfare losses of the three monetary rules drop significantly and response to output or market tightness does not, anymore, imply lower welfare costs than the inflation targeting rule, which is in line with the existing literature. In the third essay, I first show that the Friedman rule in a monetary model with a cash-in-advance constraint for firms is not optimal when the government to finance its expenditures has access to distortionary taxes on consumption. I then argue that, the Friedman rule in the presence of these distorting taxes is optimal if we assume a model with raw-efficient labors where only the raw labor is subject to the cash-in-advance constraint and the utility function is homothetic in two types of labor and separable in consumption. Once the production function exhibits constant-returns-to-scale, unlike the cash-credit goods model that the prices of both goods are the same, the Friedman is optimal even when wage rates are different. If the production function has decreasing or increasing-returns-to-scale, then to have the optimality of the Friedman rule, wage rates should be equal.
Author: David Domeij
Publisher:
ISBN: 9789171538277
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 113
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Author: Pulin B. Nayak
Publisher:
ISBN: 9788171690909
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 139
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Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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