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Author: Alexander Teytelboym
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 480
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Author: Alexander Teytelboym
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 480
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Author: Itay Perah Fainmesser
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 328
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This thesis consists of three essays on the theory of networks and its applications to markets. The first essay develops a new model for studying repeated games in buyer-seller networks, and explores the connection between network structure and cooperation. The second essay introduces new techniques to analyze the effect of Word-Of-Mouth (WOM) on cooperation in networked markets. The third essay studies how network structure affects the timing of hiring in networked markets. Consider a large market with asymmetric information, in which sellers choose whether to cooperate or deviate and 'cheat' their buyers, and buyers decide whether to re-purchase from different sellers. In the first chapter I model active trade relationships as links in a buyer-seller network and suggest a framework for studying repeated games in such networks. I derive conditions that determine whether a network is a Steady State Cooperation Network (SSCN)--a network that is consistent with trade and trust between every buyer and seller that are connected. In particular, three network features increase the incentives for cooperation: sparseness, moderate competition, and segregation.
Author: Hoda Heidari
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Rapid technological advances over the past few decades--in particular, the rise of the internet--has significantly reshaped and expanded the meaning of our everyday social activities, including our interactions with our social circle, the media, and our political and economic activities. This dissertation aims to tackle some of the unique societal challenges underlying the design of automated online platforms that interact with people and organizations--namely, those imposed by legal, ethical, and strategic considerations. I narrow down attention to fairness considerations, learning with repeated trials, and competition for market share. In each case, I investigate the broad issue in a particular context (i.e. online market), and present the solution my research offers to the problem in that application. Addressing interdisciplinary problems, such as the ones in this dissertation, requires drawing ideas and techniques from various disciplines, including theoretical computer science, microeconomics, and applied statistics. The research presented here utilizes a combination of theoretical and data analysis tools to shed light on some of the key challenges in designing algorithms for today's online markets, including crowdsourcing and labor markets, online advertising, and social networks among others.
Author: Akhilendra Vohra
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ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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This dissertation consists of three chapters in microeconomic theory, with a particular focus on market design and information economics. The papers develop and study applied theoretical models in order to: 1) Identify the unintended welfare effects of interventions in various markets and improve their design. 2) Understand how strategic actors take advantage of information revelation processes. The first chapter looks at the effect of wage caps on collective bargaining in the world of professional sports. Professional sports in the United States generate over 35 billion dollars yearly in revenue, which is divided between players and owners via collective bargaining. Given the stakes, some leagues instituted maximum contracts, limiting individual compensation to a percentage of team salary caps. Combining a model of a sports league with one of bargaining, I demonstrate that while these contracts limit salaries of star players, they can increase the welfare of all players. Maximum contracts reduce earning inequality and harmonize players' interests, improving collective bargaining power. The model highlights the welfare gains to be had if a heterogeneous group agrees to concessions that increase the alignment of their individual interests. My second chapter studies strategic targeting over networks. Persuaders, such as advertisers and political parties, expend vast resources targeting agents who amplify the persuaders' messages through their social network. Who should they target? To answer this, I develop a model of targeting on a network where agent beliefs evolve via a DeGroot process permitting persistence of initial beliefs. As a result, each agent is identified by their centrality and initial belief. Persuaders that want to steer the average belief of the agents in a particular direction take into account both features. Absent competition, a persuader trades-off an agent's centrality with the dissimilarity of her belief from that of the agent. With competition, a persuader considers the distribution of agents' interactions with its competitors. When competition is intense, the incentive to deter one's rival dominates. Equilibria where persuaders target those with similar beliefs arise, increasing polarization. This is in contrast to the canonical model where persuaders care only about the fraction of impressions they generate. In that case, targeting is based entirely on agent centrality. The final chapter of my dissertation examines the phenomenon of market unraveling. Labor markets are said to unravel if the matches between workers and firms occur inefficiently early, based on limited information. I argue that a significant determinant of unraveling is the transparency of the secondary market, where firms can poach workers employed by other firms. I propose a model of interviewing and hiring that allows firms to hire on the secondary market as well as at the entry-level. Unraveling arises as a strategic decision by low-tier firms to prevent poaching. While early matching reduces the probability of hiring a high type worker, it prevents rivals from learning about the worker, making poaching difficult. As a result, unraveling can occur even in labor markets without a shortage of talent. When secondary markets are very transparent, unraveling disappears. However, the resulting matching is still inefficient due to the incentives of low-tier firms to communicate that they have not hired top-quality workers. Coordinating the timing of hiring does not mitigate the inefficiencies because firms continue to act strategically to prevent poaching.
Author: Abhijit Sengupta (Ph. D.)
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Letting of contracts
Languages : en
Pages : 202
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Author: Fanqi Shi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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This dissertation demonstrates three works to understand how specific markets work and how we can devise the rules to improve market outcome. Chapter 1 studies a two-period matching model where one side of the market (e.g. workers) have an option to invest and delay matching in the first period. Chapter 2 explores the optimal ordering of heterogeneous items in sequential auctions with unit-demand buyers. Chapter 3 analyzes the optimal ``screening'' mechanism of products with network externalities.
Author: Nodir Adilov
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 316
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Author: Soomin Jung
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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This dissertation is on economics of networks. The first two chapters study what network sellers and buyers create when there exist gains of trade. The last chapter studies information diffusion on a given network. In the first two chapters, I study sellers and buyers who trade via bargaining. Agents can often increase their bargaining power by increasing the value of their outside options. They may seek to invest in costly relationships with potential trade partners. That is, they form an endogenous trade network and then bargain with their trade partners. I study a two-stage model in which sellers and buyers trade non-cooperatively on an endogenous trade network. In Chapter 1, sellers are assumed to have no capacity constraints. The main result of this chapter is that even though agents can increase their bargaining power by forming relationships with multiple trading partners, there exists an efficient subgame perfect equilibrium--that is, all the gains from trade are realized with the minimum costs and without a delay. Chapter 2 assumes that sellers are endowed with one unit of a good for a trade following the tradition of the bargaining literature. The capacity constraint increases the seller's bargaining power if there are many buyers who want to buy a good from each seller. This may give incentives to sellers to invest in superfluous links. Chapter 2 shows that the market can achieve efficiency even if sellers have the capacity constraint. In specific, a bilateral trading network is supported as an equilibrium network. Chapter 3 studies information diffusion on a fixed network through word-of-mouth. Word-of-mouth is an effective tool that a firm leverages to advertise the quality of its products to uninformed consumers. Such viral marketing, however, may fail if the consumers' "words" are not credible. Suppose that consumers are located on a given network and a firm "buys" one consumer and employs her as an implant to make recommendations of a product to her neighbors regardless of the actual quality of the good. I show that the viral marketing fails if the consumer network has a node with an excessively high degree of connection--for instance, a star network or a complete network--which undermines the credibility of the recommendation from an implant employed by a firm to promote a bad quality product. Also, if the viral marketing works, a good quality product is spread out over the network while a bad quality is driven out.
Author: Mariya Teteryatnikova
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics, Mathematical
Languages : en
Pages : 103
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Author: Juan Francisco Fung
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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