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Author: Alvin E. Roth
Publisher: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt
ISBN: 0544291131
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 275
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Book Description
A Nobel laureate reveals the often surprising rules that govern a vast array of activities -- both mundane and life-changing -- in which money may play little or no role. If you've ever sought a job or hired someone, applied to college or guided your child into a good kindergarten, asked someone out on a date or been asked out, you've participated in a kind of market. Most of the study of economics deals with commodity markets, where the price of a good connects sellers and buyers. But what about other kinds of "goods," like a spot in the Yale freshman class or a position at Google? This is the territory of matching markets, where "sellers" and "buyers" must choose each other, and price isn't the only factor determining who gets what. Alvin E. Roth is one of the world's leading experts on matching markets. He has even designed several of them, including the exchange that places medical students in residencies and the system that increases the number of kidney transplants by better matching donors to patients. In Who Gets What -- And Why, Roth reveals the matching markets hidden around us and shows how to recognize a good match and make smarter, more confident decisions.
Author: Alvin E. Roth
Publisher: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt
ISBN: 0544291131
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 275
Get Book Here
Book Description
A Nobel laureate reveals the often surprising rules that govern a vast array of activities -- both mundane and life-changing -- in which money may play little or no role. If you've ever sought a job or hired someone, applied to college or guided your child into a good kindergarten, asked someone out on a date or been asked out, you've participated in a kind of market. Most of the study of economics deals with commodity markets, where the price of a good connects sellers and buyers. But what about other kinds of "goods," like a spot in the Yale freshman class or a position at Google? This is the territory of matching markets, where "sellers" and "buyers" must choose each other, and price isn't the only factor determining who gets what. Alvin E. Roth is one of the world's leading experts on matching markets. He has even designed several of them, including the exchange that places medical students in residencies and the system that increases the number of kidney transplants by better matching donors to patients. In Who Gets What -- And Why, Roth reveals the matching markets hidden around us and shows how to recognize a good match and make smarter, more confident decisions.
Author: Michael Stops
Publisher: wbv Media GmbH & Company KG
ISBN: 3763941061
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 201
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Book Description
Die Fragen, wie der Arbeitsmarkt funktioniert und welchen Einfluss die Politik ausüben kann, sind Dauerbrenner in der gesellschaftlichen und politischen Debatte. Das hierzu nötige Wissen speist sich aus der Arbeitsmarktforschung, die häufig Impulse aus dem Alltagsgeschäft der Arbeitsmarktpolitik bekommt. Umgekehrt laden Fortschritte in der Methodenentwicklung und der Datenerschließung die Arbeitsmarktpolitik dazu ein, neue Fragen aufzuwerfen, die bisher nicht beantwortet werden konnten. Michael Stops greift solche Entwicklungen auf und fokussiert drei Themenbereiche: - Berufliche Mobilität und Effizienz des Arbeitsmarktausgleichs - Die Entwicklung der Effizienz des Arbeitsmarktausgleichs vor, während und nach den Jahren der deutschen Arbeitsmarktreformen 2003-2005 auf beruflichen Teilarbeitsmärkten - Die Wirkung des flächendeckenden Mindestlohns in Großbritannien auf die Beschäftigung 1999-2012
Author: Nimrod Megiddo
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 1461226481
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 209
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Book Description
This volume presents a collection of papers on game theory dedicated to Michael Maschler. Through his dedication and contributions to game theory, Maschler has become an important figure particularly in the area of cooperative games. Game theory has since become an important subject in operations research, economics and management science. As befits such a volume, the main themes covered are cooperative games, coalitions, repeated games, and a cost allocation games. All the contributions are authoritative surveys of a particular topic, so together they will present an invaluable overview of the field to all those working on game theory problems.
Author: Alvin E. Roth
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107782430
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 288
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Book Description
Two-sided matching provides a model of search processes such as those between firms and workers in labor markets or between buyers and sellers in auctions. This book gives a comprehensive account of recent results concerning the game-theoretic analysis of two-sided matching. The focus of the book is on the stability of outcomes, on the incentives that different rules of organization give to agents, and on the constraints that these incentives impose on the ways such markets can be organized. The results for this wide range of related models and matching situations help clarify which conclusions depend on particular modeling assumptions and market conditions, and which are robust over a wide range of conditions. 'This book chronicles one of the outstanding success stories of the theory of games, a story in which the authors have played a major role: the theory and practice of matching markets ... The authors are to be warmly congratulated for this fine piece of work, which is quite unique in the game-theoretic literature.' From the Foreword by Robert Aumann
Author: Eric Samuel Mayefsky
Publisher: Stanford University
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 106
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Book Description
I explore fundamental behavioral aspects of several market design environments in a variety of projects using both theoretical models and laboratory experiments. I show that human tendencies can drastically shift potential outcomes away from those which would result if individuals were fully 'rational' and unbiased in decision problems similar to those found frequently in the field. I explore two common classes of centralized matching mechanisms--Deferred Acceptance and Priority--which have wildly different success rates in practice despite both being open to manipulation by agents who have incomplete information about the other participants in the match. For this reason, theory predicts both mechanisms in equilibrium will yield match outcomes which are unstable, meaning some agents will desire to renegotiate with one another after receiving their match assignments, and thus reduce participants' confidence in using the match. I provide laboratory evidence that out-of-equilibrium truth telling by agents is substantially more frequent in the Deferred Acceptance environment and thus Deferred Acceptance matches will generally be more stable in practice than matches using a Priority mechanism. This may explain why Deferred Acceptance mechanisms appear to be more viable in the field. I also explore two different models of decentralized two-sided matching environments where establishing scarce signaling methods can improve market outcomes. In a laboratory experiment, I show that allowing potential receiving job offers to send a single signal to their favorite potential employer before job offers are made increases overall match rates in the market, but is potentially damaging to the firms making offers when compared to the market without such a signal. Then, in a theoretical model where pre-offer communication takes the form of an interview process where workers have natural limits on the number of interviews in which they can participate, I show that in many cases firms can benefit themselves and the market as a whole by voluntarily restricting the number of interviews they offer to participate in. While not traditionally thought of as market design problems, voting mechanisms are fundamentally goods allocation problems as well and have many of the same issues as traditional markets do. I explore the effects of voter bias on outcomes in an otherwise standard voting model and find that even slight external pressure on individuals in a committee tasked with coming to a collective decision can destroy the ability of that committee to arrive at the correct result, even when individuals have good information about the best decision to make. Furthermore, the quality of the decision made by such a committee can actually degrade as the committee size increases, in contrast with the canonical Condorcet Jury Theorem which predicts that a committee's ability to choose the right outcome increases quickly as more members are added.
Author: Peter A. Coles
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 242
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Book Description
Author: Israel M Kirzner
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1134915500
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 254
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Book Description
Israel Kirzner is the foremost proponent of the modern Austrian theory of the market process. This book offers substantive insights in support of this theory and a new historical interpretation of how the ideas of modern Austrians emerged.
Author: Dek Terrell
Publisher: Emerald Group Publishing
ISBN: 1789739594
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 427
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Book Description
Including contributions spanning a variety of theoretical and applied topics in econometrics, this volume of Advances in Econometrics is published in honour of Cheng Hsiao.
Author: Fei Li
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 170
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Book Description
Author: Lars Börner
Publisher:
ISBN: 9783941240438
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 54
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Book Description
