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Author: Pierre Chaigneau
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Academic theses
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Author: Pierre Chaigneau
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Academic theses
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Author: Vaibhav Sharma
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 120
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Executive compensation and its potential importance in aligning shareholder and management interests has been an extensively researched area within corporate finance. This thesis studys executive compensation while addressing several unresolved issues in the literature. Essay one examines CEO compensation following spin-offs. The second essay studys changes in CEO salaries and their relation to firm performance. Essay three examines managerial decision horizons for target and acquirer firms in mergers and acquisitions.
Author: Scott William O'Brien
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 84
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The two essays of my dissertation examine issues concerning CEO compensation. First, I examine the use of relative performance evaluation (RPE), asymmetry in pay for skill/luck, and compensation benchmarking for a sample of firms involved in a spinoff. The spinoff affects firm characteristics that influence the use of these compensation practices. I find that RPE is used for post-spinoff CEOs, but not pre-spinoff CEOs. This result is consistent with RPE being more prevalent as performance benchmark firms are easier to identify. Post-spinoff CEOs are also paid asymmetrically for luck where they are rewarded for good luck but not punished for bad luck. Both pre- and post- spinoff CEOs receive similar levels of compensation benchmarking. Second, I study the role of reference points in CEO compensation. Using two samples, I identify multiple reference points and link the reference points to the behavioral phenomena of prospect theory and anchoring-and-adjusting. In a sample of CEOs who move from one company to another (mover sample), I estimate the CEOs' expected gain or loss in compensation as a result of the move, but do not find the effects of the expected gain or loss to be consistent with prospect theory preferences. Also in the mover sample, I find evidence of anchoring-and-adjusting where the compensation of the incoming CEO's predecessor (anchor) affects the compensation of the incoming CEO. Lastly, I find evidence that fiscal year high and low prices act as reference points where drops from the fiscal year high price to the fiscal year end price result in larger decreases in compensation than increases in compensation from the fiscal year low price to the fiscal year end price, consistent with prospect theory.
Author: Min Jung Kang
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781267847461
Category : Bankers
Languages : en
Pages : 202
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Author: Wanrong Hou
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Chief executive officers
Languages : en
Pages : 312
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Author: Sooyoung Song
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 302
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Author: Andrew Fodor
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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The multi -period model presented in this paper has the advantage of considering aggregate performance over the tenure of the CEO. The key to this alternative compensation design is the holding back of some portion of CEO pay. That is to not pay the CEO the complete sum of pay justified by performance. This will allow the board to later penalize the CEO by not distributing previously held back pay. I present, and find support for, a number of hypotheses supporting the use of the holdback compensation policy.
Author: Ming Ju
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 126
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With the continued increase in executive compensation and the resulting increase in pay disparity between executives and rank-and-file employees, CEO compensation relative to the average worker pay underscores the popular apprehension related to equity vs. efficiency. This dissertation empirically examines the determinants and consequences of the CEO-worker pay ratio, and the association between acquisitions and CEO compensation. In the first chapter, I show that country-level factors such as national culture, matter in determining the CEO-worker pay ratio across countries. Using global firm-level data from 44 countries for 2002-2015, I show that the CEO-worker pay ratio is associated with national characteristics such as culture and societal equity orientation. Specifically, I find that the CEO-worker pay ratio is positively associated with power distance and masculinity of the national culture, and it is negatively associated with uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation. This pay ratio also reflects societal equity orientation, measured by income and wealth distribution proxies. This chapter contributes to the existing literature on executive compensation by documenting national culture as an important determinant of CEO-worker pay ratios globally. In the second chapter, I show that the relationship between firm value and the CEO-worker pay ratio exhibits an inverse-U shaped relation, which is consistent with elements of tournament theory, efficient contracting theory, rent extraction theory, and equity fairness theory. This is also consistent with there being an optimal pay ratio, or inflection point, beyond which increases in the pay ratio decrease firm value. I then show that the relationship between the pay ratio and firm performance differs systematically with regard to firm characteristics, i.e., in firms with a greater need for collaboration and information sharing, the optimal ratio is lower. In the final analysis, I show that pay disparity within the executive suite has little effect on firm value, rather it is the pay disparity between the named executive officers and the rank and file that drive my results. This chapter contributes to the existing literature by showing that the relationship between firm value and CEO-worker pay ratio is nonlinear. In the third chapter, I examine the effect of acquisitions, especially international acquisitions on CEO compensation, using firm-level panel data for 1995-2016, covering both international and domestic acquisitions by US firms. I find that acquisitions lead to higher CEO compensation, which can be explained by size premium, complexity premium, and opportunism. I also find that international acquisitions lead to higher CEO compensation than domestic acquisitions, which is consistent with the matching theory, as international acquisitions are larger and more complex to manage. This chapter provides direct empirical evidence on the effect of acquisitions on CEO compensation with a large database based on US firms. This chapter also adds to the literature on the comparison of international acquisition and domestic acquisition in terms of their impact on CEO compensation, which has been lacking in existing work. Overall, this dissertation advances our understanding on the determinants and consequences of the CEO-worker pay ratio, and adds insights to the literature on the implications of international acquisitions and managerial compensation.
Author: Dan Zhang
Publisher:
ISBN: 9789058923059
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 145
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Author: Long Chen
Publisher: ProQuest
ISBN: 9780549646396
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 158
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