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Author: Filipe Balmaceda
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Incentives in industry
Languages : en
Pages : 258
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Author: Filipe Balmaceda
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Incentives in industry
Languages : en
Pages : 258
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Author: Hojun Seo
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Electronic dissertations
Languages : en
Pages : 141
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This dissertation is comprised of three essays relating to empirical corporate disclosure and compensation contracting. The first essay examines peer effects in corporate disclosure decisions. I define peer effects as the average behavior of a group influencing an individual group members behavior. Using instrumental variable estimation to eliminate the effects of common shocks, I find that firms are more likely to make disclosures when more peer firms do so, and the marginal effect exceeds that of most firm-specific disclosure determinants studied in the prior literature. I corroborate the existence of peer effects by providing evidence that peer effects are absent when the disclosure is non-discretionary. In cross-sectional tests, I find that peer firm disclosure has a stronger impact on a firms disclosure decisions when the degree of strategic interactions between the firm and its industry peers is higher. I also provide evidence that industry followers respond to industry leaders disclosures but not vice versa. Finally, I examine capital-market effects and find that disclosure motivated by peers is associated with improved stock liquidity. Overall, this study highlights an important disclosure determinant and suggests that peer firm disclosure shapes the corporate information environment. The second essay empirically investigates the Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) hypothesis in CEO compensation contracts (co-authored with Sudarshan Jayaraman and Todd Milbourn). RPE theory predicts that firms filter out common performance while evaluating CEOs, and that the extent of filtering increases with the number of peers. We hypothesize that inaccurate classification of peers explains prior inconclusive evidence. Following Hoberg and Phillips (2015), we define peers based on 10-K product descriptions and find consistent evidence (i) firms on average filter out common performance, (ii) filtering increases with the number of peers, and (iii) firms completely filter out common performance in the presence of many peers. We conclude that a key identification strategy to testing RPE lies in accurately defining peers. Lastly, the third essay examines the characteristics of management earnings guidance issued right before the compensation committee meetings (co-authored with Xiumin Martin and Jun Yang). Corporate boards determine performance metric for CEOs annual incentive plans at compensation committee meetings at the beginning of a fiscal year. We find that management earnings guidance issued immediately before the meetings tends to be lower than the prevailing consensus analyst forecasts. This downward bias is only present when the performance metric is linked to earnings such as earnings-per-share (EPS). We do not observe downward bias when revenue serves as the performance metric. Also, pessimistic earnings guidance is more pronounced when the prevailing consensus analyst forecast is much more opportunistic. The downward bias is also greater when institutional ownership is more concentrated. Taken together, our findings suggest that managers have incentives to issue pessimistic earnings guidance before compensation committee meetings and that analyst earnings forecasts might serve as an anchor for the compensation committee to defend its choice of performance metric under shareholder pressures.
Author:
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ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Yuri Khoroshilov
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 372
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Author: Affan Hameed
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Feng Tang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Compensation management
Languages : en
Pages : 96
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Author: Ruslan Gurtoviy
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 246
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Author: Nicolas Tichy
Publisher: BoD – Books on Demand
ISBN: 3947095090
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 234
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Executive compensation has inspired controversial debate in both academia and the general public, and many voices criticize that executive compensation designs fail to deliver desired outcomes. Although much research has been devoted to understanding the antecedents and consequences of executive compensation design, important questions remain unanswered. This dissertation contributes to the field by exploring a previously neglected aspect: executive compensation complexity. Given the absence of an established measure of executive compensation complexity, there is an incomplete understanding of how complexity enters executive compensation contracts and what the consequences are for managers and corporations. The essays of this dissertation aim to narrow this gap. The first study presents a novel measure of executive compensation complexity, which is validated and utilized to examine the antecedents of executive compensation complexity. The second study explores the consequences of executive compensation complexity and finds that complexity impairs firm performance, regardless of the performance metric chosen (accounting-based, market-based, or ESG-based performance metrics). The third study explores the link between compensation design dispersion and executive turnover and reveals that executives with riskier compensation packages and fewer performance goals are more likely to move. The fourth study provides experimental evidence on the effect of CSR Fit dimensions and organizational reputation. Taken together, the essays of this dissertation make a significant and valuable contribution to the scholarly discourse on executive compensation. By shedding light on the complex nature of executive compensation and its implications for managers and corporations, this dissertation advances the current understanding of executive compensation and provides insights for policymakers, managers, and investors.
Author: Timothy Michael Keune
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 178
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Author: Young Ho Oh
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Agency (Law)
Languages : en
Pages : 264
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