Equilibrium Incentive Contracts PDF Download
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Author: Espen R. Moen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Incentives in industry
Languages : en
Pages : 36
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Book Description
Author: Espen R. Moen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Incentives in industry
Languages : en
Pages : 36
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Book Description
Author: Espen R. Moen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Author: Eitan Goldman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 39
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Book Description
This paper develops an agency model in which stock-based compensation is a double-edged sword, inducing managers to exert productive effort but also inducing managers to divert valuable firm resources to misrepresent performance. We examine how the potential for manipulation affects the equilibrium level of pay-for-performance sensitivity and derive several new cross sectional implications that are consistent with recent empirical studies. In addition, we analyze the impact of recent regulatory changes contained in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and show that in some cases policies intended to increase firm value by reducing misrepresentation may actually reduce firm value or increase the upward bias in manipulated disclosures.
Author: Jean-Jacques Laffont
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 1400829453
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 436
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Book Description
Economics has much to do with incentives--not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents. This book focuses on the principal-agent model, the "simple" situation where a principal, or company, delegates a task to a single agent through a contract--the essence of management and contract theory. How does the owner or manager of a firm align the objectives of its various members to maximize profits? Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors devote the bulk of their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability. Offering an unprecedented look at a subject vital to industrial organization, labor economics, and behavioral economics, this book is set to become the definitive resource for students, researchers, and others who might find themselves pondering what contracts, and the incentives they embody, are really all about.
Author: Federico Etro
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
We analyze competition between firms engaged in R&D activities and market competition to study the choice of the incentive contracts for managers with hidden productivity. Oligopolistic screening requires extra effort/investment from the most productive managers: under additional assumptions on the hazard rate of the distribution of types we obtain no distortion in the middle rather than at the top. The equilibrium contracts are characterized by effort differentials between (any) two types always increasing with the number of firms, suggesting a positive relation between competition and high-powered incentives. An inverted U curve between competition and absolute investments can emerge for the most productive managers.
Author: Bernard Salanie
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262534223
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 257
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Book Description
A concise introduction to the theory of contracts, emphasizing basic tools that allow the reader to understand the main theoretical models; revised and updated throughout for this edition. The theory of contracts grew out of the failure of the general equilibrium model to account for the strategic interactions among agents that arise from informational asymmetries. This popular text, revised and updated throughout for the second edition, serves as a concise and rigorous introduction to the theory of contracts for graduate students and professional economists. The book presents the main models of the theory of contracts, particularly the basic models of adverse selection, signaling, and moral hazard. It emphasizes the methods used to analyze the models, but also includes brief introductions to many of the applications in different fields of economics. The goal is to give readers the tools to understand the basic models and create their own. For the second edition, major changes have been made to chapter 3, on examples and extensions for the adverse selection model, which now includes more thorough discussions of multiprincipals, collusion, and multidimensional adverse selection, and to chapter 5, on moral hazard, with the limited liability model, career concerns, and common agency added to its topics. Two chapters have been completely rewritten: chapter 7, on the theory of incomplete contracts, and chapter 8, on the empirical literature in the theory of contracts. An appendix presents concepts of noncooperative game theory to supplement chapters 4 and 6. Exercises follow chapters 2 through 5. Praise for the previous edition: “The Economics of Contracts offers an excellent introduction to agency models. Written by one of the leading young researchers in contact theory, it is rigorous, clear, concise, and up-to-date. Researchers and students who want to learn about the economics of incentives will want to read this primer.”—Jean Tirole, Institut D'Économie Industrielle, Universite des Sciences Sociales, France “Students will find this a very useful introduction to the ideas of contract theory. Salanié has managed to summarize a large amount of material in a relatively short number of pages in a highly accessible and readable manner.”—Oliver Hart, Professor of Economics, Harvard University
Author: Jacques Paul Lawarrée
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 418
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Book Description
Author: T.V.S.Ramamohan Rao
Publisher: New Age International
ISBN: 9788122415056
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 370
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Book Description
Contracts Are A Major Organizational Arrangement To Conduct Transactions. Economic Theory Has Been Making Attempts To Come To Grips With Four Pertinent Issues. Why Is Contracting Superior To Imperfect Markets And Hierarchical Control In Decentralized Organizations? What Basic Institutional Mechanisms Should Be In Place To Ensure Efficiency Of Contracts? What Determines The Choice Of Contract Forms (In Particular, The Behavioral Responses Of Self-Interest Seeking To Reactions Of Others) And Contract Parameters?Can Contracts Provide A Better Alternative To Regulated Markets? Keeping Information Asymmetry And Asset Specificity As The Focal Points This Book Deals With The Following Mechanisms Of Exchange-Markets (Including Transfer Prices), Contingent Claims Contracts, Incomplete And Incentive Contracts, And Implicit Contracts.The Emphasis Is On The Efficient Structuring Of Such Contracts And The Choice Of Suitable Contract Parameters. One Chapter Is Also Devoted To Trust And Informal Dimensions Of Contracts Since It Is Recognized That Defining And Enforcing Formal Contracts Becomes Difficult As Information Asymmetry And Asset Specificity Reach Their Limits. The Level Of Algebraic Complexity In The Derivations Is Kept To A Minimum To Make The Book Accessible To A Wide Audience.
Author: Inés Macho-Stadler
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 9780199243259
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : es
Pages : 308
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Book Description
In this revised second edition, An Introduction to the Economics of Information covers the consequences for the character and efficiency of the interaction between individuals and organizations when one party has more or better information on some aspect of the relationship. This is the condition of asymmetric information, under which the information gap will be exploited if, by doing so, the better-informed party can achieve some advantage. The book is written for a one-semester course for advanced undergraduates taking specialized course options, and for first-year postgraduate students of economics or business. After an introduction to the subject and the presentation of a benchmark model in which both parties share the same information throughout the relationship, chapters are devoted to the three main asymmetric information topics of Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection, and Signalling. The wide range of economic situations where the conclusions are applied includes such areas as finance, regulation, insurance, labour economics, health economics, and even politics. Each chapter presents the basic theory before moving on to applications and advanced topics. The problems are presented in the same framework throughout to allow easy comparison of the different results. This new edition incorporates extended exercises to test the student's understanding of the material, and to develop the tools and skills provided by the main text to solve other, original problems.
Author: Benoit Julien
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 40
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Book Description
Principals seek to trade with agents by posting incentive contracts in a search environment. A contract solves the ex ante search problem, and adverse selection and moral hazard ex post. We fully characterise the equilibrium for quasi linear preferences, and derive some comparative statics. If using appropriate transfers the equilibrium allocation is constrained welfare optimal, in contrast to the one-to-one principal-agent problem. Search frictions thus correct that inefficiency because searching requires internalizing the utility of agents. Incentives are weaker than in bilateral contracting, and agents enjoy more efficient risk sharing. With a constraint on transfers search and moral hazard interact and may induce an inefficient allocation; principal competition results in over-insurance of the agents and too little effort in equilibrium.
