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Author: Larry Samuelson
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262692199
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 332
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Book Description
The author examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games. Evolutionary game theory is one of the most active and rapidly growing areas of research in economics. Unlike traditional game theory models, which assume that all players are fully rational and have complete knowledge of details of the game, evolutionary models assume that people choose their strategies through a trial-and-error learning process in which they gradually discover that some strategies work better than others. In games that are repeated many times, low-payoff strategies tend to be weeded out, and an equilibrium may emerge. Larry Samuelson has been one of the main contributors to the evolutionary game theory literature. In Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection, he examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games. After providing an overview of the basic issues of game theory and a presentation of the basic models, the book addresses evolutionary stability, the dynamics of sample paths, the ultimatum game, drift, noise, backward and forward induction, and strict Nash equilibria.
Author: Larry Samuelson
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262692199
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 332
Get Book Here
Book Description
The author examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games. Evolutionary game theory is one of the most active and rapidly growing areas of research in economics. Unlike traditional game theory models, which assume that all players are fully rational and have complete knowledge of details of the game, evolutionary models assume that people choose their strategies through a trial-and-error learning process in which they gradually discover that some strategies work better than others. In games that are repeated many times, low-payoff strategies tend to be weeded out, and an equilibrium may emerge. Larry Samuelson has been one of the main contributors to the evolutionary game theory literature. In Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection, he examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games. After providing an overview of the basic issues of game theory and a presentation of the basic models, the book addresses evolutionary stability, the dynamics of sample paths, the ultimatum game, drift, noise, backward and forward induction, and strict Nash equilibria.
Author: Stephen Jay GOULD
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 0674037847
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 408
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Book Description
In 1972 Stephen Jay Gould took the scientific world by storm with his paper on punctuated equilibrium. Challenging a core assumption of Darwin's theory of evolution, it launched the controversial idea that the majority of species originates in geological moments (punctuations) and persists in stasis. Now, thirty-five years later, Punctuated Equilibrium offers his only book-length testament on a theory he fiercely promoted, repeatedly refined, and tirelessly defended.
Author: Stephen Jay Gould
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 0674417925
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 1460
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Book Description
The world’s most revered and eloquent interpreter of evolutionary ideas offers here a work of explanatory force unprecedented in our time—a landmark publication, both for its historical sweep and for its scientific vision. With characteristic attention to detail, Stephen Jay Gould first describes the content and discusses the history and origins of the three core commitments of classical Darwinism: that natural selection works on organisms, not genes or species; that it is almost exclusively the mechanism of adaptive evolutionary change; and that these changes are incremental, not drastic. Next, he examines the three critiques that currently challenge this classic Darwinian edifice: that selection operates on multiple levels, from the gene to the group; that evolution proceeds by a variety of mechanisms, not just natural selection; and that causes operating at broader scales, including catastrophes, have figured prominently in the course of evolution. Then, in a stunning tour de force that will likely stimulate discussion and debate for decades, Gould proposes his own system for integrating these classical commitments and contemporary critiques into a new structure of evolutionary thought. In 2001 the Library of Congress named Stephen Jay Gould one of America’s eighty-three Living Legends—people who embody the “quintessentially American ideal of individual creativity, conviction, dedication, and exuberance.” Each of these qualities finds full expression in this peerless work, the likes of which the scientific world has not seen—and may not see again—for well over a century.
Author: Albert Somit
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 344
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Book Description
Author: Brian J. Loasby
Publisher: Manchester University Press
ISBN: 9780719034886
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 136
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Book Description
This work, based upon the two Manchester Special Lectures given by the author in 1989-90, and focusing on the central economic issues of co-ordination and change, treats these as problems of equilibrium in the case of co-ordination and as problems of evolution in the case of change.
Author: Lane P. Lester
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780945241065
Category : Creationism
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Author: Susy Frankel
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 110706256X
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 341
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Book Description
Examines how copyright can evolve without compromising the interests of authors, users and those who connect them.
Author: Niles Eldredge
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 1400860296
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 241
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Book Description
Scientists have recently begun to question one of the pillars of modern thought--Charles Darwin's theory of evolution. Certainly evolution occurs; but if it is a slow, continuous process by which one species gradually modifies itself into a new one, as Darwin believed, why are there so many missing links in the fossil records? Two eminent scientists, Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould, startled the world by challenging Darwin's cherished beliefs proposing instead that once a species has evolved it rarely undergoes change, and that the evolution of new species occurs only periodically, in relatively rapid spurts. In Time Frames Niles Eldredge explains how his own work with trilobite fossils led him to this unexpected conclusion, and describes the fascinating development of the new theory of punctuated equilibria. Originally published in 1989. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
Author: William H. Sandholm
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 44
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Book Description
Author: Reinhard Selten
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3662026740
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 338
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Book Description
There are two main approaches towards the phenotypic analysis of frequency dependent natural selection. First, there is the approach of evolutionary game theory, which was introduced in 1973 by John Maynard Smith and George R. Price. In this theory, the dynamical process of natural selection is not modeled explicitly. Instead, the selective forces acting within a population are represented by a fitness function, which is then analysed according to the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy or ESS. Later on, the static approach of evolutionary game theory has been complemented by a dynamic stability analysis of the replicator equations. Introduced by Peter D. Taylor and Leo B. Jonker in 1978, these equations specify a class of dynamical systems, which provide a simple dynamic description of a selection process. Usually, the investigation of the replicator dynamics centers around a stability analysis of their stationary solutions. Although evolutionary stability and dynamic stability both intend to characterize the long-term outcome of frequency dependent selection, these concepts differ considerably in the 'philosophies' on which they are based. It is therefore not too surprising that they often lead to quite different evolutionary predictions (see, e. g. , Weissing 1983). The present paper intends to illustrate the incongruities between the two approaches towards a phenotypic theory of natural selection. A detailed game theoretical and dynamical analysis is given for a generic class of evolutionary normal form games.
