Elements of Operational Design in the Planning for the Marianas Campaign in 1944 PDF Download
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Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 60
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Book Description
Operational art and the operational level of war became a doctrinal focus for the U.S. Army in the 1980s. This focus led to the development of the elements of operational design. These concepts are not new; they were developed during the interwar period prior to World War II at U.S. military staff and war colleges. During this time, however, the military did not recognize the operational level of war or operational art in its doctrine. Even though the concepts were not recognized, the intellectual process permeated the officer education system prior to World War II. Clearly, American officers used operational art during World War II. This monograph examines the extent to which planners within CENPAC used the elements of operational design in the Marianas Campaign, including end-state and objectives, effects, center(s) of gravity, decisive points, direct and indirect action, lines of operation, operational reach, simultaneity and depth, timing and tempo, leverage, balance, anticipation, culmination, and arranging operations. The implications of the study are that as current doctrine evolves, the development, education, and execution of operational concepts used during World War II continue to be useful.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 60
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Book Description
Operational art and the operational level of war became a doctrinal focus for the U.S. Army in the 1980s. This focus led to the development of the elements of operational design. These concepts are not new; they were developed during the interwar period prior to World War II at U.S. military staff and war colleges. During this time, however, the military did not recognize the operational level of war or operational art in its doctrine. Even though the concepts were not recognized, the intellectual process permeated the officer education system prior to World War II. Clearly, American officers used operational art during World War II. This monograph examines the extent to which planners within CENPAC used the elements of operational design in the Marianas Campaign, including end-state and objectives, effects, center(s) of gravity, decisive points, direct and indirect action, lines of operation, operational reach, simultaneity and depth, timing and tempo, leverage, balance, anticipation, culmination, and arranging operations. The implications of the study are that as current doctrine evolves, the development, education, and execution of operational concepts used during World War II continue to be useful.
Author: Major Chas. J. Smith
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1786253615
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 85
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Book Description
Operational art and the operational level of war became a doctrinal focus for the U.S. Army in the 1980s. This focus led to the development of the elements of operational design. These concepts are not new, and were developed in the interwar period prior to World War II at the staff and war colleges. During this time, however, the military did not doctrinally recognize the operational level or war or operational art. Even though the concepts were not recognized, the intellectual process permeated the officer education system prior to World War II. Clearly, American officers in World War II used something of operational art, including in the planning and execution of the Marianas Campaign. This monograph looks at the question in more detail, by testing the extent to which planners within CENPAC used the elements of operational design in the Marianas Campaign, including end state and objectives, effects, center(s) of gravity, decisive points, direct and indirect action, lines of operation, operational reach, simultaneity and depth, timing and tempo, leverage, balance, anticipation, culmination, and arranging operations. The implication of this study is that as current doctrine evolves, the development, education, and execution of operational concepts in the World War II era continue to be useful.
Author: Andrew Del Gaudio
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
There is much written history for the military professional to read, but little is of value to his education. While many works are often wonderful reading, they are too broad or narrow in scope, often lacking the context to be used for serious study by professional soldiers. This work was written with two audiences in mind; my colleagues in the academic world, along with my many comrades who are professional soldiers. The present work was originally conceived as a contribution to historical literature on the subject of military education. More specifically, it was to be an exploration of the concept of operational art and the manner in which planning was doctrinally conducted to articulate battle on the Eastern Front in the Second World War. Any study of war devoid of the theory and doctrine of the period would be of little use to academics and military professionals alike. By the same token, it is often necessary for an author to relate the unfamiliar feelings of combat to a reader in order to give the perspective needed to understand war. Military professionals should study history to become better decision makers. Peter Paret best explained the role of history in relation to military professionals or historians when he said, "By opening up the past for us, history added to the fund of knowledge that we can acquire directly and also made possible universal concepts and generalizations across time. To enable history to do this, the historian must be objective or as Clausewitz would have said- "as scientific or philosophical as possible." Decision making must be looked at through the lens of what Clausewitz called "critical analysis." Clausewitz sought to answer the question of "why" something happened in terms of cause and effect. A decisions being examined can only be understood if we know something of the character of the man who made it. These thoughts together provide the foundation on which greater understanding of the art and science of war is built, thus giving the military professional the tools to deconstruct a decision in terms of the problem historically in time and space. This facilitates a greater appreciation and understanding of his trade. The "reenacting process" allows scholars and professional soldiers to reconstruct problems in terms of the terrain and material used during the period; giving a clearer view into the heart of the problem. As students of the art and science of war, we must make every effort to morally, mentally and physically put ourselves in a position to understand why leaders made the decisions they did. While the sheer terror of combat can never be properly replicated, our studies must find a way to understand them. The English language, or any language for that matter has a poor ability to explain in words, written or spoken, the horror of war. War is not just the extension of policy by other means, it is a societal interaction where human beings struggle within the phenomenon called war. We must understand war to be a human activity, thus a social affair. Grasping human emotions, we see events capable of motivating or terrifying combatants in the lonely hours with the extreme violence typical of combat. In this light, we correctly educate ourselves about the true nature of war. War studied at the strategic, operational or tactical-levels should always consider decisions made, particularly in terms of their moral, mental and physical properties. Common elements to the offense or defense are the weather and terrain being fought on. While the weather will ultimately affect each differently, weather has the ability to complicate terrain in ways man to this day cannot conquer. The following pages reflect a military professional's understanding of the events at Leningrad, Narva and Sinimäed from 68 years ago. Understanding of these events was achieved through German plan for Operation BLAU. An examination of this and other operational-level documents has yielded a tremendous understanding of how the Germans envisioned the retrograde of their forces into the Baltic states. It brings the author joy to know this work can be used to explain the monumental events and sacrifices of others. To this end, I have made my finest attempt.
Author: School of Advanced Military Studies
Publisher: CreateSpace
ISBN: 9781511734011
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 58
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Book Description
This study examines the main effort concept to determine if it is a necessary element for the design of a campaign plan. Current joint operational doctrine fails to address the main effort concept. This study examines service tactical doctrine, service operational doctrine, theory, and contemporary writers to articulate an operational main effort concept. The main effort concept and ends, ways and means variables are then used to analyze four campaigns: Germany's successful 1940 campaign to conquer France; Germany's unsuccessful 1942 campaign on the Russian Southern Front; Japan's unsuccessful 1942 naval campaign against Midway and Germany's unsuccessful 1940 air campaign against Great Britain. The element of proof in judging the need for the main effort concept in campaign planning was based on the concept's role in the success or failure in the above campaigns. This study concludes that a need for a main effort concept is supported by military theorists and current U.S. Army and Marine Corps operational doctrine. The main effort concept proved instrumental to the German's successful invasion of France in 1940. Improper application of the main effort concept by campaign planners contributed to the unsuccessful results of the remaining three campaigns. The main effort concept proved applicable to air and sea campaigns as well as land campaigns.
Author: John C. Krysa
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Combined operations (Military science)
Languages : en
Pages : 43
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Book Description
Author: John C. Chapin
Publisher: DigiCat
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 145
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Book Description
"Breaching the Marianas" by John C. Chapin is a book about the WWII campaigns and Marine Corps history. The book gives a detailed account of what happened on the Mariana Islands of Saipan during the war. Excerpt: "Breaching the Marianas: The Battle for Saipan by Captain John C. Chapin, USMCR (Ret) It was a brutal day. At first light on 15 June 1944, the Navy fire support ships of the task force lying off Saipan Island increased their previous days' preparatory fires involving all calibers of weapons. At 0542, Vice Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner ordered, "Land the landing force." Around 0700, the landing ships, tank (LSTs) moved to within approximately 1,250 yards behind the line of departure. Troops in the LSTs began debarking from them in landing vehicles, tracked (LVTs). Control vessels containing Navy and Marine personnel with their radio gear took their positions displaying flags indicating which beach approaches they controlled."
Author: John C. Krysa
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Combined operations (Military science)
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
This monograph examines the planning and preparations for the cross- channel invasion of France by joint and combined forces. It illustrates the dependence of operational maneuver upon operational logistics considerations in a campaign of considerable complexity and uncertainty. Operational art involves the application of military force to achieve strategic goals. The application of force requires deliberate planning and organizing units for sequenced action in campaigns or major operations. This monograph examines the operational planning for the Normandy Campaign to execute the cross-channel invasion of France and the conduct of operations once across the assault beaches. Of particular note is the significant role played by logistics at the operational level, especially as a major determinant of maneuver. Keywords: Operational planning, Maneuver, Logistics, Operational sustainment, Campaign plan, Normandy invasion.
Author: Milan Vego
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1135988706
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 287
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Book Description
This new volume provides a comprehensive analysis of both the theory and practice of operational warfare at sea. The book is unique in using diverse sources and examples to present a comprehensive topical description and analysis of the key components of operational warfare at sea today. It opens with a survey of the emergence of operational warfare at sea since the end of the Napoleonic Wars, going on describe and analyze the objectives of naval warfare at the operational level and methods of employment of naval forces for accomplishing these objectives. The book explains the specifics of operational functions in a maritime theatre, discusses the personality traits and professional education required for successful naval operational commanders, and explores naval operational command and control in both peacetime and war, closing with predictions for the future of operational warfare at sea. This book serves as a primer of how to plan, prepare and execute major naval operations and campaigns for naval commanders and their staffs, but will also be of interest to advanced students of naval history, strategic studies and military history in general.
Author: Neil B. Friedli
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Aleutian Islands (Alaska)
Languages : en
Pages : 32
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Book Description
Author: Frank O. Hough
Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
ISBN: 9781536919066
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 228
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Book Description
The Assault on Peleliu, first published in 1950, is a detailed recounting of the U.S. Marines' fierce battle for Peleliu, part of the Palau Islands in the south Pacific. Facing approx. 11,000 hardened, entrenched Japanese troops, the 1st Marine Division began landing operations on September 15, 1944. What followed were more than two months of bloody fighting resulting in heavy casualties before the island was declared secure in late November. Included are more than 90 photographs and maps.
